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Summary
Mobile apps feed on variety of users’ information to provide great services. Some
of the features require more sensitive details such as contact list to connect with
friends or a precise location to find a desired restaurant nearby. Handling per-
sonal information is vital because the user would expect them to be processed in
an appropriate manner. However, research has proven that some third-party apps
accidentally or maliciously leak users’ personal details. Thus, researchers made
huge effort to come up with tools that detect leakage attempts. In this thesis, we
targeted several gaps to improve user experience with mobile privacy leakage prob-
lem. Initially, we designed a system that evaluates mobile privacy protection tools.
This system can be useful for developers to assess their tools, and users to evaluate
offered solutions. 165 selected Android privacy protection apps have been tested
using our system, and it was established that the most effective approach of mobile
privacy protection requires modification on mobile operating system level in order
to capture explicit and implicit leakages. That requirement makes it difficult to
find “off-the-shelve” protection tool. Therefore, it was decided to assist the user
in selecting safe apps as a precaution step before problems occur. To achieve that,
it is important to understand how mobile users form their decision when selecting
apps. 1,100 crowdsourcing participants have been recruited to study their perceived
trust of subjective and objective ratings of mobile apps’ privacy. This experiment
guided us to design new interfaces that could assist decision making towards more
privacy-friendly mobile apps, which was our most recent work. A newly designed
interface, which communicates objective privacy ratings to the user, has been pro-
posed. We have also conducted several user-studies involving 300 participants to
evaluate our proposed app’s efficiency, the result ultimately showed that users were
more motivated to engage in privacy-related decisions.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Mobile devices ownership has increased rapidly over the recent years. The wide
range of mobile devices’ possession has been accompanied by the rise of Google
Play and App Store. According to Statista, the statistics portal [8], Android users
can select from more than 3.8 million apps while iOS users are offered around 2
million apps, as of the first quarter in 2018. Mobile users can enjoy a variety of
apps, which provide useful services and features by making use of smart devices’
capabilities. The existence of mobile apps in devices is vital for better mobile device
experience. Clearly, users increasingly rely on mobile devices and apps. Mobile
apps today are growingly more advanced, powerful, life-engaging and sometimes
more privacy-intrusive.
Undoubtedly, advance in mobile technologies opens the door for new privacy
issues. As mobile apps are getting more and more popular among users, the privacy
of them also becomes more and more a concern. In some cases, malicious identities
may exploit users’ data to steal or uncover personal information about them for
illegal purposes. For instance, it was reported that some apps used stolen personal
details and secretively made calls and sent text messages, which caused financial
losses to victims [9]. Moreover, data can be used by companies to identify personal
information about users without their consent which violates the law, not to forget
these incidents where big companies, such as Facebook and Snapchat, had security
breaches in the past [10,11]. Such security incidents could endanger users’ sensitive
data. In order to detect privacy intrusive apps, mobile app stores and security soft-
ware vendors have made some good efforts to develop and deploy different solutions
(e.g., the permission granting mechanism of the Android OS), but comparing with
security products there are relatively less advanced tools for privacy protection.
Therefore, the ball is often in the user’s court to make the right decision to identify
and not to use privacy intrusive apps.
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To provide users with better privacy while using their mobile devices, the re-
search community has proposed many solutions to overcome privacy obstacles.
Many protection mechanisms and detective approaches have been presented to
prevent mobile privacy leakages. For detective techniques the main purpose is to
identify potential privacy violations as they occur and respond with corrective sug-
gestions while preventive methods try to stop violating privacy at first place. One
basic technical approach followed by many privacy leakage detection tools is to spot
unauthorised or suspicious flows between sensitive information sources and sinks,
where a ‘sink’ is an interface allows information to go out of the mobile device [5].
Nevertheless, many of these tools use a limited and static list of information sources
leaving other sources exposed to leakages [12]. Also, there is some limited work on
automatic discovery of sources. In addition, almost all mobile privacy leakage detec-
tion tools simply produce a notification for every detected leakage and leave further
actions to end users who often feel annoyed or confused on how to respond [13].
For the stated concerns, a necessity of providing a way to evaluate current pro-
vided solutions is identified. Therefore, 1) a benchmarking system is needed. Such
system could help in evaluating available privacy protection tools to help developers
as well as users. Moreover, 2) The human perception of different app ratings need
to be studied. That will help to understand how users form their decisions, and
therefore 3) come out with best approaches to engage users more in privacy-related
decisions. In this PhD work, the focus is to fill the gap of the above-mentioned pos-
sible directions from both technical and psychological sides. There are many mo-
tivations for that. One of them is that mobile devices ownership has been rapidly
increasing [14], and malicious apps running on these devices pose risks to users’
privacy. Besides, many of the currently provided solutions for detection analysis
heavily target the technical side, and we see several possibilities of improving user
experience with mobile privacy protection.
1.2 Objectives and Hypotheses
The main aim of this work is to find better solutions for mobile privacy leakage
problem from technical side, which will eventually help users make more privacy-
aware decisions. The more detailed technical objectives are listed below.
• To design, develop and test a benchmarking system that analyses mobile pri-
vacy detection and protection tools, which will help developers evaluate pri-
vacy protection solutions and help inform users about the performance of
different solutions. Previous efforts are about benchmarking privacy risks of
normal apps rather than privacy protection apps, and only few focus on static
analysis problems.
• To achieve a better understanding of human perception and behaviours in
mobile privacy, focusing on the role of apps privacy ratings to see how they
are perceived by human users to make decisions on their app choices.
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Figure 1.1: The stages of this PhD study
The expectation is users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective ratings
of apps privacy will depend on several factors. Some can be linked directly
to human factors such as experience and characteristics, or to non-human
factors such as the app category, and the type of feedback given (subjec-
tive/objective).
• To design, implement and test a new user interface that can potentially im-
prove user engagement in privacy-related decisions on installation of apps on
their mobile devices. We believe if mobile users are reminded of apps’ privacy
level, it will help them to use more privacy-friendly apps.
However, that does not match the initial planning of this PhD work. Figure 1.1
roughly explains the stages of this PhD study. At early stages, the aim was to
conduct the benchmarking experiment first (Step 1 at the Fig. 1.1) in order to
identify research gaps on privacy protection tools. That step was accomplished.
Yet, after testing many tools using PPAndroid-Benchmarker it turned out that
the targeted improvements require some resources, technical expertise and time
which are seen to be outside this work scope. Hence, the route was altered towards
improving the user experience. At step 2, user perception of different app ratings
was investigated to gain a better understanding of users’ behaviours about privacy
ratings of mobile apps. Then, a design interface was proposed to enhance users’
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privacy awareness and decision making on their mobile devices. The third work
of this PhD was about that proposed design which was implemented in PAltRoid
experiment (step 3 of the diagram).
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis to the research community is summarised as
follows:
• PPAndroid-Benchmarker has been developed for benchmarking the perfor-
mance of mobile privacy protection apps for the Android platform (Chapter 3).
The study involved testing on 165 privacy protection apps belonging to three
different functional categories to demonstrate PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s ef-
fectiveness in evaluating these tested tools. The results showed that real-time
dynamic monitoring tools perform better as they work on the underlying op-
erating system level.
• To understand the perception of behaviours of users on mobile privacy bet-
ter, an empirical study was designed and conducted on users’ perceived trust
of subjective and objective ratings of mobile apps (Chapter 4). The study
involved over 1,000 crowdsourcing participants and gives a conclusion that
users’ perception of trust is influenced by several factors, such as context,
personal characteristics and some others.
• A new user interface was designed and developed to enhance user awareness
and assist decision making towards more privacy-friendly mobile apps. PAl-
tRoid was designed for that and tested with some user studies reported in
Chapter 5, which showed the positive impact of the presented system on par-
ticipants’ privacy-related decisions on installation and uninstallation of mobile
apps. PAltRoid has successfully motivated approximately 29% of participants
to uninstall/substitute low privacy scoring apps when alternatives are offered,
and 13% of the users when no alternatives are offered.
Moreover, A literature review has been presented to obtain a comprehensive under-
standing of the current issues on mobile privacy and research efforts towards solving
these issues (Chapter 2).
1.4 Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the research literature on mobile privacy detection and preven-
tion. It starts with highlighting privacy in general. Then, it shows some scenarios
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and solutions for user privacy on computers. After that, it goes deeper to mobile
devices specific privacy problems and solutions. Next, it focuses on the Android
platform (the most studied mobile platforms for mobile privacy research), and fin-
ishes with presenting related work from the research literature.
Chapter 3 introduces PPAndroid-Benchmarker, a mobile privacy benchmarking
system. This chapter starts by reviewing related work. Then, it shows the detailed
design and architecture of this system, followed by the implementation of analysing
a large number of mobile privacy protection and prevention tools developed by both
the research community and the industry.
Chapter 4 focuses on a crowdsourcing based user study regarding human users’
perceived trust on subjective and objective ratings on privacy-friendliness of mobile
apps. This chapter starts with an introduction followed by the related work. Then,
it describes how the user study was designed and conducted, followed by the de-
tailed data analysis. The last section concludes the entire work and demonstrates
directions of future work.
Chapter 5 presents PAltRoid, a new system to engage users in privacy-related
decisions in the context of privacy ratings of mobile apps on the Android platform.
The chapter starts by a small introduction followed by related work. Then, the
detailed design, experimental studies, and a discussion on PAltRoid are presented.
Finally, the chapter closes with the conclusion and future work.
Chapter 6 summarises the whole thesis and draws our future work.
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Literature Review
2.1 Privacy: Overview
The general understanding of privacy among people is the state where their own
space is not invaded by others or not being disturbed or observed in any sense.
Authors in the research have presented many definition of privacy. Clarke et al. [15]
have precisely defined privacy as the interest that individual have in sustaining a
‘personal space’, free from interference by other people and organizations. Further-
more, they divided privacy into four dimensions, bodily privacy, personal behaviour,
personal communication and personal data. While Westin [16] explained privacy as
the claim of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others. According to Langheinrich et
al. [17], privacy has different goals in different contexts, that means it is difficult to
have a standard definition for privacy in a specific technology like computers or mo-
biles. However, some researchers came out with their own way of defining it which
helps to understand. Montjoye et al. [18] described privacy as the guarantee that
participants maintain control over the release of sensitive information that relates
to them. That leads to know any sensor readings and user interaction with devices
should be both protected. Another definition by Lucas et al. [19] is that privacy
can be achieved when personal data are not accessed without informed consent,
individuals control their personal data and have freedom from judgement by oth-
ers. Another common definition offered by AICPA and CICA in GAPP 1 standard,
which is “the rights and obligations of individuals and organisations with respect
to the collection, use, retention, and disclosure of personal information” [20].
There are several reasons that justify why privacy is significant. From a psy-
chological aspect, individuals need to have their own private space. This must
be applied in private and public. Sociologically, everybody is free to behave, free
1(AICPA) American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, (CICA) Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants, (GAPP) Generally Accepted Privacy Principles
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to socialise with others, subject to social customs, but without being threaten by
surveillance, whereas economically, individuals must be free to innovate. Further-
more, from a political view, individuals need to be independent in their thoughts,
arguments and actions. Being observed threatens democracy, and spoils speech and
conduct [21].
Privacy protection can be described as the process of finding appropriate bal-
ances between privacy and multiple competing interests. Interests include any con-
flicting interest of another person, a group of people, organisation or even individ-
ual’s interests that might conflict with each other [21].
2.1.1 Privacy vs. Security
Privacy is very complicated as it overlaps with other practices and features such
as information security. In this part, the overlap between security and privacy
will be explained. Then, some terminologies that relate to privacy are going to
be presented from ISO27000 [22]. Finally, the principle of security by design and
privacy by design will be demonstrated.
Following the provided definitions of privacy in this thesis, it is possible to say
that protection of privacy is only applicable to any personally identifiable informa-
tion, whilst information security purpose is to protect information confidentiality,
integrity, availability, authenticity and reliability, as ISO 27000 defines it. It leads
to know that security applies to personal and non-personal data as well. How-
ever, some could argue that confidentiality, which is a component of security, is the
same as privacy. That can be true in case of the information we want to protect is
personal. Even so, confidentiality element covers both types of information.
Based on ISO definition of information security, the generally accepted elements
of it are; confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorisation, relia-
bility and accountability. Where the commonly acknowledged elements for infor-
mation privacy can be taken from Fair Information Practices (FIPs), which set out
by OECD [1]. These elements are:
1. Collection limitation
2. Data quality
3. Purpose specification
4. Use limitation
5. Security safeguards
6. Openness
7. Individual participation
8. Accountability
2.1. PRIVACY: OVERVIEW 9
A joint report by the Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario and De-
loitte and Touche (Canada) [1], stated that it is obvious when drawing privacy
and security elements that some of privacy elements can be addressed by security
controls, while others cannot. Sometimes security safeguards weaken privacy pro-
tection. Likewise, privacy measures could hinder security measures. Figure 2.1
shows where security and privacy can meet.
Figure 2.1: Overlaps between security and privacy [1]
Anonymity
It ensures that a user may use a resource or service without disclosing user’s identity.
The requirements for anonymity provide protection of user identity. Anonymity is
not intended to protect the subject identity.
Unlinkability
It ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or services without others
being able to link these uses together. That protects individuals from being profiled
by knowing their habits and interests.
Traceability
The ability to verify the history, location, or application of an item by means of
documented recorded identification. By being untraceable, people can have their
right to be forgotten.
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Confidentiality
A characteristic that applies to information. To protect and preserve the confiden-
tiality of information means to ensure that it is not made available or disclosed to
unauthorised entities. In this context, entities include both individuals and pro-
cesses.
Security and Privacy by Design
The European Security Research and Innovation Forum defines the security by de-
sign (SbD) concept as “to embed security in the technology and system development
from the early stages of conceptualisation and design” [23]. In other words, security
should be taken into account when designing from the ground up. That applies for
privacy as well. Thus, privacy should be adopted as a proactive compliance tactic
rather being a reactive one. The Office of the Information and Privacy Commis-
sioner/Ontario defines PbD as the approach to protecting privacy by embedding
it into the design specifications of technologies, business practices, and physical
infrastructures [24]. Cavoukian and Chanliau said: “Privacy must be pro-actively
incorporated into networked data systems and technologies, by default. The same is
true for security. Both concepts must become integral to organisational priorities,
project objectives, design processes, and planning operations”. The objective of
Privacy by Design is ensuring privacy and gaining personal control over one’s infor-
mation and, for organisations, gaining a sustainable competitive advantage. That
may be accomplished by practising the following 7 Foundational Principles [23]:
1. Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial
2. Privacy as the Default Setting
3. Privacy Embedded into Design
4. Full Functionality - Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum
5. End-to-End Security - Full Life-cycle Protection
6. Visibility and Transparency - Keep it Open
7. Respect for User Privacy - Keep it User-Centric
2.1.2 Legal Aspect of Privacy
The right to privacy is grounded on the natural law resulting from the human
ability to reason. Therefore, the law started to acknowledge and protect the rights
of privacy regardless of the level of protection [25]. In this section, we focus on some
law elements that are related to computer privacy. We take as an example the UK
and EU jurisdictions and describe how they recognise those elements.
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Protection of Personal Data
In the UK, the GDPR protects individuals when it comes to processing their per-
sonal data. According to the Data Protection Act 2018 [26], the GDPR protects
personal data through the following:
• requiring personal data to be processed lawfully and fairly, on the basis of the
data subjects consent or another specified basis,
• conferring rights on the data subject to obtain information about the process-
ing of personal data and to require inaccurate personal data to be rectified,
and
• conferring functions on the Commissioner, giving the holder of that office
responsibility for monitoring and enforcing their provisions.
The GDPR even announced stricter rules for more sensitive information such
as race, ethnicity, biometrics, etc. Moreover, it describes in details individuals’
rights about what organisations and the government store about them and how
they process their personal details.
As for the European Union, EU Data Protection Directive is the responsible
body for protecting privacy and collected personal data about EU citizens. This
Directive is based on seven principles which are [27]:
• Notice: subjects whose data is being collected should be given notice of such
collection.
• Purpose: data collected should be used only for stated purpose(s) and for no
other purposes.
• Consent: personal data should not be disclosed or shared with third parties
without consent from its subject(s).
• Security: once collected, personal data should be kept safe and secure from
potential abuse, theft, or loss.
• Disclosure: subjects whose personal data is being collected should be informed
as to the party or parties collecting such data.
• Access: subjects should be granted access to their personal data and allowed
to correct any inaccuracies.
• Accountability: subjects should be able to hold personal data collectors ac-
countable for adhering to all seven of these principles.
In the context of the Directive, personal data means “any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person (data subject); an identifiable person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
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mental, economic, cultural or social identity” [28]. That means any data can be
considered personal as long it is possible to link that data to a particular individual.
It is also true even if who holds the data cannot make that link.
Right to be Forgotten
In 2010, the right to be forgotten was first introduced in French law. It allows
deleting emails and text messages from on-line and mobile service providers at
customer request after an agreed-upon length of time. In Europe, this right is part
of the right of a personality who protects the moral and legal integrity of people.
In that context, users can protect their identity on the Internet by preventing other
parties from collecting personal information. For instance, authorities in Spain
requested Google to delete news links, which are out of date and expose citizens’
privacy. In the USA, some organisations were noted to practice the right to be
forgotten. They made an effort to spread the idea of protecting children private
information using eraser button [29].
Cookies Compliance
Simply, cookies are sort of short-term memory for the web. By saving few data
between visited pages, cookies make the browsing experience more personal, which
is considered positive. However, it has been proved that cookies create behavioural
profiles through collecting information across numerous web sites [27]. In May 2011,
the EU Directive started first to adopt cookies compliance law. The user can invoke
the right to refuse cookies of visited web pages to protect their on-line privacy. In
the UK, Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations have been updated
following the Directive. Cookies and similar technologies are required to show clear
and comprehensive information and consent of the website user [30].
2.1.3 Privacy as a Human Right
Although privacy is a difficult concept to be defined, it has a basic and intuitive
feel to it. Throughout the history, human being expressed the feeling of the need to
have a protected private space. Some argued that privacy has existed as an innate
human need before any law or political society. That argument leads to the theory
that privacy lays in people’s natural needs [25].
Developments in the technology world dramatically improve data sharing and
communication. Still, it has come to be clear that modern technology is exposed
to many malicious activities such as interception and surveillance. Such activities
may threaten individual privacy rights. In the United Nations Human Rights, it is
plainly stated that people should be protected on-line in the same manner as they
are protected off-line. That was adopted in the ‘resolution 68/167’ that assesses
individual privacy rights as it states: “Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks” [31].
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2.2 User Privacy on Computers
Computers, either PCs or portable devices, and any information recorded on them
are parts of users’ private life that should be protected. It is universally understood
that user privacy is a fundamental human right. Stamatellos [32] stated that to
protect the privacy of personal data, data concerning an individual and data owned
by an individual should be both protected. Research community has provided many
techniques and solutions to contribute to privacy protection. However, many privacy
issues and concerns are still rising due to activities of hackers, spammers, on-line
merchants and organisation mistakes in handling private data [33]. In this section,
we present selected computer privacy issues using a scenario-driven approach. Later,
a data-driven approach in classifying privacy issues will be proposed.
Behavioural Advertising
Internet tracking collects a rich set of information about users’ usage of the In-
ternet. Therefore, it can gather sensitive information like interests and browsing
habits. Cookies are the most common tracking technique. They are proven to be
useful in many ways, one of them is profiling users and serving them with related ad-
vertisement based upon their interests. Behavioural advertising on the other hand,
is done by advertising networks. They are responsible for effectively distributing
their ads to the users. That happens through controlling tracking technologies and
compiling user profiles.
Nevertheless, on-line tracking technologies raise concerns about user privacy. It
is somehow vague to the users who tend not to favour profiling and advertising [34].
One of the concerns is advertising parties are able to link individual profiles with
identifiable information. On-line users’ activities can be matched with their names
and addresses. Furthermore, on-line profiling can be used against users by rising
prices based upon their needs [35].
Accidental Data Leakages
Shabtai et al. define data leakage as “accidental or unintentional distribution of
private or sensitive data to an unauthorised entity”. There are numerous incidents
of data breaches that were reported. In 2009, Verizon Business RISK team anal-
ysed 90 data breaches, which compromised around 285 million records. Another
example, privacy Rights Clearinghouse reported 227,052,199 records with sensitive
information in the US were exposed between 2005 and 2008 [36]. Moreover, the
massive hack incident against Sony in 2013 when it suffered from millions of leaked
records and huge losses that were estimated around 15 million [37]. Actually, there
are a lot of similar reported incidents that are made available for the public on the
Internet (e.g., datalossdb.org).
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Geolocation
Web sites try to acquire visitors’ physical location by examining their IP addresses.
Once obtained, websites determine what to display and allow users to do. For
instance, a company may display the prices of its products in different currencies
based on visitor’s location, or it might block users from some countries because of
legal restrictions. People views about using geolocation against them differ. Sa-
lomon stated that many users think that not all geolocation are bad as they cannot
identify individual users. Even though geolocation schemes assist in providing rele-
vant services and complying with different countries’ laws, privacy advocates count
it unethical. They believe it could lead to confusing information and less privacy.
Salomon quoted Jason Catlett as “the technical possibilities do allow a company to
be two-faced or even 20-faced based on who they think is visiting” [33].
Medical Privacy
The National Committee of Vital and Health Statistics in the United States adopted
a definition of medical privacy as “Health information privacy is an individual’s right
to control the acquisition, uses, or disclosures of his or her identifiable health data”.
In order to protect patients’ privacy, patients must have the right to identify how
their data is handled. In that sense, misusing patient data or collecting data without
patient consent might end with risking their privacy and health. For instance, that
could result in medical fraud, fraudulent insurance claims and even endangering
patient life [38].
Anonymous Web Browsing
Anonymous web browsing refers to the usage of the World Wide Web while hiding
users’ personal information from visited websites. There are many proposed and
applied techniques to achieve anonymity in browsing, such as VPN, proxy servers
and anonymity programs. However, these programs are susceptible to traffic anal-
ysis and users may be uniquely identified using cookies, browser plug-ins or others.
One of the identified problems is the device fingerprinting that can be resistant to
anonymisations. According to Eckersley, “It has long been known that many kinds
of technological devices possess subtle but measurable variations, which allow them
to be ‘fingerprinted’. Cameras, typewriters, and quartz crystal clocks are among
the devices that can be entirely or substantially identified by a remote attacker
possessing only outputs or communications from the device” [39].
2.2.1 Data-driven Approach in Classifying Privacy Issues
Due to the large variety of computer technologies, privacy issues and concerns are
difficult to be covered. A similar work to be mentioned is by Chen and Zhao [40].
They provided a concise analysis on data security and privacy protection issues
2.3. PRIVACY PROTECTION TECHNIQUES 15
across data life cycle stages in cloud computing. These are generation, transfer,
use, share, storage, archival and destruction of data.
As stated earlier, privacy has different goals in different contexts. Accordingly,
privacy can be found in many aspects of computer technologies. While reviewing
privacy related issues in this report, it has been identified that there is a need to
classify them following a specific approach. Hence, the data-driven approach is
proposed. It is believed that looking at the problem from a data flow angle will
help in demonstrating it. This approach will be used later in 2.5 in mobile privacy
which we believe that it will present the contents in a systematic manner. In the
following, data-driven approach stages are explained:
1. Prior to Data Creation: The first stage to think of is before creating any
data on the computer device. Computer applications normally need to obtain
data from the user. At this level, data sources are investigated.
2. During Data Creation: All data with which a user is interacting are of
concern in this phase. An example for that to think of is when a user making
a call using a PC, how it handles his recorded information. Furthermore,
while writing a text or an email how the system controls them and prevents
any interference from other parts. In this level, the focus will be on access
control and how the system distributes permissions and privileges.
3. Dynamic Data Collection: Programs collect data in run-time as they re-
quire to function. The privacy concern here is how these programs treat
collected data. Moreover, another concern is the data that is going to be
shared and for how long it is going to be kept.
4. Data in Transmission: A similar term is data-in-motion, which includes
any data that is transferred inside or outside the computer. That includes
transferring data between programs or system parts internally, uploading it
to the web or cloud, or sharing it with other devices. Privacy concerns at this
stage are communication channels, used protocols in transfers and whether
transmitted data is encrypted or not.
5. Residual Data: At this level, the privacy concern is about residual data
that is no longer required whether it has been completely destroyed or it
can be restored. Additionally, how temporary and similar data are managed
in the computer. These types of data may result in disclosure of sensitive
information.
2.3 Privacy Protection Techniques
Privacy protection has gained a considerable attention from both academia and in-
dustry introducing a wide selection of technical means for protecting user privacy.
In this section, many of these techniques are reviewed. The solutions can be seen
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as a detective or protective approaches. In the detective side, binary-code and pro-
gram analysis methods are some examples. In the protective side, researchers used
to describe methods as privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) or privacy-preserving
computing approaches. Blarkom et al. defined PET as “a system of ICT measures
protecting informational privacy by eliminating or minimising personal data thereby
preventing unnecessary or unwanted processing of personal data, without the loss of
the functionality of the information system” [41]. In this section, many examples of
privacy protection techniques which categorised as detective or protective are pre-
sented. Many proposed work derive their ways to achieve privacy concepts. As these
theoretical concepts are important and relevant to this work, we will demonstrate
some of the famous theoretical privacy concepts from the research in 2.4.
2.3.1 Detective Approaches
These types of approaches are designed to detect privacy incidents as they occur
and then respond to them accordingly. That can be achieved through application
analysis. In general, dynamic analysis is utilised to detect program flaws during
the run-time, while static analysis inspects errors of applications’ source code. The
light will be shed on different methods of analysis, which are static analysis, dynamic
analysis and binary-code analysis.
Binary Code Analysis
One of the key aspects of cyber security is to detect program flaws and malware. The
program static analysis cannot be applied, unless the binary-code of the software
is available. Binary code analysis can be also static or dynamic. Static method
involves checking the software without running it to derive its main features. That
is done in two steps, disassemble the binary-code and then statically analyse resulted
code. Researchers have proposed various methods to analyse the assembly code such
as control flow analysis and reverse engineering. That means to understand how
all parts of the code are built, what are their functionalities and how these parts
interact and relate to each other [42]. On the other hand, dynamic method involves
examining the software based on particular execution traces. It includes deriving
the binary executable properties that hold for executions using run-time data.
Binary code analysis is not an easy task to accomplish. One of the reasons behind
that is the code and data are identical and difficult to be distinguished. Nonetheless,
there are many binary code analysis techniques that have been presented in the
research community. Still, there is a big opportunity for future work to fill the gap
between the two approaches. Having a hybrid static-dynamic method could make
binary code analysis more accurate and complete [43].
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Static and Dynamic Analysis
Along with the increased importance of programs on computers, the negative effect
of security vulnerabilities has rapidly increased. Security flaws which may lead
to the exposure of private information are constantly reported. There are many
reasons for that to happen, such as lack of programming skills, time and financial
constraints and limited security awareness of developers. One of the methods to
mitigate these threats, is statically or dynamically analysing applications. Static
analysers scan the program source code for vulnerabilities, whereas dynamic tools
search for attacks during the run-time of the audited application.
In static approaches, the goal is to identify if tainted data reaches sensitive
sinks without being properly sanitised. To achieve that, data flow analysis (DFA) is
applied by computing determined data for every program point. DFA operates on
the application’s control flow graph that is produced for the tested program. Hence,
static analysis is carried on a non-runtime environment. One of its advantages is
being more comprehensive than dynamic method. Furthermore, it can be more
cost-efficient by detecting bugs at early stages of software development life cycle
with no run-time overhead. It also discovers future errors that dynamic analysis
does not.
On the other hand, dynamic analysis adopts the opposite method and is im-
plemented during application run-time. This approach is utilised through what is
called taint checking. Dynamic analysis can expose any hidden flaws and complex
vulnerabilities that static analysis cannot reveal. Nevertheless, it will only detect
vulnerabilities in the executed part of the code and adds overhead to current pro-
cesses [44], [45], [46].
2.3.2 Protective Approaches
Preventive mechanisms are meant to prevent potential privacy incidents before they
occur. As privacy is considered a wide topic and can be seen from different angles,
there is no technique to solve all privacy-related problems. However, researchers
and privacy advocates have done an outstanding effort in presenting various solu-
tions and techniques. In this part, some of the privacy protecting techniques are
demonstrated.
Anonymity Techniques
Being anonymous means that the user cannot be tracked on-line. One of the ap-
proaches to achieve anonymity is to “strip identifying headers and resend” method.
That has been used in email re-mailers and web browsing tools. An example of these
tools is Anonymizer which is a web proxy that removes any identifying information
from the web browser. Onion routing is another way that was derived from the idea
of mix network. Simply, a mix network is a chain of proxy servers. In onion rout-
ing, messages are encrypted to each mix node using public key cryptography. The
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encryption can be described as the outer layers and messages are the inner layers
which look like an onion. Each mix node removes its own layer of encryption to de-
termine what is the next receiving mix node. If all mix nodes are not compromised,
the message cannot be traced. One of the concrete onion routing system is Tor. A
third major method is based on k-anonymity concept, which will be described later
in 2.4. That concept involves publishing individuals’ data without exposing their
identifying sensitive information [47].
Authentication and Identity Management
The idea of authentication is ensuring that an individual is really the identity he/she
claims to be. To fulfil that a combination of user name and password is applied.
The user name represents individual identity, and the password represents his/her
authentication. Currently, there are many sophisticated ways of authentication by
adding more factors such as something the user has e.g., ATM card or something
the user knows e.g., memorable word.
In contrast, identity management can enhance user privacy by allowing to have
multiple digital identities. For instance, users can use different Google accounts in
their different applications. Moreover, Microsoft’s CardSpace is another example
where users are allowed to have many virtual ID cards where each card contains the
minimum amount of information. CardSpace authenticates users through identity
cards, such as a driving license and a credit card [47].
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is the operation of ciphering a plain-text so it is possible
to analyse it as if it is still in its original form. Homomorphic encryption involves
performing complex mathematical operations on encrypted data without having
to decrypt or compromise the encryption. This technique shows the transform of
one data set into another while preserving relationships between elements in both
sets. Hence, data in this type of encryption scheme keeps the same form which
means mathematical operations will give the equivalent results, whether they are
performed on plain or cipher-text [48].
Authorisation and Access Control
Authorisation includes controlling access rights by allowing or rejecting attempts.
There are three types of access control: classic way, role-based and directory-based
access control. In the classic method, an access matrix will be used to control
the access to system resources. While role-based access control, permissions are
assigned based on roles but not subjects. In a directory-based access control model,
every directory has its subjects, and permissions are assigned to directories. Some
privacy policy languages have an access control aspect, e.g., P3P and XACML [47].
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Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) can be described as the problem of com-
puting in a secured way an agreed function of certain identities’ input, guaranteeing
the privacy of it and the correctness of the output. A famous example is the Yao’s
millionaire’s problem where two millionaires want to know who is richer without
revealing each one’s wealth [49].
Privacy Policy Languages
Privacy policy is a detailed description of an organisation’s information practices,
that can be accessed from the organisation’s website. Its objective is to make users
aware of any of the website’s privacy related practices. Hence, they are target-
ing human readers. On the other hand, privacy policy languages are directed to
be machine-readable. They can be classified into two external and internal policy
languages. The former is to depict websites’ public privacy policies or preferences.
The latter assigns websites’ internal rules of privacy practices. Generally, “exter-
nal privacy policy languages are declarative without enforcement mechanism, while
internal privacy policy languages are normative with support for enforcement” [47].
2.4 Theoretical Privacy Concepts
In this section, some of the privacy models are highlighted due to their relevance to
this work as mentioned in 2.3. The effort is not to cover all of them; yet important
models will be focused on. The majority of these models utilises some transforma-
tion on the data to preserve the privacy. Usually, they minimise the granularity of
representation, so the privacy can be reduced. That leads to losing some efficiency
of data mining or management. Hence, there is a possibility of trading-off between
privacy and information loss [50]. Here are some examples of privacy models:
• K-Anonymity: The reason of developing k-anonymity privacy model is the po-
tential indirect identification of public databases’ records. That is due to using
series of record attributes that possibly help in identifying people’s records.
There are several techniques to minimise the granularity of data representa-
tion in k-anonymity method, e.g., suppression and generalisation. Using such
techniques adequately makes any single record maps onto k other records in
the data set [50].
• L-Diversity: l-diversity model was presented to deal with the weaknesses in
k-anonymity model. For instance, if there is a similarity in personal val-
ues within a group, l-diversity involves protecting the corresponding personal
values rather than only protecting records of k-identities. Thus, sensitive at-
tributes in each data set must be diverse [50].
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• T-Closeness: Li et al. show that there is still few limitations on l-diversity
and it is unnecessary and insufficient to restrain attribute revelation. Conse-
quently, they propose the t-closeness model and suggested that “the distribu-
tion of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is close to the distribution
of the attribute in the overall table” [51].
• Differential Privacy: In general, differential privacy guarantees that removing
or adding a single record will not influence the result of any analysis of the
database. That means no risk is caused by joining different databases [52].
Differential privacy “assures record owners that they may submit their per-
sonal information to the database securely in the knowledge that nothing, or
almost nothing, can be discovered from the database with their information
that could not have been discovered without their information” [53]. Thus,
this model offers rigorous mathematical guarantees against what attackers can
infer from using the results of some randomised algorithm.
2.5 User Privacy on Mobile Devices
Mobile devices are simply small computers. The main function of mobiles is mak-
ing calls and receiving texts while moving around. Many features in the mobile
environment make mobile privacy very important. ICO [54] reported some of them
which are portability, frequently used, being consistently on, collecting many users’
information, and many others. Apps can misuse data in background and user de-
sires of convenience that contradict with their privacy. As long mobiles are meant
to receive calls all the time, they need to be always on when they are carried, un-
like PCs. Moreover, advances in mobile technologies that look for user comfort
and needs bring new sensors to the market, such as motion and position sensors.
These developments allow mobiles to collect more sensitive data about users than
in normal computers.
In this section, we present the classification of issues in mobile privacy research.
Then, many mobile privacy specific issues are demonstrated in a data-driven order.
After that, we end this section with mobile privacy protection techniques. Before
describing these subsections, we first provide preliminary information about mobile
devices’ data, which are significant to understand user privacy on mobile devices.
2.5.1 Data on Mobile Devices
Data here can be referred as any piece of information on the mobile device that
relates to mobile users. It may contain sensitive details about the user which could
be exploited to identify him/her. Otherwise, it may not contain sensitive details,
yet it is possible to infer sensitive data from it through analysis [6]. Thus, data on
mobile falls in one of the following types: raw data, data inferred from raw data and
data inferred from aggregated data which possibly combined with non-mobile data.
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Theoharidou et al. [55], came out with their own way of classifying mobile data.
Their taxonomies are based on data source and information type. Based on the data
source, they classify mobile data into messaging data, device data, SIM Card data,
application data, usage history data, sensor data and user input data. Based on
the information type, they classified data as personal data, business data, govern-
ment data, financial data, authentication data and connection/Service data. This
research divides mobile raw data into three types:
1. Device identifiers such as IMEI, IMSI, Android ID, Android Advertising ID,
UDID (aka universal device ID in iOS), IDFA (aka identifier for advertising
in iOS) and Windows Advertising ID
2. Sensors data such as generated picture and video files by camera, audio files
generated by microphone, acceleration and rotation forces along three axes by
motion sensors, GPS location coordinates and environmental parameters like
temperature, humidity and pressure
3. Personal communication data which are messages, contacts, email, browsing
history and calendar data
For the second and third type of mobile data, data inferred from raw data and
data inferred from aggregated data, there are a lot of work proved that they exist.
Further examples and description will be provided later in 2.5.3 in data inference
part.
2.5.2 Classification of Issues in Mobile Privacy Research
According to Haris et al. [6] mobile privacy is often investigated either on software
level or hardware and communication level. The former is precisely the operating
system and application level which concern with privacy models, data flow, sources
and sinks of privacy, privacy solutions’ effectiveness and user attitudes toward pri-
vacy. The latter is sensors and communication level which are of interest for those
looking at mobile sensors leakages, privacy against sensor data inference and leaks
through mobile communication protocols. Briefly, Haris et al. categorised mobile
privacy issues into four groups. They are issues related to mobile applications,
mobile sensors, mobiles users and mobile connectivity.
2.5.3 Selected Mobile Privacy Specific Issues
Many researchers made effort in investigating mobile privacy issues. In this section,
mobile privacy concerns will be represented based on the proposed data-driven
approach in 2.2.1. Related privacy issues are going to be organised based on the
data state and when privacy concerns take place.
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Application Markets
In 2008, Apple was the first to provide a centralised market that offers a variety of
apps. This idea helps in removing the burden on both users and app developers.
Users can easily search for an app and download it. On the other hand, developers
do not worry about publishing and distributing their apps. Currently, all mobile
platform companies provide apps through their private application stores. How-
ever, there are third party companies that entered this competition with their own
markets such as Amazon, Firefox Marketplace, Opera and many others [56].
According to Enck [13], application stores and markets can provide three security
and privacy utilities. In order to understand them, this research will compare them
between App Store and Google Play as they are the most commonly used markets
by developers [57]. Firstly, implementing the walled-garden model to have control
on what apps the user can install. Apple applies this model on all its iOS devices.
However, Android gives the freedom of installing apps from anywhere, which can
be considered as an advantage and security drawback at the same time. Secondly,
markets can check on application security certification. Apple applies a vetting
process on any app wants to be placed in the App Store. However, the vetting
procedure is unclear. On the other hand, Google Play uses automated analysis
in scanning new candidate apps, namely Bouncer [56]. Lastly, application stores
can offer remote software management. Accordingly, Google used that utility to
remotely remove malware apps from handsets and patch damaged OS [58].
User Decisions before Installing Apps
There are many factors influence users’ decisions when choosing mobile apps. While
selecting an app, users are often motivated by reasons such as whether the app
fits their needs, preference of the interface, being trustworthy and privacy issues
[59]. However, mobile users are not accurately aware of the threats associated with
installing an app [60]. This lack of understanding leads to choosing apps that may
compromise user privacy.
Inferring from Raw, Aggregated and Sensor Data
Many researchers proved that various personal information can be inferred from
mobile raw data. There are many examples that fall in this category. For instance,
Seneviratne et al. [61] managed to predict user’s gender using a supervised learning
technique by knowing installed apps. Chittaranjan et al. [62] applied data mining
and machine learning techniques on mobile data to infer user’s personality. Likamwa
et al. [63] predicted user’s mood by using many logs that have been collected from
visited websites, SMS, voice calls and emails.
Another way is inferring data from aggregated data that is possibly combined
with non-mobile data. Seneviratne et al. [64] show how to predict user traits from
a single snapshot of installed applications on the user device. They manage to
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infer information such as religion, language, countries of interests and others using
supervised learning methods and minimal external information. Another example,
Pan et al. [65] showed that by combining collected information such as affiliation and
friendship with many mobile usage logs, it is possible to infer future app installation
behaviour of users.
Another way of inferring data has been revealed, which inferring from sensor
data. Simon and Anderson [66] have explained in their paper how to retrieve PIN
numbers by launching a side-channel attack. They used the microphone and video
camera to detect touch events and estimate the mobile device orientation, respec-
tively. Owusu et al. [67] used the accelerometer readings to spy on keystroke in-
formation when the user key in a password. Their result indicates that 6 of 99
six-character passwords can be broken in as few as 4.5 trials.
Access Control and File Permissions
Following the comparison between iOS and Android operating system, both imple-
ment access control mean to maintain privacy and security [68]. In Android, access
control is applied through Android’s Sandbox that keeps apps’ data in an isolated
environment and inter-process communications are controlled by access permissions.
However, it is not the ultimate solution. Once apps get permission, they might share
data with third parties without user approval. On the other hand, iOS isolates each
mobile app in sandbox policies [13]. Even so, Apple mobile devices use a different
type of permission, which is time-of-use permission. Therefore, the user will be
prompted when apps execute sensitive operations. Nevertheless, iOS devices suffer
from privacy information leakages same as Android [69].
Another weakness can be exploited is the privilege escalation problem. Although
sand-boxing and access control offers security for Android, the privilege escalation
can be launched against it. Davi et al. [70] prove that either a malicious app or
a genuine one exploited at run-time could escalate granted permission. In their
experiment, they escalate some privileges granted to the app’s sandbox and send a
number of short messages to a selected number without corresponding permissions.
Data Storage in Mobiles
At this stage, data storage needs to be focused on. In Android, multiple data-
storage facilities have been made available. Namely, they are shared preferences,
SQLite databases and plain old files. Apps can access them in several ways, either
using managed and native code or using content providers. In the book “Android
Hacker’s Handbook” [2], authors explicitly stated three privacy and security issues
related to those storage facilities. The most common mistakes are plain-text storage
of sensitive data, unprotected content providers and insecure file permissions.
In April 2011, Justin Case [2] reported a similar problem in Skype client for
Android. He found that Skype was creating a lot of SQL and XML files in plain-
text, with read and write permissions. Fig. 2.2 displays what Case has found.
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Figure 2.2: Reported problem in Skype client [2]
Apps and Ad Libraries Data Collection
The research community has proven that many mobile apps leak variant types of
data [5,69,71–73]. Some of these leaks can be justified where others stand doubtful.
Apps often need to send data outside the device to provide better services for users.
Nevertheless, suspicious apps leak data with no relevance to its nature. Enck [13]
stated that there is a need to identify whether a leak is intended or not in order to
decide if privacy is violated. However, there is a related work that tried to answer
that question. Keng et al. [74] correlated leaks to user action. Nevertheless, the
problem still exists. Table 2.1 shows some statistics of detected leaks by privacy
leakage detection tools.
On the other hand, advertising and analytic servers are harvesting many data
about mobile users. Seneviratne et al. came out with PrivMetrics to help users
choosing trusted apps in terms of privacy protection. They mentioned in their
website that there are more than 25 companies who could identify and know the
location of the mobile user [3]. Figure 2.3 demonstrates how these ad and analytic
servers collect users’ data. These trackers or servers have access to many mobile
third party apps, which allows them to build accurate profiles about users. On top
of that, trackers are able to infer very sensitive information from collected data such
as user’s gender, health condition and political interests, as stated earlier.
There are some reasons that help to spread this problem of third party ad
libraries. Some mobile app developers tend to distribute their apps for free following
users’ preference. These developers include advertisement libraries within their apps
to gain some profit [6] as mentioned earlier. Another reason is due to installing over-
permission apps. Over-permission means apps ask for permissions more than what
2.5. USER PRIVACY ON MOBILE DEVICES 25
T
a
b
le
2.
1:
S
o
m
e
st
at
is
ti
cs
of
d
et
ec
te
d
le
ak
ag
es
b
y
m
ob
il
e
p
ri
va
cy
to
o
ls
[6
]
T
o
o
l/
P
la
tf
o
rm
T
ec
h
n
iq
u
e
N
o
.
o
f
S
u
m
m
a
ry
F
ra
m
ew
o
rk
T
es
te
d
A
p
p
s
S
ca
n
d
a
l
A
n
d
ro
id
S
ta
ti
c
D
a
ta
F
lo
w
9
0
6
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
lo
c
to
a
d
-s
er
v
er
s,
5
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
lo
c
to
a
n
a
ly
ti
c
se
rv
er
,
1
a
p
p
le
a
k
s
IM
E
I
to
it
s
se
rv
er
.
P
iO
S
iO
S
S
ta
ti
c
D
a
ta
F
lo
w
1
4
0
7
6
5
6
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
d
ev
ic
e
ID
,
3
6
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
G
P
S
lo
ca
ti
o
n
,
5
le
a
k
a
d
d
re
ss
b
o
o
k
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
,
1
le
a
k
s
b
ro
w
se
r
h
is
to
ry
a
n
d
p
h
o
to
s
A
n
d
ro
id
L
ea
k
s
A
n
d
ro
id
S
ta
ti
c
D
a
ta
F
lo
w
2
5
9
7
6
A
p
p
ro
x
im
a
te
ly
5
7
,2
9
9
le
a
k
s
a
re
fo
u
n
d
in
a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s;
6
3
.5
1
%
le
a
k
s
a
re
fo
u
n
d
in
a
d
co
d
e.
M
o
re
o
v
er
,
9
2
%
le
a
k
s
a
re
re
la
te
d
to
p
h
o
n
e
d
a
ta
,
5
.9
4
%
le
a
k
s
a
re
o
f
lo
ca
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
a
n
d
0
.4
6
a
n
d
0
.6
1
%
le
a
k
s
o
f
W
iF
i
a
n
d
A
u
d
io
.
D
ro
id
T
es
t
A
n
d
ro
id
D
y
n
a
m
ic
D
a
ta
F
lo
w
5
0
M
o
st
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
m
o
d
el
n
o
.,
su
b
sc
ri
b
er
ID
a
n
d
m
o
b
il
e
n
o
.
P
ro
te
ct
M
y
P
ri
v
a
cy
iO
S
C
ro
w
d
so
u
rc
in
g
6
8
5
4
8
.4
3
%
a
p
p
s
a
cc
es
s
Id
en
ti
fi
er
s,
1
3
.2
7
%
a
cc
es
s
lo
ca
ti
o
n
s,
6
.2
2
%
a
cc
es
s
co
n
ta
ct
s
a
n
d
1
.6
2
%
a
cc
es
s
m
u
si
c
li
b
ra
ry
.
A
p
p
In
te
n
t
A
n
d
ro
id
S
ta
ti
c
D
a
ta
F
lo
w
1
0
0
0
It
is
fo
u
n
d
th
a
t
1
4
0
a
p
p
s
h
a
v
e
p
o
te
n
ti
a
l
d
a
ta
le
a
k
s,
2
6
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
s
d
a
ta
u
n
in
te
n
-
ti
o
n
a
ll
y,
2
4
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
s
D
ev
ic
e
ID
,
1
a
p
p
le
a
k
s
co
n
ta
ct
s
a
n
d
1
a
p
p
le
a
k
s
S
M
S
.
Ic
cT
A
A
n
d
ro
id
In
tr
a
-C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
A
n
a
ly
si
s
3
0
0
0
4
2
5
a
p
p
s
le
a
k
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
d
ir
ec
tl
y
a
b
o
u
t
d
ev
ic
e
a
n
d
lo
ca
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
.
In
te
n
tF
u
zz
er
A
n
d
ro
id
D
y
n
a
m
ic
ca
p
a
b
il
it
y
le
a
k
2
1
8
3
5
0
%
o
f
a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s
le
a
k
ca
p
a
b
il
it
ie
s
o
r
p
er
m
is
si
o
n
s
re
la
te
d
to
n
et
w
o
rk
st
a
te
,
p
h
o
n
e
st
a
te
,
lo
ca
ti
o
n
a
n
d
in
te
rn
et
co
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
.
A
G
R
IG
E
N
T
O
[7
5
]
A
n
d
ro
id
D
iff
er
en
ti
a
l
b
la
ck
-b
o
x
a
n
a
ly
si
s
7
5
0
A
G
R
IG
E
N
T
O
d
et
ec
te
d
2
7
8
le
a
k
in
g
a
p
p
s
fr
o
m
th
e
R
eC
o
n
[7
6
]
d
a
ta
se
t
m
o
re
th
a
n
a
n
y
o
th
er
co
m
p
a
re
d
to
o
l.
26 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Figure 2.3: Trackers collecting personal information [3]
they really require to function. Leontiadis et al. [77] reported that 73% of the
free apps they studied ask for at least one over-permission, which may exploit user
private data.
Data Transfer in Mobiles
Even though data transmission security, in general, receives large attention, there
is a lack of it in the mobile application world. That is possibly due to improperly
applying SSL and TLS. It has been stated that app developers make mistakes in
securing sensitive data while in transit. Some of the issues in this regard are:
unencrypted data or not strong enough encryption, having certificate validation
errors, using plain-text after failures and inconsistent use of transfer security per
network type, e.g., cell versus Wi-Fi [2].
Researchers from the University of Ulm reported that few apps on Android sent
Google authentication credentials over HTTP in plain-text. Calendar and Contacts
are two of the apps they reported. If this sensitive information is obtained by
malicious identity, the information owners will be impersonated. Moreover, many
2.5. USER PRIVACY ON MOBILE DEVICES 27
tools are available to conduct a man-in-the-middle attack, so it will ease intercepting
those tokens [2].
Residual Data
Mobile users have an incorrect assumption about residual data. They think reset-
ting mobile devices to factory default setting would delete all data from memory.
An experiment has been reported from PR Newswire that proves the misleading
assumption. In 2011, a live experiment was performed on that matter. CPPGroup
assigned an ethical hacker to review 35 second-hand mobile phones and 50 SIM
cards within the UK. 247 pieces of sensitive data were left unhandled on 19 mobile
devices and 27 SIM cards. The sensitive data contained log in details, passwords,
bank account and credit details and company information. Moreover, ICM has
randomly interviewed a sample of people to see their feedback regarding residual
data. It has been reported that 81% of them claimed they wiped all data before
selling their devices, with 6 in 10 are confident that no private data left. Conversely,
ICM reported that 54% of their mobile devices and SIM cards included personal
information [78].
On the other hand, uninstalled apps may leave vulnerable data behind in the
device. In a recent work published by Zhang et al., authors explained what they
called data residue attacks. They have shown through their analysis and experi-
ments how deleted apps can remove sensitive data unattended. Such details could
be exploited to steal users’ account credentials, access their private data, escalate
privileges and few other vulnerabilities [79]. Same authors show in a different work
how data can reside in the phone and leads to data leakage and privilege escalation
attacks [80].
2.5.4 Mobile Privacy Protection Techniques
In this section, some mobile privacy protection techniques are presented following
the same categorisation from computer privacy protection techniques in 2.2.1.
Application Analysis
The concept of application analysis for mobile devices is similar to the one for
computers, which is described earlier in 2.3.1. The research community has pro-
vided various techniques of application analysis. In this part, application analysis
techniques for mobile devices are presented.
Permission Analysis:
Some mobile platforms apply a permission framework which will be described later
in 2.6.1. Researchers have illustrated their method of identifying suspicious apps by
analysing app requested permissions. Enck et al. were the first in that by proposing
Kirin. If an app uses permissions or action strings that are defined as a dangerous
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functionality, Kirin detects it. Out of 311 tested apps from Google Play top free
apps, 10 apps were flagged based on Kirin rules. Another work by Felt et al. is
Stowaway. It identifies apps that ask for over-privileges. They analysed 956 apps
from Google Play where they found that most common unnecessarily requested
permissions are accessing the Internet and reading phone state. Even though risky
apps can be identified by analysing their permissions, this approach is limited and
still requires static or dynamic ones [56].
Static Analysis:
In this type, the analysis is run with (static source code analysis) or without source
code (binary-code analysis). Currently, almost all mobile apps that apply this
approach retrieve apps’ source codes using decompilers. Although the static method
offers an automated comprehensive apps analysis, its precision may greatly rely
on the decompiler performance or the quality of used coding. Additionally, this
approach is known to generate false positive or false negative whenever there is
a dead code in the retrieved source code. Moreover, static analysis is not able
to decide if privacy behaviour of an app is justified or not from the user point of
view [68].
Dynamic Analysis:
Unlike static analysis, dynamic ones can run without source codes. It detects data
leaks once they are executed. By performing Data Flow Analysis in mobile plat-
form, dynamic tools monitor sensitive sources. Users are notified in case there are
flows between sources and sinks. One of the remarkable dynamic analysis tools is
TaintDroid [5] (TaintDroid is described in details in 2.6.). The developers examined
30 Android common apps. They reported that half of them leak device location
with ad servers and 7 of them frequently leak device IDs. Many tools are built on
top of TaintDroid as extension for effectiveness evaluation, such as MockDroid [81],
TISSA [82] and AppFence [83]. Nonetheless, TaintDroid authors discussed some of
its limitations. First, it only detects explicit flows leaving opportunity for attackers
to use implicit flows. Kang et al. defined implicit flows as: “parts of a program
where tainted data values affect control flow, and then the control flow variation
affects other data. This can lead to under-tainting, a type of error in which values
that should be marked as tainted are not, and so for instance could cause an analysis
to fail to detect a leak of sensitive information” [84]. Also, TaintDroid reports the
data leakages without providing further information whether it is a privacy violation
or not. Above than that, a group of researchers proved the possibility of bypassing
TaintDroid which will be described later in 2.6.2 [85].
Hybrid Analysis:
Some other authors introduced tools that offer a combination of dynamic and static
analysis together. The idea is to have the advantage of both approaches in order to
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improve privacy leakage detection. There are a number of works propose this kind
of analysis such as, AppScanner, Gort, SmartDroid, and AppsPlayground [56]
Cloud-based Analysis:
Owing to mobile platforms have restrictions in resources, running the detection
analysis on them can be difficult. The community proposed cloud-based analysis
method to overcome that problem. Paranoid Android implements this approach and
will be described later in 2.6.2. Shabati et al. [86] used this method by uploading
user activity and resource usage to detect intrusions. Still, Enck [13] has shown how
Miettinen et al. have shown the limitation of applying cloud-based analysis. They
argued that there are administrational and technical boundaries.
Others:
Research community provided other proposed techniques to enhance current de-
tection analysis approaches. One work proposed using user comments from official
app markets. Another work used machine learning technique to generate automat-
ically a list of sinks and sources. Other developers inserted a forensics element
to provide causes of data leaks. Some tools utilise crowdsourcing to identify app
vulnerabilities. Lastly, researchers have gone beyond detection and tried to help
users defending their private information. AppFence, which is built on TaintDroid,
gives the user the choice of blocking data leaks by using two methods, ex-filtration
blocking and data shadowing. Another example is MockDroid and TISSA, where
they let user substitute data to be leaked with a false data [6].
Protection Mechanisms
In this part, some of the proposed protection mechanisms by the research community
are presented.
Rule-driven Policy Approaches:
According to Enck “The often-cited limitation of smartphone protection systems
is insufficient policy expressibility”. Therefore, some researchers suggested policy
languages to analyse mobile apps such as xJ2ME, SxC, Kirin, Saint, CRePE, XMan-
Droid. These languages support their requirements to integrate new proposed policy
into targeted OS. However, there is a limitation in applying the rule-driven approach
which is the difficulty of accurately defining and maintaining created rules [13].
High-level Policy Approaches:
These approaches relate to the general high-level security aims in mobile devices.
As an example, TrustDroid focuses on the isolation between applications. That
is applied by dividing apps into system trusted and untrusted domains. Then, it
controls the interaction between domains by allowing or isolating domains following
its policy. Other works followed high-level methods in preventing some attacks
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such as cross-service attack in Windows phones and confused deputy attack in
Android [13].
Faking Sensitive Information:
A number of leakage detection tools tried to provide more protection to the user
by giving control over sensitive information. Several works provide techniques to
block leakage attempts or fake the capabilities of the device or the data provided to
receivers. MockDroid is one example that provides mock data to requesting third
parties. TISSA, which is another tool, gives the user more options in providing
empty, anonymised or fake data [56].
2.6 Android as an Example
This PhD work focuses on Android platform for several reasons. First of all, Android
is an open-source OS that allows researchers and developers to access it more than
any other platform. This lets researchers build their own prototypes to approve
new ideas. Another reason is being the most widely used mobile OS. According to
IDC (International Data Corporation), Android is the dominant platform among
mobile devices’ market share. Table 2.2 shows a recent usage statistics of mobile
platforms.
Table 2.2: Mobile platform usage statistics [7]
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019
Android 84.6% 85.1% 84.8% 85.2%
iOS 14.7% 14.7% 15.1% 14.8%
Others 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Additionally, Android is the only platform that has a flexible interaction between
apps that brings many security issues for study, said by Enck [13]. To express more,
it has a rich inter-application message passing system which poses many security
problems. For instance, messages can be sniffed, altered or removed ending with
compromising mobile user privacy.
2.6.1 Android Security Design and Architecture
Before going deeply into Android security, abridged explanation about Android is
presented. The best short description for Android is Java apps built on a Linux-
based OS. That explanation is a very concise, and it does not show the complex
design of Android. In fact, it is divided into five layers, including Android apps,
the Android Framework, the Dalvik virtual machine, user-space native code and
the Linux kernel. Figure 2.4 simplifies these layers. Its applications are all written
in Java and executed within the Dalvik virtual machine interpreter. Each of the
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Figure 2.4: Android overall architecture [4]
interpreter instances is executed with a unique user identity to ensure that each app
runs in isolated Linux subsystem. Whenever an app needs to communicate with
another app, it can use IPC mechanism (Inter Process Communication) [6].
In the following paragraphs, Some of the applied security components and mea-
sures in Android OS are briefly demonstrated, which serves privacy protection.
They are Android’s sandbox, permission model, apps signing and encryption.
Android’s Sandbox
Android is based on Linux core as mentioned earlier which brings design principles
from Unix such as least privilege and process isolation. Apps are run in an isolated
environment where processes cannot interfere with each other. Sandboxing in An-
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droid is predicated on three key concepts: standard Linux process isolation, unique
user IDs and restricted file system permissions [2].
Android Permission Framework
Android platform is built with a permission framework. Apps are only able to
access a limited range of system resources. For resources that can adversely impact
the user data, experience or network, Android controls access to these resources
via permissions. There are three types of permissions, API permission, file system
permission and IPC permission. For the first type, protected APIs are camera
functions, location data, Bluetooth functions, Telephony functions, SMS/MMS and
Network/data connections.
This Android Permission Model protects users from two sides: control mobile
apps access to sensitive locations and help users to make a proper decision prior to
app installation [2]. Accordingly, app developers must declare needed permission
in the manifest file which will help to explain to the user what resources will be
accessed. That information will help the user to make decision whether to trust an
app or not.
Once a permission is granted, it will be applied to the granted app as long as it
is on the device. To avoid confusing the user regularly, he/she will not be notified
whenever an app tries to access granted permission/s. If the user uninstall an app,
the system will remove the associated permissions. Using the system settings, users
can view, grant or block permissions for their installed apps. Alternatively, the user
is able to globally turn off functionalities when they want (e.g., disable GPS, radio
and WiFi [87].
Application Signing and Encryption
Android apps must be digitally signed with a certificate before they go for instal-
lation. Such signatures do not need a certificate authority. Android will use them
to identify the author of the app. If an app requires any update, the certificate’s
private key of the author will be matched to the existing version. Another use is
to allow apps signed with similar certificates to run in the same process. Thus,
apps can expose functionality between each other if they are signed with the same
certificate. That secures app sharing of code and data.
In Android, all created data by users is encrypted before delivering it to disk,
and all reads decrypt data before sending them back to the calling process. All that
automatically occur by the kernel. It uses 128-bit AES algorithm operating un-
der the CBC (cipher-block chaining) mode and Encrypted salt-sector initialisation
vector (ESSIV): SHA256 [58].
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2.6.2 Selected Android Privacy Protection Systems
While presenting privacy protection techniques for both computers and mobile de-
vices, we categorised them into detective and protective approaches. These detec-
tion methods’ purpose, eventually, is to find a way of protecting users’ privacy.
Therefore, we use for both categories the term ‘privacy protection’ systems. In the
research and industry, there are quite a lot of tools and systems that have been
designed to protect user privacy. In this subsection, selected privacy protection
systems are illustrated. All presented works are related to Android platform, with
purposely chosen different analysis methods.
ScanDAL (Static Analysis) [71]: It implements a static analysis to detect data
leakages by converting app package from Dalvik byte-code to a defined intermediate
language. Using abstract interpretations, suspicious flows will be detected. The
authors of ScanDAL analysed 90 free apps and they found 11 of them leak private
data. They reported many location leakages to remote ad servers, namely AdMob
and AdSenseSpec. Besides location data, apps are found to leak IMEI to their app
servers.
Figure 2.5: TaintDroid architecture [5]
TaintDroid (Dynamic Analysis) [5]: This tool uses dynamic analysis to monitor
apps’ behaviour. Sensitive information sources are identified and tainted. Using
DFA, TaintDroid monitors how apps handle tainted information and notifies the
user if private data is leaked outside the device. Figure 2.5 explains how TaintDroid
works. First, data is tainted in trusted apps and then tag markings are stored in
a virtual taint map. When apps use tainted information, the Dalvik interpreter
propagates taint tags. After that, taint tags with information are encompassed in
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the parcel as trusted apps use modified IPC library. Next in step 5 of Fig 2.5, third
party apps will receive tags transparently through the kernel. The altered IPC
library removes the tags at the receiving end and assigns it to their values using
the virtual taint map and tags are propagated to the app. If the third party app
invokes taint sink library, the trusted library removes tags and sends a notification
to the user.
ScrubDroid (Anti-TaintDroid) [85]: The authors of this paper investigated
the limitation of TaintDroid, in tracking privacy-sensitive information on Android
mobile devices. They presented multiple attacks on TaintDroid using generic classes
of anti-taint methods. Therefore, they proved that taint tracking is not effective
enough in case of attackers applying one of the methods that they showed.
SmartDroid (Hybrid Analysis) [88]: It combines static and dynamic analysis.
This tool works at two levels. At the first level, it utilises a static path selector to
mine for activity switch paths through analysing activity and function call graphs.
At the second level, SmartDroid implements a dynamic analysis to traverse each UI
element and explore the UI interaction paths towards the sensitive APIs.
SuSi (Machine Learning Approach) [12]: All dynamic, static and hybrid anal-
ysis methods share one idea, which is detecting flows between sources and sinks.
Nevertheless, many of them use a static list of information sources and sinks. Lately,
a group of researchers has proposed ‘SuSi’. It analyses apps’ source code and au-
tomatically generates a list of sources and sinks using supervised machine learning
technique.
Paranoid Android (Cloud-based Analysis) [86]: This tool runs a synchronised
replica of the tested phone on a cloud-based server. The main reason to use cloud
is to avoid the constraints of detection analysis on normal devices. That allows to
perform complex analysis. In the phone, a tracer will be installed to record required
data which will be used to re-run app executions. Then, collected information will
be transmitted via secured channel to the cloud-based server. Afterwards, a re-
player re-runs apps in a smart emulator to detect privacy leaks.
CrowdDroid (Crowd Sourcing) [89]: It applies crowdsourcing in order to differ-
entiate between reliable and unreliable apps that share similar name and versions.
Crowd -sourcing tells behavioural traces from any unusual execution of the same
app. By comparing both traces, CrowdDroid can detect fake copies of applications.
Mobile Forensics of Privacy Leaks (Correlate User Actions to Leaks) [74]:
Many authors proposed privacy detection methods to identify data privacy leakages.
Nevertheless, there is a lack of information about leak causes. By correlating user
actions to leaks, authors demonstrates the causes from a user point of view. This
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information may help end users to take preventive measures and understand the
authenticity of the leak.
PCLeaks (Static Inter-Component Analysis) [90]: PCLeaks was designed to
identify possible capability leakages. It is based on ICC vulnerabilities to perform
DFA on Android apps. This tool has been tested against randomly selected 2000
apps. Authors have reported that 986 potential components leaks in 185 apps. They
presented PCLeak Validator which finds an app that tries to exploit the detected
leak. Out of the reported leaks, 75% of them are exploitable.
IntentFuzzer (Dynamic Capability Leak) [91]: Is a fuzzing tool dynamically
that analyses apps for capability leaks. Capability leaks happen when an app lacks
a permission to sensitive sources and tries to manipulate another app that has the
permission by performing access on its behalf. The authors stated that out of 2000
tested apps, 161 have this vulnerability.
VetDroid (Permission Analysis) [92]: Is a tool that reconstructs sensitive
apps behaviours from a permission use’s perspective. It applies a dynamic anal-
ysis approach and presents a systematic framework in constructing permission use
behaviours. VetDroid helps researchers and developers to study apps’ internal be-
haviour.
As part of this PhD work, a benchmarking environment is designed and imple-
mented. The reason behind that is the lack of a benchmarking tool for mobile
privacy leakage protection tools. Hence, we aim to provide a real-time dynamic
benchmarking system which helps in identifying possible improvements in related
areas. In the following chapter, our system will be demonstrated in details.
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Chapter 3
PPAndroid-Benchmarker:
Benchmarking Privacy
Protection Systems on Android
Devices
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the first work of this PhD which is about designing a bench-
marking environment for mobile privacy leakage detection and prevention apps. The
idea came after reproducing some of the currently available mobile privacy detection
tools, namely TaintDroid and Anti-TaintDroid ‘ScrubDroid’. TaintDroid is used as
a base to build many other tools with different flavours of security and privacy fea-
tures. It has been noticed that there is no real-time dynamic benchmarking system
for mobile privacy leakage detection tools.
For each new privacy protection solution, there is always a problem of how to
evaluate its performance against existing solutions. Similarly, given a number of
candidate solutions, a user has the need to know which solution is the best for her
specific needs. For researchers, a proper benchmarking system is also desired so that
insights about how to improve exist solutions can be gained and the performance of
any new solution can be properly evaluated. While such benchmarking systems are
very important, surprisingly, there is no such system in the research or commercial
worlds, not mentioning open-source tools. Instead, currently researchers and devel-
opers either depend on bespoke performance evaluation apps or collections of test
apps to conduct such benchmarking tasks.
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In this chapter, PPAndroid-Benchmarker is presented, a system for benchmark-
ing mobile privacy protection systems on Android devices, which to the author best
knowledge is the first of this kind. PPAndroid-Benchmarker is designed to be obliv-
ious to details of mobile privacy protection systems, and can detect performance
of combined mobile privacy protection apps in run time – this is why the term
“systems” is being used rather than “apps”. It is effectively a system 1) simulating
different kinds of tester-configurable privacy leakage activities; 2) capturing what
leakage attempts were successful; 3) supporting a high level of automation for the
whole benchmarking life-cycle; and 4) providing a good user interface for testers
to configure benchmarking tasks. Moreover, this chapter also highlights two ad-
ditional components of PPAndroid-Benchmarker at the design level (which have
not been implemented in this prototype): 1) an Automatic Test Apps Generator
for benchmarking static analysis based privacy protection systems; and 2) a Re-
configurability Engine allowing PPAndroid-Benchmarker to be reconfigured such
as adding and removing information sources and sinks. Although the prototype
system that has been implemented for Android OS only, the framework is generic
enough to be applied to other mobile operating systems such as iOS. The work in
this chapter targets Android platform for the reasons explained at 2.6. PPAndroid-
Benchmarker has been tested with 165 selected Android privacy protection apps,
and report the findings and some insights about current status and future directions
of mobile privacy protection and prevention tools.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
work. Then, Section 3 discusses the design and implementation of the presented
system. Section 4 presents the followed experimental set-up and Section 5 illustrates
the results and analysis. Section 6 discusses the implications of the findings and
some limitations. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the chapter and illustrates some future
work.
3.2 Related Work
Performance evaluation has been an area of research in many research fields includ-
ing computer science in general. Here we focus on performance evaluation issues
around mobile privacy. Many researchers have presented their benchmarking sys-
tems and tools for mobile devices. Some are designed to test the validity of security
and privacy protection tools, while others are built to benchmark normal apps. In
this work, the focus is on benchmarking mobile privacy protection tools. In this
section, we present related work from both types; evaluating privacy in normal apps
and mobile privacy protection tools.
3.2.1 Privacy Metering and Scoring of Android Apps
Many researchers tried to help users to understand the potential impact of privacy
caused by mobile apps. The reason is that users do not fully comprehend these
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effects and thus behave in an insecure manner, such as ignoring warnings about
requested permissions in installation [93]. Kang et al. [94] proposed a privacy me-
tre, which clarifies the potential risk of requested permissions. Another framework
proposed by Seneviratne et al. which is called ‘PrivMetrics’ [3]. It aids mobile users
to make informed decisions before installing apps by showing users an analyses
on apps privacy leakages. Moreover, PrivMetrics offers a recommendation of other
apps with a same functionality as an alternative, yet better in terms of privacy level.
Another work in this category is PrivacyGrade. The aim of its authors is to raise
awareness of the behaviours that many mobile apps have which may affect users’
privacy. It uses a privacy model that measures the gap between an app’s actual
behaviour and users’ expectations of that app’s behaviour. Then, PrivacyGrade
shows the result of applying its model in a form of grade to make it easier to be
understood by users [95].
3.2.2 Evaluating Mobile Privacy Protection Tools
As stated earlier, it is required to validate privacy protection tools in order to main-
tain user privacy. Several works presented systems to benchmark mobile privacy
protection tools. In this subsection, we present DroidBench as an example of such
works as a background for the presented benchmarking environment in this Chapter.
DroidBench
DroidBench is one of the provided benchmark testing tools which contains test cases
for some static-analysis problems (e.g., field sensitivity, object sensitivity, tradeoffs
in access-path lengths) to test both static and dynamic taint analysis tools. It
only focuses on Android. DroidBench is a collection of different apps from various
categories that pose data leaks. Also, other different apps without data leakages
are included. DroidBench test security tools if they could identify the leaks as they
occurred [96].
Stanford SecuriBench [97] is another example from the community. Although
it focuses on Web-based applications written in Java, we mention it for its rele-
vance. It comprises of eight actual open-source Web-based applications that have
intentional security flaws. These apps are written in Java in a medium size. They
deliberately suffer from several vulnerabilities, including SQL-injection, cross-site
scripting, HTTP splitting and path traversal attacks. This tool is meant to serve
as test cases for practitioners from both research and industry.
3.3 Design and Implementation
This section illustrates the design and some implementation details of the proposed
benchmarking system.
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3.3.1 PPAndroid-Benchmarker Overall Design
The main purpose of PPAndroid-Benchmarker is to evaluate privacy leakage detec-
tion applications in an automated manner. As stated earlier, the Android platform
is targeted in this work. PPAndroid-Benchmarker is composed of three basic compo-
nents, the Benchmarker App, the Drop-in Server and the PC-based mobile device
manager (MDM). Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of PPAndroid-Benchmarker.
Firstly, the benchmarker is programmed to simulate leakages of different types of
private information. It has a profile creator that allows the user to define different
benchmarking tasks. Secondly, the Drop-in Server is used to receive leaked informa-
tion from the benchmarker. Lastly, the MDM handles automatic installation and
uninstallation of tested apps during the benchmarking process.
 
Drop-in Server
Android Testing 
Benchmark
PC-based 
Android Device 
Manager
Storage of Leaked 
Information
Figure 3.1: PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s overall design
3.3.2 PPAndroid-Benchmarker Components
Figure 3.2 shows how PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s different components interact with
each other as data flows between them, where the user is also shown as a “compo-
nent” as his/her interactions with several components are needed. In the following,
the three key components with greater details are explained.
The Profile Creator allows a user (who wants to tests some privacy protec-
tion apps) to create the actual benchmarking task (i.e., a benchmarking profile).
Any profiles created can be stored in a profile database so that they can be reused
in future. The Profile Database can also retrieve app-related information from
an Apps Repository which will also work with the MDM (to be explained be-
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Figure 3.2: PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s components and data flow map
low). The Profile Creator interacts with the user to collect information about a
benchmarking profile and feed the created profile to the Benchmarker App for
execution. The profiles are stored as XML files to make them accessible from other
components and external applications more easily. The Profile Creator can be made
part of the Benchmarker App or be implemented as a PC-based application which
communicates with the Benchamarker App via USB or a wireless channel.
The Benchmarker App is the core of PPAndroid-Benchmarker and its main
purpose is to simulate leakages of different types of private information. It is pro-
grammed to collect a variety of private information from the hosting mobile device.
Thus, this app needs to be granted with all required permissions in order to ac-
cess all data sources. This is not an issue as the benchmarker is used for testing
purposes only, and can run on a dedicated testing device or within an emulator.
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The Benchmarker App is programmed to leak information to a Drop-in Server,
which is a web server set up to simulate an attacker’s information collection server.
The Drop-in Server is designed to collect all needed information to create results
of each benchmarking profile, which are stored in a Results Database for further
(off-line) analysis. The Benchmarker App is connected to the MDM in order to
facilitate the automation of the benchmarking process.
Furthermore, the Benchmarker App is facilitated with many anti-tainting tricks.
Many designed dynamic analysis tools apply taint tracking technique, e.g., Taint-
Droid, MockDroid, AppFence and many others. Therefore, several tricks were
added, which are constructed to bypass dynamic taint tracking. In the current im-
plementation, the following obfuscation techniques reported in Anti-TaintDroid [85]
are included, which were verified to be still valid for the Android and TaintDroid
versions that have been tested.
• Simple encoding attack is an array indexing attack where the tainting opera-
tion can be tricked by propagating taints of the array (X-Tainted is used to
index an array of untainted variables to assign to Y-Untainted) and the index
to the assigned variable.
• Shell command attack : The idea is to simply limit system commands to re-
move the mark off the variables. The aim here is to alter a system utility
so the value of X-Tainted can be printed in some storage area in its output
stream and then Y-Untainted becomes taint-free.
• File+shell hybrid attack takes place by separating read/write operations re-
quired to acquire a taint-free variable. A file can be created somewhere in the
system, along with the tainted information as its content, and then can be
read. If one of the operations wrongly propagate taint markings, the output
variable is taint-free.
• Time keeper attack relies on the side channel created by the time it lasts to
accomplish a task. This can work if a system clock readable without being
tainted is available. The difference of time reads prior and post to a waiting
period, which duration is based on a tainted variable value, is untainted, and
can be used with a taint-free output variable.
• Count-to-X attack : Rather than traversing arrays to find out the value related
to X-Tainted, this attack remakes the value one incremented at a time, until
Y-Untainted finds the matching X-Tainted.
• File length attack : File meta-data can be exploited as a carrier to evade
tainting process. Some data can be written to a file until the size of this file
equals the value of X-Tainted. The resulted size can then be read without
being marked.
• Clipboard attack : The same technique of the previous attack can be followed
using a clipboard if it is available for applications use.
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• Exception/error attack occurs by inserting executing paths that contain de-
liberate exceptions. Exception handlers will help to make taint-free variables
to the values belong to the recognised value of X-Tainted leading to the ex-
ception.
• Remote control attack : The idea is to remtely taint-free the tainted variable
X-Tainted and assign a known untainted value to Y-Untainted. This attack
is carried out by sending commands using http communication with the des-
ignated server.
• File last modified attack : If a tainted variable is written to some file, the whole
file will be marked as tainted too. By using any system command attack such
as (cat /path/X-Tainted), the file can be modified with a malicious application
to produce a Y-Untainted. Eventually that will break the taint propagation
chain
The Mobile Device Management (MDM) is a PC-based Android device
manager handling automatic installation and uninstallation of each tested privacy
protection app during the testing process. The MDM has been implemented to
communicate with the Benchmarker App via a TCP port, although other commu-
nication channels can also be used. When the MDM receives an app download link,
it downloads it and installs it to the mobile device using ADB (Android Device
Bridge). After the benchmarking process ends at the Benchmarker App’s side, the
MDM will receive a request of uninstalling the tested app.
Drop-in Server: In order to simulate the complete information leakage process,
a sink is required to allow information to go out of the mobile device. In PPAndroid-
Benchmarker, the Internet connection is used as the sink. To simulate the case
of information leaked through the Internet, it is needed to set up a server that
receives leaked information. A number of server-side scripts (written in PHP in this
implementation) are used to handle received leakage information, some are used to
receive leaked files, and some others to create the results as XML files.
3.3.3 Data Management
A prototype of PPAndroid-Benchmarker has been implemented including all the
above components. At the time of this writing, this prototype supports the following
information sources:
• Device IDs: IMEI, IMSI, Android ID
• Personal data: SMS messages, contacts, call logs and browsing history
• Sensor data: camera, microphone, accelerometer axes data, last known ge-
olocation by GPS device or the ISP (Internet service provider)
• Files on the mobile device’s external memory storage
44 CHAPTER 3. PPANDROID-BENCHMARKER
The above list is not supposed to be complete, but used as a representative start
of the presented prototype system. Adding more sources is a matter of improving
the tool itself. To simplify this prototype, any advanced processing of information
leaked were not applied (e.g. encryption and steganography) other than some tricks
specially added to circumvent taint tracking techniques. Adding more advanced
information processing operations to information leaked will not be difficult, but
require a proper interface to allow easy reconfiguration (see below).
The presented design also considers two other major conceptual components, the
Automatic Test Apps Generator and the Reconfigurability Engine, which
have not been implemented in the current prototype system yet but will be added
in future versions of PPAndroid-Benchmarker prototype.
3.3.4 Automatic Test Apps Generator
PPAndroid-Benchmarker is designed to benchmark privacy protection apps more
in a dynamic way. To support benchmarking of static analysis tools, an automatic
Test Apps Generator can be developed to allow generation of apps with different
privacy leakage capabilities. The Test Apps Generator will take the source code
of the Benchmarker App as the source and the user’s descriptions of the test apps
wanted, and generate a number of apps with requested privacy leakage capabilities.
The process of generating test apps can contain random factors so that a large
number of test apps can be generated, which will produce much more test cases
for static analysis based tools than other solutions can provide. The generated
apps (in the form of apk files) can be used to benchmark any static analysis based
privacy protection systems. This component can be achieved in several ways such
as embedding a compiler that can automatically convert the source code of the
Benchmarker App into a subset representing the needed privacy leakage profile and
then compile the resulting source code to a mobile app. The compiler may be
implemented as part of the MDM as well.
3.3.5 Reconfigurability Engine
Any instance of PPAndroid-Benchmarker can only cover a limited number of sources
and sinks and limited settings for benchmarking profiles. To allow extension of
supported features and reconfiguration of the system (including removing some
unwanted features), a Reconfigurability Engine can also be developed.
A major part of the Reconfigurability Engine is addition and removal of sources
and sinks. This can be achieved by defining a dynamic list of sources and sinks
for PPAndroid-Benchmarker to process. The dynamic list needs to support both
descriptions of sources and sinks and also code for accessing the sources and sinks.
One way of supporting such a dynamic list is to have an XML file for the sources
and another one for the sink, and the binary code for accessing each source and sink
is provided in the form of an executable plug-in following a defined API. Another
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way of achieving this is to provide source code of new sources and sinks directly
with description files, and a compiler is used to re-compile the whole system into a
new instance of PPAndroid-Benchmarker.
Another part of the Reconfigurability Engine is changing how the system behaves
e.g. how to automatically configure some privacy protection apps requiring human
intervention, which can be achieved by defining other configuration files or APIs so
that different types of plug-ins can be added.
Another major part of the Reconfigurability Engine is to add and reconfigure
more information processing operations and tricks against static and dynamic anal-
ysis techniques. This prototype has included a number of tricks mainly for testing
TaintDroid. Adding more will require a different type of API and plug-in system
so that any operation can be added between any pair of source and sink, which will
need to work along with the API/plug-in systems for sources and sinks.
3.3.6 Interaction between Components
The interactions between different components can be explained by telling how a
typical benchmarking task looks like. At the beginning, the user will fill a test profile
to tell the benchmarker about details of the test. It will include information such
as types of leaked data, mobile device specifications, privacy apps to be tested and
others. The profiles are written in XML as stated. The profile creator keeps XML
files in the Profiles Database in order to be used for analysis. Then the Benchmarker
App starts communicating with the MDM to request installing each tested app. The
MDM searches for the required app and installs it. MDM keeps records of installed
apps in the Apps Repository for future use. Once the Benchmarker App receives
a signal of starting the test, it will initiate leakage attempts to the Drop-in Server.
The latter keeps the results as XML profiles in the Results Database.
3.4 Experimental Setup
In this section, the method that has been followed to set up the experiment is
explained. It starts with describing how tested apps were collected, followed by
how special apps were handled. Lastly, an explanation of variant settings and
implementation is provided.
3.4.1 Selection of Privacy Protection Apps
The first step of the experiment was to identify and collect Android apps with
some real-time privacy protection features. These tools were collected from vari-
ant sources. Many of them were gathered from Google Play store as it is the main
source for Android apps. The following steps were taken to collect the apps. Firstly,
Google’s search engine was used to look for related privacy apps. Many keywords
were used in this step. For example, “privacy”, “security”, “private”, “protection”,
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“leak”, “dynamic analysis”, “static analysis”, “leakages” and several others were
used. Secondly, some major third-party Android markets have been explored such
as Amazon Appstore, GetJar, Slide ME, F-Droid, Samsung Galaxy Apps, AppsLib,
Mobogenie and a few others. Thirdly, many related apps have been collected from
cyber security product vendors and service providers. The list of these vendors
were taken from AV-Comparatives website [98]. There are around 50 mobile se-
curity companies like AVG, AegisLab, Bitdefender, etc. Lastly, some data leakage
protection and Android forensics tools are included such as TaintDroid, NowSecure
forensic tool [99], PrivacyProtecter app reported in [100]. All privacy protection
apps that have been found were targeted to be tested but not all of them are
available or provide real-time protection. At the time of this writing, in total 165
privacy protection apps have been collected and tested. According to the sources,
these tools can be categorised as follows:
• Apps dedicated for privacy protection (from Google Play),
• security apps with privacy protection features (from Google Play),
• apps from third-party markets,
• security vendors’ apps (those not covered in the above categories) and
• privacy related apps developed by researchers.
Functionally speaking, those tools can be categorised into three different groups:
1. apps that try to detect privacy violations at installation time,
2. apps that detect privacy violations based on blocking access to sensitive in-
formation sources,
3. real-time dynamic monitoring tools requiring changes to the Android system.
3.4.2 Testing Procedure and Settings
In this experiment, the testing procedure covers three different scenarios: fully auto-
mated testing without user intervention, semi-automated testing with user interven-
tion, and testing access-related analysis apps. For the fully automated scenario, the
tester (as a user) is involved to select target apps for testing and define the bench-
marking tasks only. For the semi-automated scenario, the tester is also involved in
the process of installing process because some apps require manual configuration
before they can run properly. For the last scenario, the Benchmarker App will at-
tempt to access private sources first. Then, if the access is granted, the app will
proceed with the actual leakage.
PPAndroid-Benchmarker has been equipped with some options to increase the
configuration power. For instance, the user can set time-outs for the evaluation test.
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Moreover, the user can set wait times between data acquisition by the benchmarker
and data leaking attempts.
The architecture of PPAndroid-Benchmarker is intended to work in an auto-
mated manner as much as possible including automatically downloading and in-
stalling a target app. However, download links of some apps cannot be automati-
cally determined, so the apk files must be provided manually by the user. Moreover,
some apps are marked for manual configuration and initialisation. For instance,
some apps require manual registration, accepting terms or connecting to the cloud.
To ensure all target apps were tested with the most appropriate configuration set-
tings, settings with and without user intervention were manually tested and then
labelled each app with the best setting accordingly.
While testing apps which require Root access, it has been noticed that there is a
need of different settings. In this case, PPAndroid-Benchmarker is programmed to
also record if access to each target data source is blocked. That allows PPAndroid-
Benchmarker to know if a recorded failure of a privacy leakage attempt was blocked
at the access level or at a later stage.
Most apps can be tested with PPAndroid-Benchmarker without a special treat-
ment. However, there are a few tools that must be tested using a different proce-
dure or special settings. For example, TaintDroid does not work as a stand-alone
application. It involves building a custom-built operating system on the tested de-
vice/emulator. Thus, a customised version of Android was built to test TaintDroid
against PPAndroid-Benchmarker in an emulator. Accordingly, Anti-TaintDroid
(ScrubDroid) was tested in the same environment, too.
In this experiment, it has been decided not to test apps based on traffic anal-
ysis. Testing such apps requires some significant changes to the architecture and
procedures of PPAndroid-Benchmarker, and this was left as a future work.
3.4.3 Special Benchmarking Profiles
In this subsection, some special benchmarking profiles are discussed which were
used in the experiment.
Baseline Benchmarking Profile
The Android system itself may already has some privacy protection mechanism so
that some privacy leakage attempts can be detected and blocked at the operating
system level. In this experiment, a baseline profile was always ran without any
third-party privacy protection app first. When each privacy protection app was
tested, only those new successes in detecting privacy leakages were counted. For
the Android version that has been ran in this experiment, none of the privacy
leakage attempts were detected by the Android system, but this may change in
future versions.
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Probing Phase
As mentioned above, some apps may require user intervention. A probing phase
was therefore added to test if an app behaves differently with and without user
intervention. Figure 3.3 shows how this phase was conducted.
 
 
Leak 
info 
Profile data 
 
Result data 
 
Android App 
 
Contextual 
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Figure 3.3: PPAndroid-Benchmarker in probing phase
Access-Based Apps
Some apps block privacy leakages by blocking access to sensitive information sources.
Therefore, a special benchmarking task is added to test if a privacy leakage attempt
is blocked at the source access level or afterwards. The Benchmarker App will access
each source in the benchmarking profile and check if there is a response from the
tested app, and if the access goes through it will proceed with the actual leaking
attempt.
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3.5 Results & Analysis
This section presents the analysis results gathered from testing collected apps and
tools. It starts by demonstrating the probing phase results. Then, the findings from
the three functional categories of privacy protection apps are reported, respectively,
since the behaviours of apps in each category are different.
3.5.1 Probing Phase Results
During the study, some apps were noticed that they need to be configured before
using to ensure all included privacy protection means and settings are enabled. A
small experiment was conducted for nine apps, selected from distinct categories.
Seven out of nine asked for user input in variant ways. For example, some asked
the user to accept terms, to slide a few ad pages, to register on-line or to wait
for configuration. The time spent to set up each app after installation were also
calculated. Table 3.3 shows the findings of this small pilot study. As a consequence,
the actual benchmarking tasks were conducted in two approaches depending on if
user intervention is needed: fully automated without user intervention and semi-
automated with user intervention.
Table 3.3: Probing apps requirement of user-intervention
App Set-up Interac- Type
No. time in tion of interaction
seconds required
1 16.1 Yes Accept terms/ Connect to cloud
2 26.5 Yes Accept policy/ Configurations
3 8.5 No -
4 22.5 Yes Slide some ads/ Configurations
5 8.8 Yes Accept policy/ Configurations
6 13.0 Yes Accept terms/ Upgrade offer
7 76.3 Yes Accept terms/ Set a code/ Register
8 57.4 Yes Click start/ Setting/ Slide ads
9 18.0 No -
3.5.2 Benchmarking Results
In this subsection, results of the three functional categories are shown. These are
static analysis apps, apps require Root and dynamic analysis apps.
Static analysis based apps
A majority of the mobile privacy protecting applications collected from different
app markets belong to the first category. Apps in this group are only capable
of inspecting privacy-related features of an app at installation time. They either
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apply a permission analysis, statically analyse installed apps or upload examined
app to a sandbox to test it dynamically. Some tools notify the user of reported
malicious apps if installed. Nevertheless, none of them reported the Benchmarker
App of PPAndroid-Benchmarker as a malicious app. Therefore, all tested apps
did not block or detect any of the leaking attempts. Table 3.1 clarifies that where
‘F’ indicates the failure of tested apps to detect privacy violation. The results are
expected and demonstrated that PPAndroid-Benchmarker worked as designed.
In this group, approximately %75 of the apps were tested semi-automatically
with user intervention and the rest was tested in a fully automated manner.
Privacy apps requiring Root access
The second category covers apps that block access to defined sensitive data sources
on mobile devices. All apps in this group require the Root access in order to re-
ject other apps’ requests of accessing sensitive information sources. In PPAndroid-
Benchmarker testing, five commercial apps were found to provide such a function-
ality: SECUREit, X Privacy, PDroid Privacy Protection, LBE privacy guard and
360 Mobile Safe. The last two apps are only available in Chinese. One research app
developed by Li et al. [100] also falls into this category.
Table 3.2 shows the result of testing apps in this category. Those apps are
different in terms of how much they protect the user. As illustrated, each app has
its own fixed list of predefined private information sources. The table shows how
each app responded to privacy leaks of variant sources. ‘F’ indicates that the app
did not react against that leakage, where ‘B’ means the attempt was blocked. X
Privacy clearly is more diverse than others in covering many sensitive sources. It
is also capable of faking the mobile device identifier IMEI (represented as ‘B+’ in
Table 3.2). This app is the only one in this group able of providing an option
beyond blocking attempts. Hence, X Privacy gives three options when the IMEI is
being accessed: block, fake, and allow. All the apps in this group were tested in the
semi-automated with user interaction mode on a rooted device. The reason is that
they need to be granted with root access to function. Additionally, most of them
require the user to set up the app and interact with some interfaces before they are
ready.
Real-time privacy monitoring apps
The last category covers only a few apps developed by researchers. For this category
TaintDroid was tested since it is the basis of many other solutions. Table 3.4
illustrates the result of benchmarking TaintDroid with the presented system. It
shows that TaintDroid succeeded in detecting privacy leakages in real time, as ‘S’
shows in the table, for its predefined list of sensitive information sources. Each
time that it has been tried to leak a piece of sensitive information, TaintDroid
triggered a notification showing the tainted tracked data alongside with the leaking
app and some other details. Some information sources, notably ‘files’, ‘call log’
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and ‘camera’, are not included in TaintDroid’s list, so the privacy leakage attempts
were not detected. When the information leakage was attempted using anti-tainting
tricks, most of leakage attempts were not detected, except for for the ‘direct buffer’
and ‘lookup table’ attacks.
TaintDroid in this work was tested in a customised emulator since it requires a
modified version of Android operating system to run. TaintDroid was tested in a
fully automated manner since no user intervention is required in the benchmarking
process.
3.6 Discussions
In brief, this experiments proved that PPAndroid-Benchmarker is efficiently and cor-
rectly working as designed. The overall results from the benchmarking experiment
can be summarised as follows: static analysis based apps when tested all failed to
detect any real-time leakage attempts, privacy apps that require Root access could
block access to some sensitive information sources, and TaintDroid (representing
dynamic analysis based methods) could detect most of the leakage attempts except
for three information sources tested but it failed when most anti-tainting tricks were
applied.
As a general observation, the more “intrusive” a privacy protection tool is, the
more powerful it can do to detect and prevent privacy leakage attempts. What
is meant by “intrusive” is how much changes a tool requires from the operating
system, ranging from the most intrusive to the least: rebuilding the operating sys-
tem, requesting Root access to the operating system and hooking into the operating
system for checking new apps at the installation time. However, even for the most
intrusive tool, TaintDroid, there are still privacy leakages that cannot be detected.
This implies that the best approach is for the operating system itself to provide
native support on privacy leakage detection and prevention, so that the intrusive-
ness will not be an issue any more. If that happens, PPAndroid-Benchmarker will
still be able to benchmark the built-in privacy protection mechanism since it simply
simulates what malicious apps are doing. As a matter of fact, in the current imple-
mentation, a baseline benchmarking profile is always run without any third-party
privacy protection apps so it is easy to identify what privacy leakage attempts can
be detected by the Android system itself.
Some could argue, why PPAndroid-Benchmarker does not give a numeric or
categorical rating for tested apps. Having a way of rating privacy protection mobile
apps in terms of their general performance can be very useful for end users, and is
a topic for the future research. A possible way of giving scores or ratings through
PPAndroid-Benchmarker is to count how many sensitive sources are protected by
the tested tool, but some issues need to be carefully considered. First, not all
sensitive information leakages are considered privacy violation [101]. Some sensitive
information is transmitted out of the device for the sake of providing better services
for the user. For instance, collecting users’ precise location can help an app give more
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personalised and contextualised recommendations, and collecting some user details
help mobile app vendors to provide extra functionalities and more personalised
services. Another issue is that it can be very challenging to cover all means of
collecting sensitive information sources from the mobile device, so any ratings based
on a limited coverage can be inaccurate or biased. In addition, it is not trivial to
give a single rating for so many different information sources and ways to leak
information. It may be beneficial to produce multiple ratings representing different
aspects of the privacy protection level. For each rating, there is also issues around
how to aggregate results of all covered information sources and sinks together, which
is not trivial, either. Therefore, rating mobile privacy protection apps could be a
very complicated task, and requires further work beyond this work’s scope.
One of the key design goals of the presented work is to increase the level of
automation to streamline the benchmarking processes. However, since Google Play’s
Terms of Services does not allow automated download of mobile apps, that feature
cannot be fully achieved for this prototype. The system has to run in a way such
that the tester is asked to provide the apk file of the tested app. Nevertheless,
PPAndroid-Benchmarker currently mitigates this problem by building an Apps
Repository so that known apps can be retrieved directly from the database without
any user intervention. Note that this limitation is not a technical issue but a legal
one. If PPAndroid-Benchmarker is adopted by Google, this issue will naturally go
away.
As it has been mentioned before, due to the need to set up and configure initial
settings, it is not possible to fully automate the benchmarking process without
any human intervention. However, given enough information about what kinds
of human interventions are needed, such interventions can be avoided by adding
needed human interactions into the Apps Repository and then using some system
services to emulate the actions done by human users. For instance, some system
services for accessibility purposes have provided ways to automate clicks of buttons
on the user interface, which may be incorporated in further versions of PPAndroid-
Benchmarker.
To allow further development and validation of PPAndroid-Benchmarker by the
wider research community, it has been decided to release the current implemen-
tation as an open-source tool at: https://github.com/SaeedAlqahtani/PPAndroid-
Benchmarker. As mentioned before, the plan is to add some new components and
APIs into the current implementation. Other researchers and developers are wel-
come to contribute to PPAndroid-Benchmarker, by conducting more tests, adding
new add-ons to it and porting it to other mobile operating systems.
3.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, PPAndroid-Benchmarker is presented, a benchmarking system for
evaluating performance of mobile privacy protection apps. This system allows to
benchmark privacy protection apps designed for the Android platform. To the
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best of the author knowledge, PPAndroid-Benchmarker is the first of its kind.
PPAndroid-Benchmarker has been tested on 165 privacy protection apps belonging
to three different functional categories to demonstrate PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s
effectiveness in evaluating their performance in detecting privacy leakage attempts.
It is believed that the experiment that has been conducted is also the first of the
kind as many previous efforts are about benchmarking privacy risks of normal apps
rather than privacy protection apps. The results showed that real-time dynamic
monitoring tools like TaintDroid is the best approach, which is not a surprise since
such tools require the most changes to the underlying operating system.
For future work, there are a number of improvements that can be made on
PPAndroid-Benchmarker. The most important components to add to the presented
prototype are the Test Apps Generator and the Reconfigurability Engine discussed
in Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5. Adding these two components is not technically dif-
ficult, although it is necessary to decide carefully how to make them more usable
to end users of PPAndroid-Benchmarker. Another interesting feature to add is to
incorporate the system with an Off-line Analyser. This component can be de-
signed to collect both testing profiles and benchmarking results with the aim of
producing more visualised results to facilitate understanding of tested privacy pro-
tection apps and comparing their performance. It can also produce one or more
ratings to reflect the level of privacy protection of each tested app. Furthermore,
another future work is to add a benchmarking profile for dynamic behaviour apps.
Some privacy protection apps have dynamic behaviours. There are some privacy
protection apps connected to a cloud and update their data every while. Other
apps may have an intelligent way of adapting their behaviours, e.g. it may use ma-
chine learning techniques and improve its responses to privacy leakage attempts of
malicious apps. To properly benchmark such apps, PPAndroid-Benchmarker need
to run the benchmarking task for a significantly long period of time and capture a
number of snapshots of the tested app’s behaviour, and then see if some changes
can be observed.
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Chapter 4
User Perceived Trust of Mobile
Apps’ Privacy Ratings
4.1 Introduction
Mobile apps are the soul of mobile devices that are the sources of functionalities and
features. Variety and sophisticated functions that apps offer today require access
to sensitive sources of information on the phone. However, apps can be poorly
or intentionally designed to violate the user’s privacy, so mobile users must pay
attention when selecting apps. On the other hand, it is hard for app stores keeping
track of all apps to identify malicious and legitimate apps especially that their
statistics are remarkable. The number of available apps in Google Play Store from
December 2009 to December 2017 has been dramatically increasing. According to
Statista [102], it was very recently placed at 3.5 million apps in December 2017,
after actually surpassing one million apps in 2013. The same website announced
that during May 2016 there were 65 billion apps downloaded from Google Play,
reported from the online company. Over and above, a report in 2017 showed that
daily US users usually spend 2.3 hours with digital media on mobiles [103].
Earlier in the literature review of this thesis, privacy risks of mobile devices have
been presented. One of the risks is the consequences of private information leakages
of malicious apps. Based on the fact that apps are ubiquitous and essential, users
need to be informed about security and privacy issues of apps. To solve that, one
of the elements to look at is the ratings associated with apps that can help users to
make decisions about apps to install and use. App ratings mainly aim to provide
users with feedback about the app either in terms of security, privacy, performance
or any sort of experience that can be encountered in use.
Ratings of apps in general can be classified into subjective and objective ratings
according to the extent of the direct human involvement in the evaluation process,
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although the distinction between both classifications can be more complicated. In
this thesis, the focus is on mobile privacy leakage issue. Hence, this work concen-
trates on privacy ratings in studying users’ perceived trust. Moreover, the following
definitions are used for a given app: 1) an objective rating is an automated (i.e.,
machine-generated) evaluation of the app in terms of privacy; 2) a subjective rating
is human-judged evaluation of the app’s privacy level.
Although there is some evidence of the usefulness of objective app privacy ratings
in motivating users to select more secure apps, how human users perceive objec-
tive ratings and how such ratings influence their behaviours (especially when the
objective ratings contradict with subjective judgements of their own or what they
heard from human experts) remain largely unstudied. Since any contradiction can
potentially cause a loss of trust of users, understanding users’ trust in both objective
and subjective app ratings could offer ways of improving the design and evaluation
of the related systems. The determinants of trust in the human decision-making
process have been studied in various contexts [104,105], however, to the best of the
author’s knowledge, they have not been systematically investigated in the context
of mobile apps research.
To fill the above-mentioned gap, a user study on users’ perceived trust in sub-
jective and objective privacy ratings of mobile apps has been conducted. Data
collected from over 1,000 crowdsourcing workers revealed that: 1) the user’s own
subjective perception of app privacy could heavily influence their perceived trust in
subjective and objective ratings of mobile apps; 2) there are different user-specific
behavioural patterns in the reported trust in subjective and objective ratings of
mobile apps; 3) users’ trust in app ratings is dependent on the app category; 4) no
sufficient evidence that users’ trust in app privacy ratings is influenced by demo-
graphic factors such as skill-level and gender except the age which has proven to
play a significant role on users’ self-reported trust.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents selected
work closely related to the work reported in this chapter. A detailed description
of the user study is given in Section 4.3, which is followed by data analysis and
results in Section 4.4 and more discussions on the main findings in Section 4.5. In
Section 4.6, some limitations of this study are presented. The last section concludes
the chapter with future work.
4.2 Related Work
In this section, related work is reviewed. It starts by describing the role of trust-
worthiness, followed by showing evidence on the impact of subjective and objective
feedback on decision making.
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4.2.1 The Role of Trustworthiness
Trust in the mobile apps context can be important in predicting to what extent
ratings will affect users’ decision-making processes related to mobile app privacy.
Huang et al. [106] indicated that low perceived security may cause users to reject
the use of IT systems, while high perceived security may result in engaging insecure
practices. This would imply that risk perception, which can be in relation to trust,
can greatly affect users’ decisions and behaviours. To the best knowledge of the au-
thor, no work touched the effect of trust in human decision-making in the context of
mobile apps ratings. However, in social sciences, trust is often explained as an indi-
vidual’s readiness for a vulnerable circumstance as a result of a positive expectation
of others’ actions [105], where “others” can be other people or automated systems.
It is a general understanding that the interpretation of trust is context-dependent
and research on it requires a multi-dimensional approach in the right context [107].
Trust characterisation, factors and influences have been also studied. Often,
researchers attribute trust to three factors of a trustee: 1) expertise or ability: to
what extent a trustee is considered to be competent, 2) trustworthiness: the level of
cooperation and kindness that a trustee is seen to be, and 3) honesty: the integrity
level that the trustee is believed to be [105, 108]. Trust can be also influenced
by other factors such as conditional reasons and personality traits [104, 105, 107].
Moreover, another work has shown when judging others trustworthiness through
Facebook profiles, observers rely on some meaningful cues e.g., number of friends,
number of comments and likes, smiling profile photographs, etc [109].
4.2.2 Impact of Subjective and Objective Feedback on Decision
Making
To the best of the author’s knowledge, very limited work has investigated the in-
fluence of subjective and objective feedback and ratings on users’ decision making
processes. Some limited research has been done in the areas of marketing, business
and health care. Lynn [110], as an example, explained how subjective messages are
trusted more than objective messages in relevance to the rise of venereal diseases.
In another related work, some researchers from the marketing research com-
munity examined the influence of message board persuasion in terms of subjective
messages and/or objective messages. They found that using objective messages is
more efficient than subjective ones. Yet, combining the two types did not improve
the result from using either subjective or objective alone [111].
The closest related work in the area of cyber security was done by Chen et
al. [112]. A user study was conducted to investigate the impact of risk (negative)
and safety (positive) information in mobile apps’ summaries on users’ decisions
on app installations. They suggested developing a validated risk/safety index for
mobile apps. That could be used to improve users’ decisions when they install new
apps, specially when that index is framed in terms of safety.
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4.3 User Study Design
Mobile users’ trust in mobile apps appears to play an important role in predicting
either they depend on subjective or objective rating to form their decisions about
apps. As a consequent, this work sheds light on how trust affects human users’
decision making processes in the context of mobile apps’ privacy ratings. In fact,
this experiment tends to find out which is the most trusted evaluation source of
apps privacy, objective (from automated computer programs), subjective (hu-
man experts opinions) evaluation of app privacy level or the user own judgement.
Ultimately, the user study was designed to answer research questions in the following
subsection.
4.3.1 Research Hypotheses
This user study has been designed to investigate users’ trust in subjective and
objective privacy ratings of mobile apps. The expectation was that users’ self-
reported trust in this context is dependent on several factors. These factors can be
either linked directly to human aspects such as their characteristics and experience,
or to non-human aspects such as the app category, and the type of feedback given
‘subjective/objective rating’. In this piece of work, the following five hypotheses
were formulated to be tested:
• Hypothesis 1 (H1): users’ own subjective judgement on app rating plays a
significant role in users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective ratings.
• Hypothesis 2 (H2): users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective
ratings is user specific.
• Hypothesis 3 (H3): users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective
ratings is dependent on app category.
• Hypothesis 4 (H4): demographic factors such as age, gender and skill level
play a significant role in users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective
ratings.
• Hypothesis 5 (H5): users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective
ratings differs based on the context.
4.3.2 Procedure
To test the above hypotheses, a within-subjects crowdsourcing-based experiment
was conducted. At the beginning of the user study, a brief overview was given to
the participants explaining the meanings of subjective and objective ratings. The
study was designed to be completed within 30 minutes. The study was structured
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in three sessions1. Participants’ demographics including age, gender, and their
computer skill levels were collected in the first session. Then, six apps with their
subjective and objective ratings (see Section 4.3.3) were presented to participants
without revealing any details about the presented apps. The six apps were displayed
in a completely “anonymous” form (shown as “App 1”, “App 2”, etc.) in the second
session. In the third and fourth sessions, app type was revealed such as “Anti-
virus 1”, “Anti-virus 2”, “Messenger 1”, “Messenger 2”, etc. Each participant was
asked to complete 18 questions (one question per app), a third of the questions on
“anonymous” apps and the other two-thirds are evenly on Tool and Social apps
(Section 4.3.3 describes how categories were chosen). The apps were shown to the
participants in a random order and participants were asked to focus on a single app
at a time.
Table 4.1: Apps names used in our experiments and their privacy ratings, shown
in 4-point scale
Mobile apps Privacy ratings
Hidden Tool Social Objective Subjective
App1 Antivirus1 Messenger1 C A
App2 Antivirus2 Messenger2 A B
App3 Antivirus3 Messenger3 D C
App4 Antivirus4 Messenger4 B D
App5 Antivirus5 Messenger5 A A
App6 Antivirus6 Messenger6 C C
a The 4-point scale of app privacy rating was chosen to be in
line with the strength rating scales used for the password
sessions (see Footnote 1).
For each app, participants were asked which rating they trust more. Dummy
app names was presented to users to avoid complicating the study with other fac-
tors (see Section 4.3.3). Users were informed that objective scores are generated by
an algorithm developed by a group of human security experts, whereas subjective
scores are generated by a group of human security experts. Participants were of-
fered four choices of answers (“Subjective Rating”, “Objective Rating”, “Neither”,
and “Undecided”), and they had to select one of the four. The Neither option im-
plies that a user disagrees with both objective and subjective privacy scores, where
“Undecided” means that the participant is unable to make a choice.
All apps with their ratings were shown to participants in the same order as
shown in Table 4.1. The order was not randomised for two reasons: 1) to get an even
randomisation of app orders, this would require a larger sample size of participants
1 In our user study, we actually included two more sessions on password strength ratings,
which is reported in a separate thesis (Chapter 3 [113]). To counterbalance the learning effects,
participants were randomly divided into two groups, one was asked to do the password tasks first
and the other the mobile app tasks first. Our analysis showed that the data from both groups were
consistent so we used all participants for our data analysis reported in this thesis.
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(a) Hidden Apps (b) Displayed Apps ‘tool’ (c) Displayed Apps ‘social’
Figure 4.1: A screen-shot of “anonymous” and displayed
app questions and rating options
and additional expenses can be avoided if the apps order is fixed; 2) only dummy
names of apps were displayed to avoid complicating the study with many factors
that might affect user responses. The only information revealed to the user is the
app type in the second sessions. Therefore, it does not make sense to show the
user “Messenger 6” before “Messenger 3” for instance. However, participants were
allocated to different orders of displaying password and app sessions to exclude the
potential influence of the order of displayed sessions. Furthermore, to minimise the
potential influence of the order of answer options in each question, the order was
randomised.
After a participant made a choice for one app, another follow-up question was
asked for the participant to justify his/her decision. A set of predefined justifications
were displayed to help guide the participant. These presented reasons are shown
according to user previous selection, meaning that there is a set of reasons for each
choice of trust. Table 4.2 depicts the reasons that were shown to participants.
Moreover, there was a space for the users to construct his /her own reasoning in
a free-format text area. This part of the design was added to investigate how
participants made their decisions of the perceived trust.
Like typical crowdsourcing based user studies, we did not collect any personal or
sensitive data. The user study was reviewed by the University of Surrey’s Univer-
sity Ethics Committee (UEC) and a favourable ethics opinion was secured before
running the user study.
4.3.3 Our Choice of Mobile Apps
In this experiment, eighteen pairs of objective and subjective rating combinations
were used. There were six apps displayed to participants in each session. Table 4.1
shows the apps that were used along with their privacy scores. In the following, the
considerations of how apps’ privacy scores were determined are discussed.
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Table 4.2: Predefined answers for users’ reasons behind each choice of rating
Choices ID Reason Options
Objective
O1 Automated algorithms can detect hidden things better than
humans.
O2 Humans often make mistakes while automated algorithms al-
ways do what they are designed for.
O3 I dont believe human experts can always agree with each other.
O4 The objective rating matches my expectation.
O5 The objective rating is lower and I want to be at the safer side.
O6 It is just my feeling and I cant explain it.
O7 Others.
Subjective
O8 Automated algorithms cannot predict new form of attacks.
O9 Automated algorithms are designed by human experts but they
wont do as well as human experts.
O10 Computer programs can contain errors and bugs so the results
may be misleading (although not intended by human design-
ers).
O11 The subjective rating matches my expectation.
O12 The subjective rating is lower and I want to be at the safer
side.
O13 It is just my feeling and I cant explain it.
O14 Others.
Neither
O15 Neither ratings match my expectation.
O16 It is just my feeling and I cant explain it.
O17 Others
Undecided
O18 I need more information to make a proper choice.
O19 Others.
Different App Categories
The study was designed in a way that represents different apps categories and variant
privacy levels. Three categories were chosen to allow studying user perception
in variant contexts. In a pilot study, we decided to use three categories: anti-
virus tools, instant messaging apps, and mobile games. However, games were later
removed in the formal study as they contain too many sub-categories and it was
hard to classify them consistently (which we left for future research). The remaining
two categories represent two representative classes of apps: security tools like anti-
virus apps are supposed to be trusted as they meant to protect security of mobile
devices, while social tools like IM apps allow users to share information including
personal and sensitive information so they can be perceived privacy sensitive by
many users.
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Different Subjective and Objective Ratings
The subjective and objective privacy ratings are simply allocated to apps in a way
fulfils the study goals. Dummy app names were used to avoid potential impact of
factors such as app name, user’s familiarity with the app, attractiveness of the icon,
etc. Therefore, any privacy ratings can be given to apps without limitations.
The allocated ratings are believed to be reasonable to some extent, although
there might be some disagreement of how they were selected. In early stages of
the design, limited cases were tested which represent differences between subjective
and objective privacy scores. In that case, participants were asked to select what
they trust based on the rating value and type. Yet, a few cases were added, where
subjective and objective ratings are made equal to study user behaviour in this spe-
cial condition. In addition, the difference between objective and subjective ratings
were made logical, so the participant does not feel it is not realistic. Therefore, that
difference was one- or two-point difference on the 4-point scale for each rated app.
In this way, the potential effect of illogical ratings can be controlled, to avoid hav-
ing trust issues of the user-study. Furthermore, the design has taken into account
having a variant pair of subjective and objective ratings for each app to provide a
more uniform distribution of apps’ ratings.
4.3.4 Recruitment
The CrowdFlower crowdsourcing platform [114] was used to recruit participants
in this study (in April 2018 CrowdFlower was renamed to Figure Eight). Each
participant was rewarded $0.6 for the whole study (including the password strength
tasks which are not covered in this thesis)2.
The recruitment only involved the most trusted workers rated by CrowdFlower
(the so-called ‘Level 3’ workers) to maximise data quality. The whole user study
is split into a number of parts and ran on different days and at different times to
recruit participants from different geo-locations and working times.
4.3.5 Quality Assessment
Some strategies are needed to ensure the quality of the collected data due to the
reason that crowdsourcing based studies can incur a lot of noise in the data. There-
fore, outliers, as anomalies, inconsistencies and deviants in data, must be detected
to achieve high reliability. The following paragraphs explain the participants pre-
screening step, followed by how outliers were detected.
In the pre-screening step, as mentioned in the previous subsection, the recruit-
ment only accepted Level 3 workers. To elaborate, CrowdFlower provided a feature
that allowed selecting workers based on trust annotations. These annotations are
2Note that on crowdsourcing platforms rewards for such micro tasks are mostly very cheap.
$0.6 was agreed based on similar tasks on the same platform to avoid under- or over-motivating
participation.
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acquired from groups of other trusted annotators. Also, each worker (participant)
has a trust level or reputation which is built based on the previously accomplished
jobs.
Post the data collection, three detection rules were constructed to detect outliers.
These are built based on workers’ actual responses. The following set of rules were
followed to ensure the reliability of approved answers.
1. Unfinished tasks were excluded from the results. This was done to ensure that
all questions are answered in both sessions.
2. Only tasks that were completed within a reasonable time were accepted. First,
we calculated the average duration to complete the task from a small pilot
study included ten participants and the actual average duration from our
crowdsourcing experiment (approximately 8.5 and 11 respectively). Using k-
means clustering, we split the participants into 3 groups based on their task
completion time. The smallest group where participants spent less time than
others are treated as outliers. Specifically, we sat a threshold value based on
the clusters and the average spent time to accept participants work. Precisely,
the threshold we used was 4 minutes.
3. Conflicting answers from the same participant were considered from outliers,
and therefore excluded. In this rule, outliers were identified whenever their
given reasoning deviated from the selected rating they chose to report trust.
This step was manually done.
These approaches would produce large errors if it is applied too rigidly. In
other words, the above approaches could exclude participants who are not
necessarily outliers since a honest participant may still produce a few errors
unintentionally. Such unintended human errors would be expected and should
not degrade the trustworthiness of their responses as such mistakes would hap-
pen without intention and can be neutralised by other participants’ answers.
Therefore, it would be better to not exclude those who made only a few con-
flict errors. Then, this would require calculating the average human error
rate in a separate study and use this to determinate the threshold value of
acceptable human errors.
4.4 Results
In this section, results of this crowdsourcing based experiment are illustrated. This
section starts with analysis of the participants. Afterwords, the observed behavioural
analysis is described on different levels: app condition, behavioural patterns, demo-
graphic factors and app dependencies. Finally, the section ends with elaboration of
reasons behind trust analysis.
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4.4.1 Participants
Based on a statistical power analysis, the required sample size for this user study
is 293. This sample size is the outcome of an acceptable power of 0.95, given
an expected medium effect size of 0.5 and p < 0.05. Ultimately, the sample size
(N = 1077) exceeds the desired number of subjects which in turn would have a
significant power.
In total 1,100 participants took part in the presented user study. 23 participants
were excluded because they took the experiment more than once. Therefore, the
data that have been analysed were based on 1, 100− 23 = 1, 077 participants from
68 countries. The male-female ratio was 66% to 34%. The participants had a
reasonably wide age range: 26-35 (39.4%), 18-25 (30.6%), 36-45 (20.8%), over 45
(8.6%), and below 18 (0.6%) (they were excluded as it is against the ethics approval
of this study). Due to the relatively small number of participants in the last two
age groups, participants were re-grouped to have a more even distribution: 25 or
below (336 participants), 26-35 (424 participants), 36 or older (317 participants).
Figure 4.2 shows participants distribution by age, computer skill levels according to
their gender.
In the following subsections, the main results of the presented user study are
illustrated. For the four answer options for each app, 2-character short names are
defined: su for subjective rating, ob for objective rating, ne for neither and ud for
undecided.
4.4.2 Behavioural Analysis
In this subsection, an analysis of participants’ behaviours is demonstrated at variant
levels. First, it shows how the app category, when it is revealed, affected users trust.
Then, it illustrates the observed behavioural patterns of participants. After that,
this part continues with showing the effect of demographic factors on users’ self-
reported trust. Lastly, it investigates if participants’ behaviours are influenced by
different rating combinations.
App Category Condition
First, the impact of the display condition of the app category (apps category hidden
or shown, as a binary independent variable) on participants’ self-reported trust in
subjective and objective ratings is reported. Here, the dependent variable is the
4-valued answer of each participant (i.e., the self-reported trust). Among the four
values, our main interest is on su and ob, but we will also look at ne and ud since
they can reflect how participants felt about the shown subjective and objective
ratings.
In order to visualise the collective behaviour of all participants, 3-D histograms
of participants’ behavioural patterns for both hidden- and displayed-app conditions
have been produced as shown in Figs. 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, where the bin in the 3-D
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Figure 4.2: Age (a) and computer skill levels (b)
distribution of participants based on their gender
histogram at position (i, j) indicates the number of participants who chose su i
times and ob j times (0 ≤ i + j ≤ 6)3. Each bin in the 3-D histogram denotes a
specific behavioural pattern of a number of participants in terms of a participant’s
tendency to trust subjective or/and objective ratings.
The data represented in the 3-D histograms has different dimensionalities. For
the reason that this study aims to compare subjective vs. objective factors, the
graphs in Figs. 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 focus on two dimensions which are subjective and
objective app ratings. However, the data can be seen from different angles such as
representing the collective behaviour based on given apps’ scores. This will be for
future work as it goes beyond the scope of this study.
From Figs. 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 it can be seen that the participants’ collective be-
haviour was not significantly affected by the app category display condition. Despite
the apps category information was hidden or displayed, most participants tended to
3The maximum value of i + j is 6 because the sum cannot exceed the number of apps shown
to participants, which is 6.
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Figure 4.3: 3-D histogram of participants’ collective behaviours in terms of their
choices on su and ob for plain apps
 
   
Figure 4.4: 3-D histogram of participants’ collective behaviours in terms of their
choices on on su and ob for tool apps
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Figure 4.5: 3-D histogram of participants’ collective behaviours in terms of their
choices on su and ob for social apps
follow one of four typical behavioural patterns (i.e., four peaks in the 3-D histogram
– see Section 4.4.2).
For participants who reported full trust in objective ratings (79 participants),
less than 6% of them (3 in Tools apps session and 6 in Social apps session out of 79)
changed their reported trust for at least one app after the app category was revealed
to them in the following session. On the other hand, 58 participants reported full
trust in subjective ratings, less than 10% (8 in Tools session and 3 in Social session
out of 58) of them shifted their answers for one app at minimum. This suggests
that a great majority of subjective and objective ratings believers have a consistent
reported trust in all sessions. One more thing to note is that around 7% (75/1077)
of the participants reported trust in neither subjective nor objective ratings in both
conditions, suggesting some human users may have an intrinsic disbelief on ratings
given by others (machines and other people).
Although the pattern in the three 3-D histograms is clearly visible, a Stuart-
Maxwell χ2 test and a multinomial regression were conducted to see if there are
any statistically significant differences. The Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests showed that
there is an observed difference between plain and other app category sessions as
seen in Table 4.3. The table shows that participants tended to trust subjective and
objective ratings more when the app category was displayed. It deserves noting
that participants trusted subjective rating more than objective in tool session. On
the contrary, the multinomial regression results in Table 4.4 show a low McFadden’s
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Table 4.3: Results of the Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests for analysing participants’
self-reported trust in subjective and objective ratings
Distributions Compared χ2 p-value
su (Plain) vs. su (Tool) 23.163 0.0007
su (Plain) vs. su (Social) 15.205 0.019
su (Tool) vs. su (Social) 8.5759 0.199
ob (Plain) vs. ob (Tool) 14.9 0.021
ob (Plain) vs. ob (Social) 13.443 0.036
ob (Tool) vs. ob (Social) 5.2312 0.514
su (Plain) vs. ob (Plain) 3.745 0.711
su (Tool) vs. ob (Tool) 15.78 0.015
su (Social)vs. ob (Social) 9.5279 0.146
a
For p-value, “< ε” means that the exact p-value could not be
obtained but it drops below the precision limit (which is 2.22×
10−16 for R, the language we used for statistical tests). The
same notation will be used for other tables below.
Table 4.4: Results of the multinomial logistic regressions conducted on the app
category condition as the predictor of participants’ self-reported trust
Predictor b SE p-value OR
Tool su -0.098 0.042 0.0216 0.907
Tool ne -0.015 0.058 0.7974 0.985
Tool ud -0.124 0.0498 0.0129 0.884
Social su -0.047 0.043 0.2738 0.954
Social ne 0.0302 0.058 0.6059 1.031
Social ud -0.034 0.049 0.491 0.966
a
χ2 = 9.8746 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.0002. The baseline of the
independent variable (app category condition) is “Plain”. The pivot
outcome is “ob” and OR means the odds ratio (the same hereinafter).
R2 value, suggesting that the condition as a binary variable does not have a good
predictive power. Regression result shows there is no significant difference at most
as majority of p-values are higher than 0.05. That suggests the differences were
better tested by other statistical tests (i.e., Stuart-Maxwell x2 test). 4
Behavioural Patterns
As it has been mentioned earlier in 4.4.2, four peaks can be observed in the 3-D
histogram of collective behaviour of all participants, each referring to a distinct
4In the table, each row represents a prediction model where the predictor variable x is the
display condition (1 = display, 0 = hidden) and the predicted variable is ln
(
p(y)
p(ob)
)
, and y ∈
{su, ne,ud}. The predictor is a linear equation: ln
(
p(y)
p(ob)
)
= βy0 + βy1 × x.
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Figure 4.6: 2-D histograms of participant’s collective behaviours in terms of their
choices on su and ob
behavioural pattern. This appears to suggest that each participant may have some
intrinsic behavioural style that can influence her/his self-reported trust in subjec-
tive and objective ratings. Therefore, by knowing which behavioural style a person
has, the trust in subjective and objective app ratings can be predicted which will
allow to test H2. Therefore, a k-means algorithm has been performed to cluster
all participants of the user study into four behavioural clusters: P1 (disbelievers,
246 participants, centre={0.7, 0.6}, P2 (balanced believers, 391 participants, cen-
tre={1.8, 2.8}), P3 (subjective rating believers, 281 participants, centre={4.3, 0.7})
and P4 (objective rating believers, 159 participants, centre={0.2, 5.3}). Figure 4.6
depicts the four generated behavioural groups from k-means clustering.
Another multinomial logistic regression was applied by using the behavioural
cluster of each participant which is obtained from running the k-means clustering.
This regression tests whether the behavioural cluster label is a good predictor of
participants’ perceived trust. The results are given in Table 4.5, which indicate that
the effect is statistically significant with significant odd ratios. The result shows
that subjective rating believers (P3) are more likely to select subjective ratings
over objective ratings comparing to the balanced believers (P2). The odds ratio of
(P3) shows that subjective rating believers are predicted to select subjective ratings
over objective ratings more than those who belong to the other behavioural styles.
Unsurprisingly, the disbelievers (P1) are more likely to trust neither ratings or select
undecided more than any other group according to high odds ratios.
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Table 4.5: Results of the multinomial logistic regression conducted on the
behavioural pattern as the predictor of participants’ self-reported trust
Predictor b SE p-value OR
P1 su 0.325 0.060 7× 10−8 1.383
P1 ne 1.809 0.063 < ε 6.103
P1 ud 2.039 0.057 < ε 7.686
P3 su 1.281 0.045 < ε 3.6
P3 ne 0.301 0.071 2.4× 10−5 1.351
P3 ud 0.271 0.064 2.2× 10−5 1.312
P4 su -1.996 0.073 < ε 0.136
P4 ne -1.939 0.115 < ε 0.144
P4 ud -1.395 0.08 < ε 0.248
a
For p-value, “< ε” means that the exact p-value could not be obtained
but it drops below the precision limit (which is 2.22× 10−16 for R, the
language we used for statistical tests). The same notation will be used
for other tables below.
b χ2 = 6749.9 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.13324. The baseline of the
independent variable is “P2” balanced believers. The reference of app
rating is “ob”.
The above analysis may be seen as circular reasoning as the personality labels
are obtained from the data and then used to predict the data. To further vali-
date whether the personality labels obtained from running the k-means clustering
are reliable, another analysis was applied where the data was split into two non-
overlapping subsets. Each subset contains users’ responses on a different subset
of three apps. Then, k-means clustering algorithm was run on each data subset
to derive the personality label for each participant and then used the label as an
independent variable to predict the reported trust in the other subset. Next, a
multinomial regression on each data subset was conducted, as can be seen in Ta-
ble 4.6. The results showed that the odds ratios observed in the new analysis are
mostly aligned with the findings in the first analysis, suggesting that most users
behave consistently for different apps in how they reported their trust in subjective
and objective ratings.
Another interesting element to study is the behavioural changes of participants
with different behavioural patterns when the app category condition changed from
plain to tool or social. Figure 4.7 shows a comparison between the distribution
of users’ responses in terms of their choices on su and ob for the four behavioural
patterns. There are four green sub-figures, each referring to a particular behavioural
group style (P1, P2, P3, or P4) and highlighting the distribution of users’ responses
when the app category was hidden. The number of participants in a particular
behavioural group style is shown at the top of each green sub-figure.
The four yellow sub-figures highlight how users with a particular behavioural
style changed their behaviour when the app category was shown as Tool. At the top
of each sub-figure, the number of participants who did not change their behaviour
is highlighted in dark grey while the sum of participants who completely shifted to
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Table 4.6: Results of a multinomial logistic regression conducted on two app data
subsets as the predictor of participants’ self-reported trust
(a) Model 1 based on Dataset 1
Predictor b p-value OR
P1: ne 0.289 0.0511 1.335
P1: sb 0.623 2.19× 10−13 1.865
P1: ud -0.45 0.0018 0.636
P3: ne 0.725 6.72× 10−11 2.065
P3: sb 1.121 < ε 3.068
P3: ud 0.302 0.0012 1.353
P4: ne 1.839 < ε 6.292
P4: sb 0.66 < ε 1.936
P4: ud 1.798 < ε 6.038
a
χ2 = 1629.5 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.063. The dataset
includes users responses on App1, App3, and App5.
b The baseline is “P2”. The reference of app rating is “ob”.
(b) Model 2 based on Dataset 2
Predictor b p-value OR
P1: ne 0.114 0.325 1.121
P1: sb -0.303 2.72× 10−5 0.738
P1: ud -0.198 0.0486 0.819
P3: ne 1.519 < ε 4.571
P3: sb -0.37 5.03× 10−6 0.687
P3: ud 1.505 < ε 4.505
P4: ne -0.601 4.54× 10−8 0.548
P4: sb -1.003 < ε 0.367
P4: ud -0.69 2.6× 10−14 0.502
a
χ2 = 1626.9 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.0628. The dataset
includes users responses on App2, App4, and App6.
b The baseline is “P2”. The reference of app rating is “ob”.
another behavioural style is highlighted in dark red. The number of participants in
each other behavioural style is highlighted in light red. The four orange sub-figures
follow the same format as the yellow ones, but they represent how users with a
particular behavioural style changed their behaviour when the app category was
shown as Social.
As a whole, 39.5% of participants (425/1077) changed their reported trust when
the app category was Tool, and 37.8% of them (407/1077) when it was Social apps.
Less than half (133/281, 47%) of subjective rating believers (P3) changed their re-
ported trust for at least one app (see Fig. 4.7 c). Most of them (30%) had an extreme
shift towards balanced believers while a few of them (6%) shifted to trust objective
ratings. However, objective ratings believers (P4) seemed to have a stronger view as
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they shifted only slightly towards other groups (27% total participants who change
their views) (see Fig. 4.7 d). For disbelievers (P1), the behavioural change had a
wider distribution, whereby 40% (on average of both categories) of participants mi-
grated to balanced believers more (see Fig. 4.7 a). Finally, P2 had less behavioural
distribution (36% on average) as P1 but with high level of trust in subjective ratings
(see Fig. 4.7 b).
P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
size 246 size 147 76 20 3 99 size 145 60 36 5 101
148% 77% 20% 3% 144% 59% 36% 5%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 89 23 16 0 0 0 0 0 72 11 4 1 1 0 2 0 79 14 12 4 2 0 2
1 22 40 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 23 21 13 2 0 0 1 7 13 20 9 1 1 0
2 12 44 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 21 22 6 4 0 0 2 3 17 20 3 1 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 3 2 5 0 0 0 3 6 13 1 1 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 6 2 6 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
size 391 size 50 242 65 34 149 size 54 252 59 26 139
34% 162% 44% 23% 39% 181% 42% 19%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 6 3 6 4 8 8 10 0 8 3 4 13 4 5 5
1 0 0 30 58 30 0 0 1 3 7 20 26 14 8 0 1 5 13 21 20 6 12 0
2 0 0 92 40 43 0 0 2 4 21 84 30 32 0 0 2 3 18 86 24 33 0 0
3 0 0 43 42 0 0 0 3 5 19 14 18 0 0 0 3 2 19 28 21 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 7 19 0 0 0 0 4 6 3 20 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
size 281 size 27 87 148 19 133 size 29 81 158 13 123
20% 65% 111% 14% 24% 66% 128% 11%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 3 1 7 0 6 2 3 1 2 0 7
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 10 6 7 8 0 1 5 2 2 11 6 4 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 11 22 10 9 0 0 2 3 8 22 4 15 0 0
3 24 50 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 15 8 14 0 0 0 3 5 19 10 10 0 0 0
4 25 20 55 0 0 0 0 4 18 8 31 0 0 0 0 4 15 10 31 0 0 0 0
5 16 33 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 14 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 13 0 0 0 0 0
6 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 55 0 0 0 0 0 0
P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
size 159 size 4 28 12 115 44 size 7 31 6 115 44
9% 64% 27% 261% 16% 70% 14% 261%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0 0 32 13 79 0 2 1 1 2 19 12 76 0 3 0 1 2 25 8 73
1 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 1 0 0 0 2 3 8 0 1 0 2 0 2 8 9 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 3 10 0 0 2 0 1 3 3 5 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 3 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 7 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
(d) Objective rating believers P4
Socials Session (uncontrolled)Plain Session (controlled) Tools Session (uncontrolled)
su su su
su
ob ob
su su
P1
P2
ob ob ob
ob
P3
ob ob ob
(a) Disbelievers P1
(b) Balanced believers P2
ob
su su su
su su su
P4
ob ob
(c) Subjective rating believers P3
Figure 4.7: 2-D distribution of participants’ responses according to their
behavioural pattern in each app category condition
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Table 4.7: Results of the multinomial logistic regression conducted on the age
factor as the predictor of participants’ self-reported trust
Predictor b SE p-value OR
26-35 su -0.147 0.419 45.4× 10−4 0.863
26-35 ne -0.176 0.055 14.5× 10−3 0.838
26-35 ud -0.169 0.049 64× 10−4 0.845
≥ 36 su -0.324 0.045 4.6× 10−13 0.723
≥ 36 ne -0.631 0.063 < ε 0.532
≥ 36 ud -0.185 0.052 33× 10−4 0.831
a
χ2 = 130.84 (p < ε), McFadden R2: 0.00258. The baseline of the in-
dependent variable is “≤ 25” balanced believers. The reference of app
rating is “ob”.
Demographic Factors
More multinomial logistic regressions have been conducted to test the possible im-
pact of demographic factors including gender, age, and skill level on participants’
self-reported trust. The results showed that the effect is not significant when testing
gender and skill factors (χ2 = 165.41, p < ε, McFadden R2 = 0.0033, odds ratios
are not far from 1). Nevertheless, that was not the case for the age factor. As in
Table 4.7, the results prove the overall effect of age is statistically significant which
suggests that the age can be a good predictor of the self-reported trust.
To further investigate how age influence users’ self-reported trust, the partic-
ipants’ collective behaviours have been displayed in 3-D histograms based on the
age group that they belong to. In Fig 4.8, the 3-D histogram shows participants
responses who are 25 years old or younger. Despite the app category condition, the
majority of this age group are in the balanced personality group. Yet, it is clear
that not many of them fully trusted the objective rating. Figure 4.9 displays the
same as the former figure but for the age group between 26 to 35 years. A majority
of participants in this group are in the balanced area as well. However, there is
a slight increase toward objective ratings, suggesting that more people in this age
group trust objective rating than those who are younger. The very interesting find-
ing can be seen in Fig. 4.10. For the age group older than 35 years, the majority
of participant here fully trusted the objective rating. Nevertheless, the four per-
sonality clusters were visually obvious in all groups, which further confirms what is
mentioned earlier in 4.4.2.
Rating Dependencies
As the presented apps in this experiment were not real, there is no point of compar-
ing the users’ responses between individual apps. However, it might be interesting
to look into app pairs to see if the rating combinations have an effect on the user
responses. If that is the case, the participant self-reported trust can be predicted
based on the provided details about ratings.
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A Stuart-Maxwell chi2 test was applied to see if the distribution of participants’
responses significantly shifted when the app changed between different sessions. In
Table 4.8, the results do not show significant differences for each single app when
the category condition was changed from plain to tool/Social or from Tool to Social.
Table 4.8: Results of the Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests on participants’ perception of
subjective and objective app ratings for different app sessions
Predictor χ2 p-value
App1(P) vs App1(T) 8.999 0.0293
App2(P) vs App2(T) 5.375 0.1463
App3(P) vs App3(T) 1.707 0.6354
App4(P) vs App4(T) 8.812 0.03189
App5(P) vs App5(T) 2.327 0.5073
App6(P) vs App6(T) 7.557 0.0561
App1(P) vs App1(S) 3.087 0.3784
App2(P) vs App2(S) 1.946 0.5838
App3(P) vs App3(S) 2.752 0.4315
App4(P) vs App4(S) 3.801 0.2837
App5(P) vs App5(S) 5.324 0.1495
App6(P) vs App6(S) 14.09 0.00279
App1(T) vs App1(S) 2.810 0.4218
App2(T) vs App2(S) 1.781 0.6191
App3(T) vs App3(S) 3.919 0.2704
App4(T) vs App4(S) 1.255 0.7398
App5(T) vs App5(S) 3.319 0.3449
App6(T) vs App6(S) 2.064 0.5593
a
P, T and S refers to plain, tool and social app condi-
tion, consequently.
Table 4.9 shows a comparison between different app pairs when apps were dis-
played as Tool. A number of Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests were used for testing ho-
mogeneity for the four rating options (su, ob, ne and ud). The results showed
significant differences between different app pairs, suggesting that users’ trust and
decision-making were dependent on the displayed ratings. Table 4.10 is the same
as the former table, but for app pairs when they were displayed as Social. It also
indicates significant differences between each pair.
4.4.3 Users’ Reported Reasons
Users’ reasons behind their reported trust were collected. Figure 4.11 compares
the percentage of reasons given for each app in different contexts. Each reason
labelled with a different number (refer to Table 4.2) and colour. In total, 18% of
participants reported that objective ratings are more trusted because the objective
rating was the lower rating which made them feel it is safer. 25% of participants
selected objective or subjective ratings as they matched their expectations while 7%
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Table 4.9: Results of the Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests on participants’ perception of
subjective and objective app ratings for different Tool app pairs
Predictor χ2(p-value) Predictor χ2(p-value)
AV 1 vs AV 2 3.1881 (0.3635) AV 1 vs AV 3 30.473 (< ε)
AV 1 vs AV 4 20.567 (1.3× 10−4) AV 1 vs AV 5 140.08 (< ε)
AV 1 vs AV 6 213.73 (< ε) AV 2 vs AV 3 36.327 (< ε)
AV 2 vs AV 4 22.415 (5.3× 10−5) AV 2 vs AV 5 153.13 (< ε)
AV 2 vs AV 6 219.75 (< ε) AV 3 vs AV 4 12.033 (7× 10−3)
AV 3 vs AV 5 62.464 (< ε) AV 3 vs AV 6 132.56 (< ε)
AV 4 vs AV 5 96.386 (< ε) AV 4 vs AV 6 154.88 (< ε)
AV 5 vs AV 6 25.523 (1.2× 10−5)
AV refers to ‘Anti-Virus’.
Table 4.10: Results of the Stuart-Maxwell χ2 tests on participants’ perception of
subjective and objective app ratings for different Social app pairs
Predictor χ2(p-value) Predictor χ2(p-value)
MSG 1 vs MSG 2 0.7904 (0.852) MSG 1 vs MSG 3 27.822 (4× 10−6)
MSG 1 vs MSG 4 16.94 (7.3× 10−4) MSG 1 vs MSG 5 155.96 (< ε)
MSG 1 vs MSG 6 216.91 (< ε) MSG 2 vs MSG 3 25.58 (1.2× 10−5)
MSG 2 vs MSG 4 15.67 (1.3× 10−3) MSG 2 vs MSG 5 167.15 (< ε)
MSG 2 vs MSG 6 236.26 (< ε) MSG 3 vs MSG 4 8.5674 (0.03563)
MSG 3 vs MSG 5 85.049 (< ε) MSG 3 vs MSG 6 157.5 (< ε)
MSG 4 vs MSG 5 113.9 (< ε) MSG 4 vs MSG 6 177.55 (< ε)
MSG 5 vs MSG 6 19.55 (2.1× 10−4)
MSG refers to ‘Messenger’.
of participants selected “neither” as none of the ratings matched their expectations.
18% of those who selected subjective ratings were influenced by their desire to be on
the safe side, mainly because subjective ratings were lower than objective ratings.
4.5 Discussion
In this study, users’ perceived trust of app ratings given by two rating sources (au-
tomated computer programs and human expert opinions) were compared. Hence,
it targets providing a novel contribution to the related literature. Nevertheless, the
impact of users’ subjectively created judgement on their behaviour show some over-
lapping results. This section expands on the interpretation of the results focusing
on the hypotheses that are given at the beginning of this chapter.
Before moving on to discuss more, a point to observe is that some participants
changed their responses after seeing the app category, suggesting that they were
actively engaged in the user study. This implies that many crowdsourcing workers
were actively engaged in the study, which could be seen as indirect evidence that
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the observed changes are a reflection of realistic behaviour in real world. We ac-
knowledge the natural limitations of using crowdsourcing workers for conducting
user studies especially on quality of data collected, but the nature and some de-
sign elements of this study (simple tasks that crowdsourcing workers did not have
much motivation to cheat) have given some level of confidence on the results that
have been reported in this work. In future, the plan is to conduct an even larger
scale study with more apps, more crowdsourcing workers and also a medium-scale
lab-based study to further validate the results of this experiment.
As mentioned earlier in Section 4.3.2, another work on users’ perceived trust
of password strength ratings has been conducted in parallel with this reported
work. The intention is to investigate user’s self-reported trust of subjective and
objective ratings in variant contexts. The design of app privacy and password
strength sessions in this experiment has been aligned to allow comparing them.
The work of the other part which is users perceived trust of password strength
ratings is reported in [113].
4.5.1 Contextual effects
First of all, the app category condition has proven to have an influence on users’
self-reported trust. The finding showed a significant shift of participants’ collective
behaviour after the app category condition changed, which confirms the hypothesis
H1. Likewise in the password strength session, the shift of collective behaviour of
users self-reported trust was more obvious when the password condition is changed
from hidden to displayed passwords. As a consequent, that would suggest that such
a finding can be potentially generalised to wider contexts.
Additionally, participants tended to trust objective and subjective ratings more
when the app category was displayed. It also shows that users’ own subjective
judgements on app privacy played an active role in their trust in both objective and
subjective app ratings. This was more obvious in the password strength case, where
passwords were displayed as participants were supplied with more information.
It has been also observed that some participants were risk-averse as they showed
willingness to select the rating that matched their expectations while some others
had a higher tendency to trust a trustee even when there is not enough information.
These behaviours can be attributed to the strong impact of people’ behavioural
patterns on their trust perception.
4.5.2 Behavioural patterns and their effects
This experiment revealed the existence of different behavioural patterns that have a
significant impact on users’ self-reported trust, providing support for the hypothesis
H2. Some participants appeared conservative and cautious when it came to trusting
a particular type of app ratings. This is reflected in some participants’ tendency
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towards selecting the lower rating to be on the safer side, suggesting that the app
rating can also have an influence on perceived trust.
Some other behavioural patterns can be associated with trust bias. Participants
who had an extreme trust in either subjective or objective ratings can be considered
risk-seeker. In contrast, some participants seemed to be risk-averse as they avoided
trusting any solutions in most cases, regardless of the specific situation.
The effect of the behavioural patterns was very obvious in all app categories
condition. This suggests that user’s perceived trust can be predicted if his/her
trust behavioural pattern is known. That means that it could help if contextualised
and personalised app privacy ratings are provided based on the user’s behavioural
pattern.
In the password strength part, the effect of the behavioural patterns becomes
less obvious with displayed passwords compared with hidden password. This could
be attributed to the fact that many participants based their self-reported trust on
their own subjective judgements on the password strength, while their behavioural
styles just become more or less a default setting.
4.5.3 Individual app rating impact on user’s trust
Since displayed apps in this work were not realistic, there was no point of compar-
ing individual app impact. Yet, the associated ratings with apps is an interesting
element to look at. The intention is to see if users’ behaviour is affected by the dis-
played ratings. The participants’ collective behaviour showed that the app category
had an obvious influence on users’ self-reported trust. However, when individual
apps from one category were compared to those from another category (e.g., App1
vs. Messenger1, Antivirus3 vs. App3), there were no observed significant differ-
ences. Yet, the case is not the same when the comparison was done within the
six apps in each category, Stuart-Maxwell x2 tests returned very low values. This
indicates that user’s decision making was dependent on the displayed ratings.
Whereas the main objective of this study is to know what affects users more
the subjective or objective rating, all other app details were excluded to avoid
complicating the study. As mentioned earlier, the aim is to eliminate any potential
impact of other factors such as app name or familiarity, icon attractiveness, etc.
4.5.4 Demographic factors
Unexpectedly, we did not observe any significant influence of gender and skill-level
on users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective ratings. This could be linked
to the effect of an unbalanced population sampling for these demographic factors,
which is one of the limitations of this study. Yet, this is not the case for the age
population of the experimented sample. Age has proven to be a good predictor
of users trust, which indicates significant influence on users’ self-reported trust of
ratings. Consequently, the hypothesis H4 can be partially accepted.
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Age element has revealed an interesting finding in terms of participants’ col-
lective behaviours that requires further investigation. Clearly, the older people age
group showed more constant responses in all sessions comparing to other age groups.
This can be related to experience and age level that allowed them to make the same
decisions despite the app category. Yet, younger people (less than 36) showed more
randomness in terms of the collective behaviour in the plain session. Once the app
category was displayed, their collective behaviour became closer to how the older
age group people behaved.
4.6 Limitations
The choice of apps and their subjective and objective ratings impose some limita-
tions. Users’ trust may be influenced by many other factors [104, 105] that are not
easy to control and analyse in a single user study. These factors can include apps’
other features (i.e., icon feel and look, brand, developer, familiarity), context of use,
etc.
Although it has been attempted to select representative app categories for the
experiment, a larger set of apps are needed in order to study the effect of many
other categories on users’ self-reported trust of privacy ratings.
It has been stated earlier that using real apps will complicate the design of
the study. Having too many factors with the displayed app will not help knowing
what influenced users’ responses. Thus, the choice was made to use dummy apps.
Studying other factors is left for future studies, although it might be challenging to
be indicative in allocating both subjective and objective ratings for real apps (in-
stead of dummy apps) since there is no perfect objective estimator, and no available
“ground-truth” subjective ratings obtained from security experts.
As mentioned before, the behavioural analysis of the app category condition
implies that it is more likely that many (if not most) participants were well engaged.
One question that needs to be addressed, however, is whether participants who did
not change their answers for all app sessions were actually engaged. Although there
is a possibility of cheating, there is no clue about the actual number of cheating
behaviours or misunderstandings of the questions. This intrinsic problem could be
attributed to the use of a crowdsourcing platform, and future research is needed to
see if this issue can be studied with more evidence on the level of engagement of
each individual participant.
4.7 Conclusion & Future Work
This chapter reports a novel study (to the best of the author’s knowledge) comparing
users’ perceived trust on mobile apps’ privacy ratings given by automated algorithms
and by human experts. The main findings include: 1) users’ self-reported trust in
subjective and objective ratings of app privacy is heavily influenced by users’ own
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subjective judgements; 2) users behave differently for different app categories; 3)
there are different behavioural patterns that can strongly influence users’ decisions;
4) users have a (slightly) higher tendency to trust objective ratings when their own
subjective judgements match the objective ratings; 5) age can play a significant role
in users’ self-reported trust in subjective and objective ratings.
The user study produced some relatively more surprising results. Particularly,
the lack of observed effects of gender and skill level on self-reported trust is un-
expected. While a number of possible explanations can be speculated, the results
imply that users’ perceived trust and their knowledge on apps are more compli-
cated than it has been previously thought. The results may also be related to the
limitations of the crowdsourcing method itself, where the demographic information
provided by participants may contain much more noise than other more controlled
experiments. The exact effect of demographic factors requires further investigation.
Nonetheless, it has been observed that age has an obvious influence on the user’s
self-reported trust.
Although the demonstrated work is about app privacy ratings only, a parallel
study on subjective and objective ratings of password strength was also conducted.
The results showed that participants’ collective behaviours differed from the app
case, which led to the belief that the application context also matters (as expected).
As a whole, it is believed that more future research should be conducted to
enrich the evidence on how users perceive mobile apps’ privacy ratings and how
they choose what to trust. Particularly, considering the limitations of crowdsourcing
based studies, our plan is to conduct more crowdsourcing based studies and also a
traditional lab-based study to further validate the reported results. Such studies
will help the design and deployment of mobile apps’ privacy ratings, and possibly
the presented details of apps in app stores.
In terms of the role of the difference between subjective and objective ratings,
some future work is required to study how the rating differences can influence the
results. The ratings may also need some careful handling, e.g., it might be better to
use real apps and real subjective and objective ratings to confirm findings reported
in this chapter. Factors are built based on real data might affect the users’ self-
reported trust in subjective and objective ratings. Therefore, it is planned to include
experts opinion to represent subjective ratings as well as to use real apps with some
real objective ratings. This will allow to study the effect of them on users’ trust
which might lead to interesting findings of this research.
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Chapter 5
PAltRoid: Improving Mobile
User Engagement in
Privacy-Related Decisions
5.1 Introduction
As mentioned earlier in Chapters 1 and 4, the more mobile apps are getting life-
engaging and sophisticated, the more privacy concerns come on the scene. We have
given many examples that show how mobile apps can invade user’s privacy. The user
is entitled to choose her/his apps. Furthermore, the way how Android permission
framework works, as described in 2.6.1, it leaves granting access permissions to
sensitive resources to the user too.
The research has shown that mobile users often fail to understand or ignore com-
municated privacy details at installation time, despite the risk that users are willing
to take in favour of acquiring what they look for. These two reasons contributed
to the problem of privacy leakages on mobile devices. The research community has
suggested many ways to communicate privacy indicators and nudges in a more un-
derstandable and concise approaches. All that takes place to assist users in making
better privacy-related choices.
In this scenario, the user is very likely to end up with some privacy invasive apps
on his/her device. Due to lack of awareness, users often get a lot of privacy invasive
apps installed on their devices. Moreover, there is a lack of privacy awareness
enhancing tools on mobile devices. Enhancing privacy awareness can help users
make more informed decisions about installing and uninstalling apps. This could
be achieved if solutions or alternatives are provided to the user. However, there
are only few tools where authors recommended more privacy-friendly apps to users.
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Consequently, we decided to develop a tool to fill that gap, and conducted user
studies to verify the usefulness of the proposed tool.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section II discusses related
work. The design of PAltRoid is described in Section III. Section IV presents a
lab-based and a crowdsourcing-based study we conducted to verify the performance
of PAltRoid. Section VI illustrates our analysis of the results of the user studies.
Section VII discusses the implications of the findings and some limitations. The last
two sections illustrate planned future work and concludes the chapter, respectively.
5.2 Related Work
This section is divided into three subsections, improving users privacy awareness,
privacy scoring of Android apps and alternative apps identification. In the first sub-
section shows how researchers tried to improve privacy awareness of mobile device
users. Next subsection presents some work focusing on privacy scoring of Android
apps. Lastly, related work on generation of similar Android apps is illustrated.
5.2.1 Improving Privacy Awareness of Users of Mobile Devices
Researchers have proposed many approaches to improving the privacy awareness
of users of mobile devices. These methods mainly focus on communicating privacy
nudges and information to the user, so that they can make more informed decisions.
“A nudge is a soft, paternalistic intervention, usually manifested as a subtle yet
persuasive cue that makes people more likely to decide in one direction or the
other”, according to Zhang and Xu [115].
Android has been developing its permission granting system to make users more
privacy-aware. We discussed earlier how that model can assist the user in making
more choices towards safer privacy. However, the research has proven that users still
make bad calls. Therefore, researchers suggested many solutions. In this subsection,
we review some of the selected recent ones. One of the methods is to equip users
with privacy details prior to app installation. For instance, Tian et al. [116] proved
that users’ decisions can be improved by giving users some details about Internet of
Things (IoT) apps to avoid granting permissions to over-privileged apps. The idea
is to close the gap between what IoT apps offer and how they function in run-time.
SmartAuth (as Tian et al. call it) analyses collected data from an app’s descrip-
tion and source code and then communicates it to users. User studies conducted
on the system provided evidence that the proposed design had improved users’ de-
cisions in the lab. Gerber et al. [117] suggested an alternative design for Google’s
permission-granting interface called COPING. Using an online study, COPING
authors compared it against several published interfaces including Google’s legacy
and recent permission interface. The results show that reducing interface complex-
ity does not necessarily help users make privacy related decisions. Consequently,
the design should help maximise both comprehensiveness of communicated details
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and user understandability of them. Dini et al. proposed MAETROID [118] that
analyses an app’s set of permissions and metadata collected from Google Play and
generates a simple icon represents the app’s risk level (Trusted, Medium Risk or
High Risk). Kleek et al. [119] investigated how users’ choices are effected when
revealing how apps handle data. Their key hypothesis is that exposing users to
richer details about previously hidden information flows out of the apps, such as
what data has been collected, who is behind it and how the data is being used,
will help users make privacy-aware choices. Kleek et al. shown through their lab
study that privacy indicators do support people in making more confident and con-
sistent choices towards privacy side. Rajivan and Camp [120] studied the influence
of privacy priming and privacy cue framing on users’ choices of Android apps. The
outcome of their user study indicates that some icon framing led to more privacy-
aware decisions and priming for privacy increased users’ awareness.
Other researchers looked into protecting privacy to rise users’ privacy awareness.
Hatamian et al. came up with FAIR [121] and proposed to generate a privacy risk
score by applying fuzzy logic to data collected by apps from different sources. That
score highlights the privacy invasiveness of installed apps, so users can decide if they
should uninstall or replace more privacy-invasive apps. INSPIRED [122] detects
suspicious security and privacy behaviours and tries to infer the underline inten-
tion behind such behaviours. It matches the user’s intention with apps’ intended
behaviours and justifies granting the required permission. To understand the user’s
intention, INSPIRED applies a machine learning based permission model that col-
lects user behavioural data. SecuRank [123] analyses permission usage within app
groups to detect over-privileged apps, and suggests a functionally similar apps that
require less sensitive access.
Zhang et al. [124] proposed a different way to close the gap between app de-
scriptions and permissions. Authors came up with DESCRIBEME tool, which
generates security-centric app descriptions that help the user to avoid malware and
privacy threatening apps. Eventually, the user will be provided with security-centric
details that aid him to make better calls. Kong et al. [125] approached the same
problem using a different way. Authors bridged the gap between the security issues
and users perception by automatically assessing the review-to-behaviour fidelity
of mobile apps. To prove their idea, they introduced AUTOREB applies some
state-of-the-art machine learning techniques to infer the relations between users
reviews and 4 categories of security-related behaviours. Furthermore, AUTOREB
employes a crowdsourcing approach to automatically aggregate the security issues
from review-level to app-level. Experiments show that it is possible to infer the
mobile app behaviours at user-review level with high accuracy.
5.2.2 Privacy Scoring of Android Apps
Many researchers are interested in methods that can help users to understand the
potential impact of mobile apps on users’ privacy. The reason is that users do not get
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enough information and help, so they are making decisions that harm their privacy,
such as ignoring warnings about requested permissions in installation [93]. Kang et
al. [94] proposed a privacy metre, which clarifies the potential risk of mobile apps
based on their requested permissions. PrivMetrics [3] has a rating system utilising
basic anomaly detection methods along some privacy level indicators. PrivMetrics
groups apps based on their functionality and supposes that each group have a simi-
lar behavioural pattern. Apps deviating from their groups are treated as anomalous
ones. An app’s final rating is the mean of each of the following-calculated proba-
bilities [126]:
1. Number of requested permissions
2. Deviation of requested permissions from average behaviour
3. Number of integrated third party trackers
4. Number of executed dangerous API Calls by the trackers
Another work in this category is PrivacyGrade [95,127]. The aim of this tool is to
rise awareness of the behaviours that many mobile apps have that may affect users’
privacy. It uses a privacy model that measures the gap between an app’s actual
behaviour and users’ expectations of that app’s behaviour. The app’s behaviour
is obtained from statically analysing sensitive data that the app uses and how the
data is used. More precisely, the static analysis check if tested apps use sensitive
data primarily due to third-party libraries included with the app. For instance, the
analysis can help in inferring how sensitive resources are used on the phone and for
what. If app A requires access to GPS location, the use of third-party libraries will
tell whether this app uses it for map purposes or other advertising purposes. On
the other hand, users’ expectations are collected via asking crowdsourcing workers
about their expectations of a core set of 837 different apps. Then, PrivacyGrade
shows the result of applying its model in a form of grade to make it easier to be
understood by users. To be more specific, all apps are assigned scores based on
PrivacyGrade model. Apps show no privacy issues are assigned an A+ grade. The
rest of the apps are sorted by their rating and then split into quartiles. The first
quartile of apps are graded as A, the second quartile are assigned B, the third
quartile received C, and the last quartile assigned D as the lowest grade.
5.2.3 Alternative Apps Identification
One of the proposed methods to identifying apps similar to a target app is to
compare the textual information associated with candidate apps and that of the
target app. In the natural language processing community, similar techniques have
been extensively investigated resulting in many approaches to measuring textual
semantic similarity, which is intended to tell how related text A is to text B. The
comparison can be extended depending on the granularity of the texts. The word-
to-word level comparison has been widely studied, and the WordNet Similarity
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library [128] was introduced for this purpose and used by many researchers. At the
sentence-to-sentence and text-to-text levels, there are also many proposed methods
such as Optimal Matching, Greedy Pairing, LSA (Latent Semantic Analysis), LDA
(Latent Dirichlet Allocation), and others [129]. For instance, in LSA, the texts
are transformed into vectorial representations and a semantic similarity score is
computed from the cosine of these vectors [130].
Some researchers considered the problem of identifying alternatives of a given
Android app. PrivMetrics 5.2.2 recommends functionally similar apps and better
in terms of privacy through using LSA to compare similarity of descriptions of two
given mobile apps [3]. AnDarwin detects similar Android apps based on their se-
mantic information. It is based on application code analysis via comparing apps to
a subset of their closest neighbours [131]. Chen et al. showed how to find cloning
apps through matching centroids generated out of encoded control flow graphs of
apps [132]. Gorla et al. [133] implemented LDA on app descriptions and clustered
generated topics using the k-means algorithm to find apps with similar descriptions.
Thung et al. used CLAN (a system for detecting similar software systems) on sys-
tems tags from SourceForge to detect similar applications [134]. Moreover, Thung
et al. presented CLANdroid to help users find alternative mobile apps by comparing
Android-specific semantic anchors such as API calls, intents, permissions and a few
others [135].
Another interesting piece of work is the AlternativeTo website [136]. This web
service is entirely built upon provided alternative apps from crowdsourcing users.
It is a free service that help users to find alternatives of products from variant
platforms such as web application, Desktop software, mobile apps, wearable apps,
etc. All alternative apps are provided by human users of the website: users can
add new apps, suggest new alternative apps for any existing app, and vote on any
alternative app recommended by others via likes and dislikes.
5.3 Design
This section illustrates the objectives and hypotheses of the whole study. Then
it explains the design of the presented application along with used and collected
data and details of alternative apps identification. PAltRoid’s name was chosen to
represents the related terms (P)rivacy, (Alt)ernatives and And(Roid).
5.3.1 Objectives
The objectives of this study are as follows:
• To evaluate the presented design user interface for Android apps, in terms of
to what extent users will be engaged in privacy-related decisions.
• To collect participants view of the new designed interface and their feedback
on how PAltRoid’s design can be further improved.
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Figure 5.1: PAltRoid’s overall design
5.3.2 Hypotheses
Using the app, mobile users will be effectively engaged more in privacy-related
decisions on their devices. Therefore, it will help the users to improve their overall
privacy level.
5.3.3 PAltRoid Overall Design
The main purpose of designing PAltRoid is to improve mobile users engagement in
privacy-related decisions. To achieve that goal, we apply the following ideas into the
design of PAltRoid. First is adding privacy ratings and making them more visible
to users will help. Moreover, giving users alternative apps with similar functionality
but better privacy scores can influence users towards installing more privacy-friendly
apps. That may motivate users uninstall apps that are not privacy friendly and not
important, which can help reduce overall privacy risks without compromising utility.
Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of PAltRoid. It consists of three main com-
ponents. Namely they are the mobile app, data server and alternative apps engine.
The proposed interface design is represented in the mobile app to communicate
privacy-related details. This app is connected to the server to be able to grab mo-
bile apps’ privacy scores and information of alternative apps when needed. Finally,
the alternative app engine generates similar apps in terms of functionality to be
offered as replacement of apps with low privacy scores.
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5.3.4 PAltRoid Components
This subsection contains a detailed description of the proposed system components.
The mobile app
has three activities, which are mainly used to communicate privacy information
to the user. The first activity shows apps’ privacy ratings on a bar chart as
in Fig. 5.2a. The length and colour of each bar represents the privacy score of
an installed app. Very low privacy rated apps are listed on top of the chart and
will be viewed first in order to emphasise on the risk that they pose. Thus, apps
are ranked based on privacy-invasiveness from top to bottom. The implemented
privacy scoring is a 5-grades scale ranging from A+ (most privacy sensitive) to D
(least privacy sensitive). The 5-grade ratings scale was obtained from PrivacyGrade
which is mentioned earlier in 5.2.2. There are five privacy ratings A+, A, B, C and
D which are respectively colour-coded as dark green, green, yellow, orange and
red. PrivacyGrade team made a website where the grades are colour coded this
way [137]. In our PAltRoid design, the same colouring scheme as PrivacyGrade has
been followed to provide consistency aside from being clear indicators of a low or
high privacy level.
In cases of low privacy scoring apps, namely B, C and D, their privacy bars
will be incremented with a grey stacked bar to highlight possible improvement of
the privacy score if an alternative app is installed. The improvement can be made
if the risky app is replaced by one of the recommended alternatives. When the
grey stacked bar is clicked, the second activity will be launched. It will display
recommended alternatives of the selected app as Fig. 5.2b shows. These alternatives
are ranked on two levels, first from better privacy ratings to lower ones then based
on how similar they are to the clicked app. Each alternative app is equipped with
user ratings from Google Play to help the user in making the right decision.
Furthermore, clicking on any recommended alternative app will take the user to
the third activity, which will provide the user with app description as it appears
on Google Play alongside with its link to the app store. By offering that, the user
will be able to select between alternatives and once decided, PAltRoid will take the
user to the app page on Google Play to proceed. Figure 5.2c shows an example of
how the third activity appears on the mobile screen.
The data server
works as the data supplier for the mobile app as well as a data collector (on user’s
behaviour). Collected data from users is described later at subsection 5.3.6. This
server has a database holding two tables. One table contains relevant details includ-
ing privacy scores of more than 1.4 million free third-party apps which are obtained
from PrivacyGrade, and the other one represents alternative apps data. The server
resides online to allow different instances of the client app to access it from anywhere
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(a) First Activity (b) Second Activity (c) Third Activity
Figure 5.2: Screen shots of PAltRoid
over the Internet. MySQL is used to construct the database on the server, and the
server is equipped with PHP scripts that allow mobile app clients to communicate
with the database.
Alternative apps engine
The development of this component went through two stages. In the first stage,
several textual measuring techniques on app descriptions were applied to deter-
mine similarities between any two given apps. SEMILAR [138], a semantic similarity
toolkit, has a Java library that has been utilised in the generator to find similarities
among compared peers. Yet, some pre-processing on textual data needs to take
place to apply similarity methods. Therefore, textual data has been pre-processed
in four steps, as follows:
1. tokenisation (i.e., removing punctuation from words),
2. converting words into their base forms,
3. part-of-speech tagging,
4. syntactic parsing.
A small test on available semantic similarity methods on the SEMILAR library was
set to come out with the approach that suits what is needed. It was found that LSA
is more sufficient that other tested methods in finding similarities in the prepared
testing set. LSA was better in giving more reasonable similarity scores, as well as
the incurred overhead is lower than other approaches. Since semantic measuring
techniques come with the price of false positives, it has been decided to improve
this components to provide better alternatives.
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In the second stage, previous results were replaced with another data obtained
from a crowdsourcing website AlternativeTo (introduced earlier at subsection 5.2.3).
The power of crowdsourcing allows it to offer more precise and relevant result than
computer generated, based on our subjective evaluation on a random small subset.
The alternative apps engine has been incorporated with a web crawler to fetch
relevant data from AlternativeTo website. Owners of this website have generously
allowed us to do the web crawling.
5.3.5 Data Used
In PAltRoid, the proposed design interface requires two forms of data. The first set
of data provides details about third-party Android apps and their privacy ratings.
Since designing a new privacy scoring algorithm goes beyond the scope of our work,
we were searching for a mobile app privacy scoring database that can meet our
need. Hong et al. [95, 127] have generously supplied us with a snapshot of their
dataset (dated from last quarter of 2016). This dataset covers more that 1.4 millions
Android apps, including details such as app descriptions, privacy ratings, Google
Play links, and many other useful information.
The second type of required data is alternative apps. This source of data proved
useful in affecting users’ decision. As mentioned earlier in 5.3.4, in the initial design
of PAltRoid, alternative apps were calculated using LSA. However, that approach
produced many false positives. Approximately each app was provided with 20
alternative apps, out of them 15 to 17 on average were considered irrelevant apps
by participants from a pilot study (which will be described later at Section 5.5).
For that reason the option has been made to use data which is built on users’
crowdsourced preferences. After doing a comprehensive search for web services to
provide that data, AlternativeTo [136] was found to be a suitable candidate as its
data is primarily based on crowdsourcing. One drawback of data from AlternativeTo
is that it does not cover as many apps as PrivacyGrade, but the number of apps
covered are sufficient for our research and our inspection on a random subset of the
covered apps showed a much higher accuracy than our LSA based approach.
5.3.6 Collected Data
Collected data are a list of users’ installed apps, participant ID as a unique identifier
(not linked to the participant’s personally identifiable information), and apps pri-
vacy scores. Participants’ behaviour was monitored to see if using the app triggered
them to make privacy-related decisions on mobile apps. Recorded information re-
lated to such behaviour includes the number of newly installed apps, the number of
uninstalled apps, the frequency of accessing the PAltRoid app and the amount of
time spent in each screen activity.
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5.4 Experimental Studies
In this section, details of the conducted studies to evaluate PAltRoid can be found.
The studies were carried out in a lab and crowdsourcing-based formats, whereas a
quantitative method has been followed to test the hypotheses in 5.3.2. The main
reason for conducting these studies is to evaluate our proposed PAltRoid.
5.4.1 Ethical approval
Both lab-based and crowdsourcing-based studies was reviewed and given a favourable
ethical opinion by the University of Surrey’s University Ethics Committee (UEC).
The UEC reference number for the lab-based study is ‘UEC/2017/074/FEPS’, while
for the crowdsourcing-based study is ‘UEC 2017 074 FEPS Amendment 1’.
5.4.2 Study Groups
This study involved three groups to test the proposed design. The following list
explains these groups and the reason behind choosing them.
• Experimental Group 1 (Group 1): In this group, PAltRoid full design has
been experimented. This version has all design elements explained earlier at
subsection 5.3.4.
• Experimental Group 2 (Group 2): Participants in this group experimented a
basic design of PAltRoid. This version of the app has only the same main
screen activity without offering any alternatives.
• Control Group (Group 3): the interface has nothing displayed to participants.
In this group, the aim is to investigate participants’ base-line behaviour which
will eventually tell their uninstall rate of apps.
5.4.3 Lab-Based Study
In this subsection, the procedure followed and recruitment details for the lab-based
study can be be found.
Procedure
To test the hypotheses, a between-subjects lab-based experiment was conducted.
Participants were allocated to one of the user groups. In this lab-based experiment,
there were two user groups (the third group introduced later at the crowdsourced-
based study), Group 1 and Group 2 (Group 2 was considered as a control group
at this stage). Users in Group 1 have experimented the proposed design interface,
while in Group 2 participants have only exposed to the first app activity which
displays privacy scores of installed apps (no alternatives offered). In the beginning
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of the study, participants were given a brief description of the study, including the
study objectives and tasks. Moreover, participants were provided with a copy of
Participant Information Sheet ‘PIS’ (refer to Appendix A) to inform them about
the study. The PIS explains everything to the user from their role, purpose of the
study, benefits and risks, who handle the data and many other details.
Each study participation consists of three sessions. First one is where partic-
ipants are being briefed and helped to install the study app. The second session
involves allowing some time for participants to experiment the app in real world.
In the last one, participants are being debriefed and offered help to uninstall the
experimented app.
In the first session, each participant was helped to get the PAltRoid app in-
stalled on her/his device. The research coordinator (Saeed Alqahtani) encouraged
participants to interact actively in the process of using the targeted app design.
Then, participants in the second session were asked to use the app on a daily basis
for one week, and at least once a day. To keep that going, the app was set up to trig-
ger a reminder in the notification area in case a participant did not access the app
for longer than 24 hours. Relevant anonymous data (described in subsection 5.3.6)
were uploaded to the server that is connected to all ‘client’ apps.
In the third session, the research coordinator helped participants to uninstall
PAltRoid app from their mobile devices. Participants were then had a short semi-
structured interview with the research coordinator, which was used to collect their
subjective views, overall experiences on different aspects of the PAltRoid app and
their privacy awareness (refer to Appendix B for interview schedule). Moreover, they
were also asked to take a quick survey to collect their demographic information and
other feedback of the study. The questionnaires for Group 1 and 2 can be found at
Appendix C.
Recruitment Details
Below are the details of the recruitment process of this study:
• Test environment: First and third sessions of the user study were conducted
in a controlled lab environment using one computer at the University of Surrey
and the participants mobile device.
• Test equipment: To conduct the planned user study, a desktop was prepared
to help us install the PAltRoid app to participants’ mobile devices. Each
participant was asked to also use that computer to fill the electronic survey
at the end, if the participant gives his/her consent.
• Incentives: Participants were compensated for their time spent for partici-
pating in the study. Each participant received a payment in cash based on
the standard rate of £10 per hour. As there were two sessions to attend at
the lab, users who fully participated were compensated with £20 in total.
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• Task duration: Each session of the study did not exceed one hour. On
average, each study session lasted for approximately half an hour. For the
time between sessions, users were asked to keep the PAltRoid app with them
for at least one week. We estimated that 7 days should be sufficient for
collecting enough data about participants’ behaviours.
• Inclusion criteria: The participants were required to be over the age of 18.
Also, users must own an Android mobile device and the Android version must
be higher than API 16: Android 4.1 (Jelly Bean). That is due to the reason
PAltRoid uses features work on API 16 and higher.
• Sample size: The aim is to collect on minimum 80 participants in each group.
Meaning that, 160 in total (2 experimented designs * 80 = 160), yet the study
was driven to collect as much as possible to strengthen the observed result of
the analysis.
• Recruitment: We aimed at recruiting students, staff of the University of
Surrey and people from the local community through internal advertisements
such as posting recruiting flyers and advertising posters on campus and online
social networks. Appendix D shows the advertising poster used for the lab-
based study.
5.4.4 Crowdsourcing-based Study
At the planning stage of this experiment, a crowdsourcing-based study was reserved
as a back-up plan in case we have any difficulties completing the lab-based study
(e.g., recruiting enough participants). We also planned to use a crowdsourcing-
based study to cross-validate the results of the lab-based study. The lab-based study
proved difficult in recruiting the targeted number of participants. However, based
on the experience from the work in Chapter 4, crowdsourcing approach can be con-
sidered faster in recruitment process. This subsection explains the crowdsourcing-
based study that was carried out to test PAltRoid.
Crowdsourcing Platform
In this study, Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) was chosen as the crowdsourcing
platform. AMT has some extra features makes it more preferred than other plat-
forms. Most importantly is the advanced API and command line interface that help
to design complicated tasks with minimal effort. AMT is quite popular among re-
searchers and crowdsourcing users. Furthermore, it gives more control over recruited
participants, such as paying satisfactory work, recruit many users in less time, etc.
People who create tasks are called ‘requesters’, while participants are called ‘work-
ers’. Each worker has a unique identifying worker ID. Moreover, a requested job or
a designed task is referred as Human Intelligence Tasks (HIT) [139].
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Procedure
For the crowdsourcing-based study, we followed the same overall procedure as the
lab-based one. Nonetheless, minor aspects of the design were changed to suit the
nature of the crowdsourcing studies, as described in details below.
To reach the targeted number of participants, the crowdsourcing-based experi-
ment was conducted. This crowdsourcing study was split into two HITs. Each was
designed to be completed within 30 minutes. At the beginning of the first HIT, a
modified version of the PIS (refer to A) was displayed to participants. By taking
the that HIT, workers consent to the study terms and conditions (described in the
PIS). After a participant had agreed to proceed, he/she was instructed to follow a
download link of the PAltRoid app preceded with how-to steps shown on the HIT.
When the app was launched, it asked the participant to insert her/his worker ID
on AMT which helped to identify who completed what. Also that ID was used to
compensate and qualify workers for the second HIT. Workers who completed first
HIT were motivated to comeback after one week time of experimenting the app.
Figure 5.3: First time instruction fragment
Seven days after the first HIT was closed, the second HIT was posted on AMT.
Only workers of the first HIT who followed instructions were allowed to proceed.
In the second HIT, the participants were instructed to uninstall the testing app.
Then, their views and feedback were collected through an online survey embedded
in the task. The estimation of this session is to last for about have an hour, yet
most of the workers managed to complete it in less than ten minutes.
In total, the needed time for the whole experiment is approximately two hours.
Each HIT requires 30-45 minutes and the daily usage is estimated to be between
3-4 minutes per day.
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Study Survey Design
In the second HIT of this study, participants’ subjective views were collected using
an online survey. Since the crowdsourcing workers were recruited virtually, it was
not possible to interview the participants due to their large number. Therefore,
the design of the survey has been extended to collect more related feedback. The
survey consists of four parts. The first part contains the task instructions. The
second part gathers demographic details about the participants such as gender, age,
nationality, language/s spoken and the level of education. Then some background
questions were asked in the third part to collect information about the privacy
awareness of the participants. The last part is an assessment of the tested PAltRoid
app. Different types of questions have been used ranging from multiple choices,
Likert-type scales, open-ended questions and free-formatted comments. The type of
question was selected based on the nature of the information sought. The attached
survey in Appendix E shows how this survey was designed.
Compensation and Quality Assessment
The total amount of money given to each participant is $5 where $1 for the first
HIT and the rest rewarded once the second part was completed. The second HIT
offered more money to encourage workers to comeback after the first HIT. After
investigating the average given hourly wage on AMT, it was found that requesters
mostly pay around ∼$2 per hour. For this study, we decided to give $2.5 for each
spent hour.
AMT allows requesters to have sometime before compensating workers in order
to check the credibility of the submitted work. On the other hand, the collected data
on the server helped in identifying outliers who did not follow the study instructions,
and therefore excluded from the second HIT. Moreover, the compiled survey results
also helped in determining whether a human or robots took the HITs. That can be
told from the provided answers where this can be judged based on the percentage
of sensible answers.
5.5 Results & Analysis
This section reports the finding from both the lab-based and crowdsourcing-based
studies.
5.5.1 Participants
Based on a statistical power analysis, the power of our experiment design is 0.865,
where given an expected medium effect size of 0.5 and p < 0.05. Knowing that the
sample size of the presented crowdsourcing-based study is 76 at each group.
5.5. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 101
In the lab-based study, the minimum number of participants could not be
achieved. There were 12 participants in the experimental group and 10 in the con-
trol group (Group 2). The lab-based study proved challenging and time-consuming,
although variant means of advertising the study was used. Therefore, the decision
was made to switch to the crowdsourcing-based study and the lab-based one was
used as a pilot.
Through the crowdsourcing platform used, namely AMT, we managed to recruit
300 participants in total. 228 of them have succeeded to follow HITs’ instructions.
The remaining 72 workers were excluded as some were considered outliers and some
did not comeback to do the second part. These were allocated randomly to one of
the three groups (76 in each group). Moreover, the recruitment was held at different
times and via multiple batches, in order to ensure the demographic diversity of the
recruited participants. Actually, not all workers were accepted as some didn’t follow
the instructions. However, AMT allows us to call for another worker whenever a
previous one’s work is rejected. The experimental group was completed first with
76 valid participants. As a consequent, it was aimed to get the same exact number
in other groups to facilitate the statistical analysis.
The participants in this crowdsourcing-based study were from 19 different na-
tionalities. In Group 1, there were 59 male and 17 female participants, while 52
male to 18 female participants were in Group 2. The male-female ratio was roughly
76% to 24%. The numbers of participants in different age groups are: 8 and 7 in
age group “25 or below”, 50 and 43 in age group “26-35”, 18 and 20 in age group
“36 or older”, in Groups 1 and 2, respectively. We did not invite Group 3 workers
to the second HIT. Therefore, no demographic information are avilable for them.
5.5.2 App Ratings
The distribution of apps is shown based on their privacy scores. The focus here is on
Groups 1 and 2 as they are designed to display privacy ratings to the participants.
Group 3 does not have such details as it was used only to know the “base-line”
behaviour of participants: the “natural” rate of app uninstallations.
Figure 5.4 shows the distributions of apps’ privacy scores in both groups. In
Group 1, participants had 3,394 apps in total, about 52% (1,755 apps) of them
have a privacy rating in our dataset that was displayed to the participants. Out
of these apps, there were 30 apps rated D, 71 rated C, 226 rated B, 1384 rated A
and 44 rated A+. On the other hand, in Group 2, there were 4,603 apps in total
where 52.4% (2,414 apps) have a privacy score in our dataset that was shown to the
participants, which include 29 apps rated D, 73 rated C, 289 rated B, 1955 rated A
and 68 rated A+. Figure 5.5 shows the participant-specific number of apps with a
privacy score in our databse, for both Groups 1 and 2. This figure shows that there
are two participants in each group who can be considered as extreme participants
as they had more than 100 rated apps on their mobile devices. On the contrary,
there are four participants had an unusually low number of (less than 5) rated apps.
102 CHAPTER 5. PALTROID
2%
79%
13%
4%
2%
A+
A
B
C
D
3%81%
12%
3%
1%
Figure 5.4: Number of apps with different privacy scores in Groups 1 and 2
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Groups 1 and 2
5.5.3 Lab-based Results
Although the number of participants in the lab-based study was not large enough,
we still report the result of this study as a pilot. The study recruited only 12 and
10 participants for Groups 1 and 2, respectively. 5 participants in Group 1 made
at least one uninstall attempt and only one participant substituted one B rated
app. Those five participants removed one C-rated app, two B-rated apps and one
app without a privacy score. Nonetheless, in the semi-structured interview and
the survey participants often expressed that they had considered removing some
apps due to their low privacy scores. Particularly, 7 users in Group 2 considered
removing 4 D-rated apps, 1 C-rated apps, and 2 B-rated apps. In Group 1, only
two participants reported that they had considered uninstalling a D-rated and a
C-rated apps. Due to the fact that the number of participants in this study is not
sufficient, the statistical tests was not carried out.
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5.5.4 Privacy-Related Decisions
There are three variables that have been analysed to capture the participants’ be-
haviours in the crowdsourcing-based study. The first variable is the number of
substituted/removed apps due to their low privacy scores, which will be referred to
as SR. The value of this variable was obtained via the collected data on the server
side and confirmed from the reported answers of the survey. The second variable
is the number of apps that participants had considered removing but they did not
for some reasons, referred to as CR. The value of this variable could be obtained
only from the participants’ responses to the survey. The last variable is the number
of all app uninstallations observed during the experiment, Which will be referred
to as PE. The value of this variable is automatically obtained as the PAltRoid app
monitored and recorded all app uninstallations during the experiment. It was no-
ticed that participants had removed some low-score apps without reporting them
in the survey. This was considered as a potential positive effect caused by the use
of PAltRoid app.
Before going deep into analysis in this subsection, let us have a look at the
average percentage of uninstalled apps with each specific privacy score in Groups
1 and 2, where the average percentage is calculated as the average of each user’s
app uninstallation rate. The line-graphs in Fig. 5.6 show the average frequency of
uninstalled apps with different privacy scores and for different groups. The graphs
suggest that the behavioural nudging effect in Group 1 is higher than in Group 2.
Furthermore, it seems that the impact of the PAltRoid app on the uninstallation rate
increases as the privacy level decreases (goes from A to D). A number of statistical
tests were conducted to confirm the observations and to produce more insights. It
is worth mentioning that there was not a single case that an A+ app was removed
or replaced during the experiment.
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As said before about Group 3, the reason of having it is to monitor users’
uninstall rate. Hence, the app was just a blank UI where workers only needed
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to access the app once a day. Rather surprisingly, we did not see any case of
app uninstallation among the 76 participants who enrolled into this group. It is
expected that some users might install and uninstall an app in less than 24 hours,
but that is not of an interest to this study. Data from Group 3 can tell us the
“natural” rate of app uninstallation as a reference for us to check how many app
uninstallations observed in Groups 1 and 2 may not be the consequence of using the
PAltRoid app. Accepting the result that normally no participant would uninstall
any apps within a week (as what we observed for Group 3), all uninstall decisions
in Groups 1 and 2 could be considered as a result of using the PAltRoid app (the
full version and the simplified version without alternative apps). In Table 5.1, the
numbers of uninstalled apps in Groups 1 and 2 across all participants are shown,
based on the assumption that all PE decisions were influenced by the PAltRoid
app. The data in Table 5.1 shows that the effect on Group 1 is higher than Group
2. Taking into account that Group 3 did not record any uninstall calls, we believe
that the PAltRoid app did help motivate participants in Groups 1 and 2 to make
safer privacy-related decisions.
Table 5.1: App uninstallation statistics in Groups 1 and 2, assuming PE decisions
are all valid
Compare element Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
No. of users who uninstalled app(s) 32(42.11%) 21(27.6%) 0
No. of uninstalled D-rated apps 6(20%) 4(13.8%) 0
No. of uninstalled C-rated apps 11(15.5%) 4(5.5%) 0
No. of uninstalled B-rated apps 18(8%) 5(1.7%) 0
No. of uninstalled apps without a score 34(2.1%) 20(0.9%) 0
The number and percentage are calculated based on the total number of apps/participants in that group.
From a statistical point of view, the impact of the PAltRoid app on users’ app
uninstallation behaviours is studied as follows. To investigate the impact of the
PAltRoid app on each individual participant’s behaviour, further analysis was con-
ducted. The app uninstallation rate for each privacy score per participant was
calculated. Then, Welch’s Two Sample t-test was applied using the app uninstalla-
tion rate to determine whether there is a significant difference between the means
of two groups. The t-test was chosen as the dependent variable was normal (the
uninstall rate for each participant). Table 5.2 clarifies that there is a significant
difference in uninstalled B-rated apps between Groups 1 and 2. However, that is
not the case for C- and D-rated apps which may be explained by the much smaller
number of such apps. Moreover, the not small variance of the number of apps each
user means the app uninstallation rate may not be a robust indicator allowing us
to observe the expected effects.
As a consequent, participants’ decisions were dichotomised to avoid using the
app uninstallation rate. While the dependent variable, the participant’s behaviour
is defined as a binary variable: the value 0 means that the participant did not take
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Table 5.2: Two sample t-test results on uninstalled apps with different privacy
scores, for Groups 1 and 2
Privacy Score Group 1 mean Group 2 mean p-value
B 0.11842 0.02961 0.02126
C 0.075 0.04386 0.3865
D 0.05263 0.03289 0.5425
any app uninstallation or replacement action, and the value 1 means she/he took at
least one such action against an app. The independent variable here is the privacy
score of the app that the user uninstalled. This variable is categorical and has five
values: A+, A, B, C, and D. The values that of an interest in this study are B,
C and D, as they indicate problematic privacy levels. In this study design, the
comparison is between independent groups. Since the dependent variable can be
considered as categorical here, a number of χ2 tests were applied to test the first
hypothesis at 5.3.2. In Table 5.3, a comparison of participants’ responses between
groups on the three outcome variables SR, CR and PE. The χ2 test results on SR
tell that the participant’s app uninstallation behaviour in Group 1 is significantly
different from that in Group 2. That leads to the conclusion that participants who
saw alternative apps in Group 1 were influenced more towards safer privacy-related
decisions. However, the results on CR and PE did not show a significant difference
between Groups 1 and 2. The SR results may indicate that participants were
affected by the proposed deign when they reported that they considered removing
some low privacy scoring apps.
Table 5.3: χ2 test results for analysing participants’ app uninstallation behaviours
Dependent Variable χ2 p-value
SR: Group 1 vs. Group 2 4.7896 0.02863
CR: Group 1 vs. Group 2 0.30536 0.5805
PE : Group 1 vs. Group 2 1.9891 0.1584
As earlier, a binary variable was defined for each participant and each problem-
atic privacy score (D, C, B, and no rating). Then, a number of Wilcoxon rank sum
test (due to the fact that dependent variable here is categorical) were conducted
to find out if participants in Group 1 responded differently from those in Group 2.
Table 5.4 depicts the result of running these tests. The results seem close to those
from the t-test shown in Table 5.2, showing a significant difference only for B-rated
apps.
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Table 5.4: Wilcoxon rank sum test results on uninstalled apps with different
privacy scores, for Groups 1 and 2
Privacy Score W p-value
B 3268 0.01692
C 3040 0.232
D 2888 1
Null 3078 0.2915
5.5.5 Analysis of Participants’ Subjective Feedback
In this subsection, participants’ subjective feedback on the PAltRoid app is anal-
ysed. The feedback was collected from the online survey filled by participants at
the end of the study. The analysis is presented here on two parts, the first showing
how participants responded to assessment questions on the survey and the second
showing a sentiment analysis of their reviews. We focus on Groups 1 and 2 only
because participants in Group 3 did not see any design elements so had nothing to
comment.
General Assessment of the App Design
To know participants’ assessment on different aspects of the app design, several
questions were asked as part of the survey. Some questions are direct such as ‘Do
you think the tested app is useful?’ followed by another saying ‘Please tell us why
you think the app is/isn’t useful’. In Group 1, 60 picked ‘Yes’ (79%), 14 chose
‘Maybe’ (18.4%), and only 2 said ‘No’ (2.6%). In Group 2, the responses were as
follows: 47 chose ‘Yes’ (61.8%), 22 chose ‘Maybe’ (29%), and 7 chose ‘No’ (9.2%).
The results showed that most participants found the privacy ratings are useful and
showing alternative apps made more feel the app useful. Moreover, the question
‘How would you assess the design of the tested app?’ was asked where participants
had to choose one of the following three options: ‘simple and clear’, ‘needs some
time to be understood’, ‘confusing and can be further improved’. Table 5.5 shows
that participants in Group 1 were slightly more positive than those in Group 2.
Yet, the majority in both groups believed that the design of the app was simple
and clear. Another related question is ‘Do you think you gained knowledge while
using the tested app?’. In Group 1 three workers answered that with ‘No’ to that,
10 were ‘Not sure’ and the rest said ‘Yes’ (82.9%), whereas in Group 2 eight said
‘No’, 14 ‘Not sure’ and the rest ‘Yes’ (63.2%). As a whole, participants in Group 1
seemed more positive about the knowledge acquisition question (i.e., the value on
privacy awareness enhancement).
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Table 5.5: Participants’ response to the question ‘How would you assess the design
of the tested app?’
Answers
Group Simple and Needs some time Confusing Can be
clear to be understood further improved
1 57 9 1 9
2 43 15 4 14
Sentiment Analysis of Participant’s Reviews
In this part, the sentiment analysis on participants’ reviews is presented. This kind
of analysis allows to understand whether users’ feedback about PAltRoid is positive
or negative. Using a very basic sentiment analysis package in ‘R’ which is called
(sentimentr), every participant’s review was given a positive/negative score, calcu-
lated by counting the number of positive and negative words in the text. Although
it is very simple, it was applied as a quick test to have a sense of the data dealt with.
For Group 1, 78.95% of the comments are positive and 21.05% are negative, while
72.86% are positive and 27.14 are negative at Group 2. Nevertheless, these figures
can be misleading and it has been required to do a further investigation using more
advanced sentiment analysis tools.
To approach the sentiment analysis more in depth, we decided to extract emotion-
related information from the reviews. Using a ‘WordEmotion Association Lexicon’
algorithm [140], the scores of eight emotions were generated for reviews from both
groups. Figure 5.7 highlights these emotion scores along with negative and positive
scores. Looking at negative emotions which are anger, disgust, fear, sadness and
the overall negative score, it can be seen that Group 2 scores higher than Group 1,
implying participants in Group 1 found the full version of the app less frustrated
than Group 2. The positive emotion scores are almost the same for both groups,
implying participants in both groups find the full and simplified versions of the app
equally useful. Nonetheless, we noticed that some emotion scores are misleading as
the meaning can be different in this context. For example, participants used a lot
of security related terms such as, ‘secure’, ‘protect’, ‘privacy’, etc., which eventually
affected the score and considered to be negative while they were meant to be prais-
ing the tested app. Considering the issues we encountered using automated tools,
we decided to conduct a manual sentiment analysis.
To conduct the manual sentiment analysis, two independent researchers, Dr.
Abdulaziz Alanazi from Department of Physics and Mr. Saleh Jalbi from Depart-
ment of Civil and Environmental Engineering, were recruited from the University of
Surrey. We recruited them using a broadcast message to several groups on ‘What-
sApp’ application. The two researchers were asked to identify positive and negative
phrases from participants’ feedback. Any phrases that are not either praising or
criticising the design of the app are considered neutral. This procedure was blindly
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done to avoid any unconscious bias, meaning that all comments were given to the re-
searchers without disclosing to which group they belong. After manually analysing
all participants’ feedback, it was confirmed that a majority of participants in both
groups have a positive feeling toward the PAltRoid app. Yet, participants in Group
1 (72.37% of them) is significantly more positive than those in Group 2 (62.68%).
15 participants in Group 2 gave negative comments and mostly they were wonder-
ing why there was no solution to low-scoring apps or how the scores are generated.
For Group 1, there were only 6 participants who negatively commented against the
tested app. Some of their comments were criticising the apps without a privacy
score, which is not directly related to the PAltRoid app. Some other participants
believed that the PAltRoid app needs to be more interactive such as working in the
background and dynamically monitor new apps installed and their activities. For
the rest of the reviews, there were 10 neutral comments in each group where the
opinions do not support a particular group.
5.6 Discussions
Experimental studies done in this study have proven the positive impact of PAltRoid
on participants’ privacy-related decisions. The feedback from participants shows
that most of them did pay attention to privacy warnings shown by the PAltRoid
app and took necessary actions. From participants’ responses to survey questions
about their background knowledge of privacy, it can be seen that several of them
were aware of privacy issues yet they still had privacy invasive apps on their devices.
The well-known privacy paradox between privacy and utility was also observed in
our data. For instance, we noticed that several participants had mentioned they
did not like the the app ‘Uber’ due to its very low privacy score (D), but they
could not give it up as its utility is very essential to them. In another case, some
participants explicitly asked for better alternative apps or good practices on how
to use apps with low privacy ratings. A few participants even asked for the user
interface to be further improved because they really liked the app and would like it
to be even more interactive, e.g., its working in the background to pop up privacy-
related messages whenever necessary. Pleasantly, two participants said they had
been looking for a similar app that works like an anti-virus app but for privacy
protection. Another useful thing to mention here is about negative comments from
Group 2. The majority of the participants were not happy with the design for one
reason – they felt they had been left without a solution (i,e., alternative apps), which
reflects the usefulness of the full version of the PAltRoid app and their willingness
to take actions when proper support is provided.
As far as we know, in the literature, there is no similar work that PAltRoid can
be directly compared with. However, the closest work to look at is PrivMetrics [3].
Although its main focus is not about improving the user interface like PAltRoid,
it has a way of displaying the result that may seem relevant. It investigates the
implications of third-party apps collecting users’ personal information and provide
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the user with relevant details to help users decide about their apps. PrivMetrics
utilises a different way of assessing apps’ privacy from PrivacyGrade, which is an
intrinsic difference. The focus of the presented work is to display related privacy
details in a new user interface to help users to make more informed privacy-related
decisions, so our work is independent of the privacy scoring algorithms used.
The remedy to apps with low privacy scores that PAltRoid offers is alternative
apps with better privacy scores and similar functionalities. The main goal here is
to nudge users towards safer privacy states and foster more risk-aware behaviours.
In order to make this remedy work in real world, these alternative apps must be
similar enough while having a better privacy score. This task proved not trivial. The
machine produced alternatives incur computational overheads and come with the
price of many false positives. That was the reason for us to go for a crowdsourcing-
based approach based on AlternativeTo, but it currently does not offer a large
number of alternative apps and not for all privacy invasive apps.
People might wonder why the crowdsourcing workers were paid less than lab-
based ones, or even than the minimum hourly wage. A short answer to that question
is because that what was given is the market price and even slightly higher. In such
platforms, users sign up to do tasks for a low pay. There are some reasons to explain
that. One of them is that this kind of jobs is not a full time one to compare it to the
minimum wage, and mostly workers do these tasks in their free times or as a second
source of income, despite the fact that most workers usually do multiple tasks in the
same hour. Doing a crowd sourcing task does not require attendance somewhere or
at sometime. This kind of situation affected how HIT requesters set the pay of their
advertised tasks. Moreover, that could be a reason why quality of this platform is
less than lab-based way. In a study that analysed AMT payroll [141], authors said:
“workers earned a median hourly wage of only ∼$2, and only 4% earned more than
$7.25/h” where they surveyed 2676 workers performing 3.8 million tasks. In this
presented experiment, workers from AMT were compensated with $5 for a total
work that does not exceed two hours on average. This decision has been made
after considering all above thoughts and for a very important reason which is avoid
over-motivating workers so their behaviour will not be tampered.
Lab-based and crowdsourcing based studies have their own pros and cons. For
that reason, we cannot replace each other. One of the challenging tasks to accom-
plish this work was the participants recruitment. The aim of acquiring a sufficiently
large number ended up with spending longer time than planned. Furthermore, the
nature of this study requires a period of time to allow users experiment the app in
order to extract their realistic behaviour, that also made it harder, despite that some
users were not keen because they were worried about their privacy on their personal
phones. This presented work was done mainly with the crowdsourcing based study,
with a very limited validation in a lab-based pilot. Nonetheless, it will be helpful to
conduct a proper lab-based study and more crowdsourcing based studies in future
(maybe using different platforms and other designs) to further validate the results
we obtained.
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There is one behaviour we observed in our study that arouse curiosity and
therefore future studies. As expressed earlier, there were many apps that do not
have a privacy rating in the PrivacyGrade dataset. It was planned that those apps
are not in the scope of this study, and so such apps were intentionally displayed at
the bottom of the list of all apps. Interestingly, some participants in both Group 1
and 2 decided to uninstall some of such apps. Since this phenomenon was discovered
only during the data analysis phase, we could not ask those participants about why
they took such action. We hypotheses that this may be some psychological effect
where people lean towards reducing unnecessary risks if they can be done easily
(e.g. those low-rated apps are not actually important or used much).
There are some aspects of the design of the PAltRoid app which limit what we
could have achieved in our study. Surely, one of them is not all apps are privacy
rated. The presented piece of work is dependent on what the PrivacyGrade dataset
offers but this dataset covers free apps only and it is quite outdated (last quarter
of 2016). However, it was the only available dataset we could obtain access during
our study. Some participants clearly expressed their annoyance of seeing apps with-
out a privacy score. Another limitation is the lack of sufficient user-friendly details
about how the privacy scores are calculated. The PAltRoid app’s user interface has
a section on ‘details’ tab that can show how PrivacyGrade calculates the ratings.
Yet, some participants were not satisfied with the information given and wanted
more in-depths explanation especially for apps with low privacy scores. They be-
lieved that knowing more about the reasons behind the low privacy scores will help
them to decide how to use the app in a more risk-aware manner such as blocking
individual permissions for access to some resources (which is now allowed under the
new dynamic permission model in newer version of Android OS).
The biggest challenge we encountered in our study is about identification of
right alternative apps satisfying both utility and privacy requirements. Machine
generated apps in this context can be similar but not always a better alternative.
You could provide ‘A’ taxi hire app as an alternative to ‘B’ but it might not work
in all countries or cities. Some apps are difficult to be replaced as they provide a
unique and excellent service (while being privacy invasive). Therefore, this part of
the design should be maintained properly. Otherwise, users will gradually lose trust
of the proposed design. In relevance to this limitation, providing a download page
or apk file for alternatives is not easy. Again, not all apps are available at all Google
Play markets. Offering a cure name without providing it can be very frustrating.
5.7 Future Work
While working on PAltRoid there are several identified future ideas. Some of them
are to improve the current design and others are a different way of displaying privacy
related information. This section reports all planned future work.
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5.7.1 Improvement on Current Design
In regard to improving the current design, there are some ideas built based on re-
sults and participants’ feedback. First of all, in case more details can be obtained
about these rating, they will be added to the design where users can see them. On
the other hand, alternative apps require similar attention where they need to be
updated directly from AlternativeTo. Its API is currently unsupported. Nonethe-
less, one idea can be more straightforward. The aim here is to allow users add their
own suggestions to the alternative section which will be connected to the server.
Moreover, users will have an up-vote and down-vote buttons to improve current
displayed similar apps. When PAltRoid becomes available at application stores,
the hope is that users will help in enriching the data. Applying human-in-the-loop
(HITL) approach will naturally make this issue disappear.
5.7.2 New Ideas for Different Design Interfaces
On light of result from this Chapter, it has been planned to design different interfaces
to communicate both types of subjective and objective ratings. There are many
different ways of visualising privacy scores, and here we explain few of them as
examples. One of the planned goals is to use a different way of displaying objective
privacy scores than PAltRoid. Apps privacy ratings will be displayed in a 2-D
colourful bar chart. This design is meant to present a comprehensive sense of the
privacy level on user’s mobile. This will be achieved by showing the chart on one
screen view. Each bar will represent a privacy level of one app and can be clicked.
That will allow to show details about the rating and alternatives. With more user
studies on current and future proposed designs, it will be possible to confirm which
design is more efficient and in what context.
Another idea is to make use of subjective user ratings and comments on apps
publicly available on different app stores. The subjective information about user
apps will be visually displayed in a friendly interface. For the reason that comments
and feedback are going to be lengthy and need to be validated, the plan is to do
an analytic processing on the data. Analysis will involve contextualising privacy
related details from the comments. Also, there are some thoughts to make the
app more intelligent to make its data personalised by learning from user usage of it.
Ultimately, user studies will explain how users perceive different types of ratings and
variant design interfaces, which is believed to be useful in improving user experience
with mobile apps in terms of privacy.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter presents PAltRoid, a system for helping users to make more informed
privacy decisions about mobile apps on on their mobile devices. It was imple-
mented as a mobile app that communicates privacy scores of mobile apps in a
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user-friendly interface. It also comes with better alternative apps to installed apps
with low privacy ratings, as potential solutions for replacing the problematic apps.
A crowdsourcing-based and a pilot lab-based user-studies have been conducted to
assess the efficiency of this presented software. The experiments provided evidence
that participants’ decisions were improved with the help of the PAltRoid app.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter gives an overview of the entire works presented in this PhD thesis.
Moreover, it draws some planned future work and possible research directions.
6.1 Overview
In this thesis, the mobile privacy leakage problem has been investigated to enhance
user experience in this context. In the beginning, a review on the background
of this problem has been presented to comprehend current related issues in order
to determine possible solutions (Chapter 2). It is obvious that the research has
contributed a variety of technical remedies to this problem. While reproducing some
of the related work from research community, namely TaintDroid and ScrubDroid,
we realised that there is a need for a benchmarking system that can evaluate privacy
protection tools in run-time.
To fill that gap, PPAndroid-Benchmarker has been developed for analysing mo-
bile privacy detection and protection apps (Chapter 3). That will help developers
and users to know where they stand in the middle of variant provided privacy pro-
tection tools. We evaluated our system by testing against 165 tools gathered from
research and industry. We also learned that real-time dynamic monitoring tools
perform better than others, as they operate with the underlying operating system.
This approach can be very challenging and often impossible for the end-user to
apply as it needs an advanced technical level. Therefore, we decided to take a step
back and see how users choose their apps, which are the source of threat on users’
privacy. That will help to know what affect their decision making process.
No matter solutions are provided on the technical side, users are always prone to
make mistakes. Therefore, the best procedure, as author believes, is to help educate
the user in making better calls. As an action towards understanding the users, a
user perceived trust of subjective and objective ratings of mobile apps privacy has
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been studied (Chapter 4). The author came to know that the subjective judgement
and the behavioural pattern of a user affect the decision of trusting subjective or
objective rating of apps. Thus, it has been decided to investigate the possibility of
supporting user decisions to be more privacy-aware.
In Chapter 5, the author has shown how PAltRoid helps to rise the privacy
awareness of the user. Communicating privacy details and providing better alter-
native apps can help users in making more privacy-related decisions. The interface
design can be an efficient approach to deliver privacy warnings about installed apps.
PAltRoid uses a colourful horizontal stacked bar chart to show the privacy level of
each app on the phone and the apps are ordered based on privacy score from weak
(top of screen) to strong (bottom of screen). This way of displaying information is
purposely made to increase users attention of privacy threats. Additionally, each
threatening app will be offered a possible improvement when alternatives are taken,
when possible. The experimental studies done on this app have shown the partici-
pants positive interaction towards privacy-aware decisions.
6.2 Selected Future Work
This section outlines some future research directions that are planned to follow up
in the privacy research of mobile computing. Some of the future directions are
about extra ideas for further improving what have been done in this PhD work,
while others are identified gaps in the wider area of research.
6.2.1 Improving PPAndroid-Benchmarker
In Chapter 2, we explained the future plans to improve PPAndroid-Benchmarker
which can be summarised as follows. One component to add is the Test Apps
Generator. This component will help to benchmark static analysis tools. The goal
is to allow generation of apps with different privacy leakage capabilities and different
leaking methods. By using the source code of the Benchmarker App and the user’s
descriptions of the test apps wanted, this component will generate a number of apps
for feeding into the tools to be tested.
Another component to add is the Reconfigurability Engine. This will allow 1)
adding and removing sources and sinks; 2) adding and reconfiguring more informa-
tion processing operations and tricks against static and dynamic analysis techniques.
Furthermore, we are also planning to add the Off-line Analyser. This aims at
producing more visualised results to ease understanding of the results. In addition,
this component can be designed to generate a score of the tested app to give a sense
of the privacy protection level.
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6.2.2 Users Perceived Trust of Mobile Apps’ Privacy Ratings: More
User Studies
We believe that a lab-based study needed to confirm results from the crowdsourcing
based studies reported in Chapter 4. In addition, further investigation is required
to fully comprehend users’ perception of app privacy ratings, and how they form
their decisions. Future studies in this area should consider to use realistic apps and
possibly real subjective and objective ratings to enrich evidence of the findings.
Another possible direction is to extend current user studies in this filed. We
aim to study different factors that could impact users perceived trust. Some of the
factors that we plan to study is the use of strong wording in apps description, as
well as brand names. We would like to see how such factors influence users’ choices
of mobile apps.
6.2.3 Extending PAltRoid
As mentioned in Chapter 5, several plans have been set to improve the current
app. Firstly, we aim to make privacy scores and offered alternative apps are up-to-
date by directly fetching data from the source websites. Also, we hope to provide
more useful information behind the privacy scores to help users understand how
to use their apps and why some apps are more privacy invasive. Furthermore, we
plan to add in human-in-the-loop (HITL) feature into PAltRoid to allow users to
add their own suggested alternative apps and vote on current provided ones (i.e.,
incorporating a service similar into AlternativeTo to PAltRoid).
More user interface design and features are also a possible future work to help
achieve the same goal of PAltRoid. There are many other ways to display privacy
scores and the alternative apps. For instance, the 1-D bar charts used can be
extended to 2-D or even 3-D to show a more comprehensive view of the privacy
levels of all installed apps (e.g., showing the privacy scores of all installed app as
a 2-D image with different colour patches, where each colour patch represents an
installed app). Besides that, another feature is planned to utilise subjective user
ratings and comments of apps already existing on app stores. Such data can be
displayed in a user-friendly way to inform users about other how other users see an
app with a bad privacy score and all the alternatives, e.g., the comments may be
shown as a word cloud so that the most important keywords can be communicated
to the user and more detailed information can be revealed if the user clicks on a
particular word. More user studies will be needed to find out which user interface
can engage users better to make more informed privacy-related decisions.
6.2.4 Wider Directions
It has been remarked that many privacy protection tools use a limited and static
list of information sources, leaving other sources unmonitored. Among those missed
sources, some are user specific such as files storing the user’s personal information
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and other sensitive data. We will study how to apply machine learning tools to
identify such personalised information sources that deserve protecting. This likely
requires a human-in-the-loop approach as the learning process has to be helped by
the user himself/herself.
In addition, almost all mobile privacy leakage detection tools simply produce a
notification for every detected leakage and leave further actions to end users who
often feel annoyed or confused on how to respond. So there is a need to improve the
user’s overall experience from detection to further actions against privacy invasive
apps. There is a clear gap here and much less work has been done on helping users
make final decisions after privacy leakage attempts are detected. We have developed
some ideas in this direction, and two of such ideas are to develop “smarter” filters to
show users fewer notifications and to rank such notifications in a more user-relevant
(i.e., personalised) manner. We plan to employ machine learning techniques to learn
from users’ feedback of notifications to optimise the “smarter” filters and to provide
more useful tips to users for further actions against potential privacy leakages.
Lastly, little work has been done on understanding how leaked personal infor-
mation is actually used by receivers of such information in the real world. We
expect such information can be collected through several useful techniques such as
honeytokens and digital watermarking, which can allow tracking leaked data along
the information usage chain. This direction has a flavour of active forensics so can
potentially help both mobile device users and law enforcement agencies.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Participant Information Sheet
In this appendix, the PIS of the lab-based study followed by PIS of the crowdsourcing-
based study can be found, respectively.




Version 4 - 13/06/2018 
Study Title: Improving notification and user engagement in privacy-related decisions 
via new mobile user interface designs 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Title of Study: Improving notification and user engagement in privacy-
related decisions via new mobile user interface designs 
 
University of Surrey Ref:  
 
Ethics Reference Number: UEC/2017/074/FEPS 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Introduction 
 
My name is Saeed Alqahtani, a PhD student at the University of Surrey/ 
Department of Computer Science. I would like to invite you to take part in this 
research project which forms part of my PhD research. You should only 
participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in 
any way but you must be a user of an Android device. Before you decide 
whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. 
Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of the research is to evaluate the effectiveness of a mobile app 
user interface, in terms of notification and user engagement in privacy-related 
decisions. 
 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You have been invited to take part in this study to collect your view and opinion 
on one of the mobile app user interfaces in this experiment. At least 20 
participants to be recruited for each mobile app interface. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No, you do not have to participate. There will be no adverse consequences in 
terms of your legal rights and your care / treatment / employment status / 
education, if you decide not to participate or decide to withdraw at a later stage. 
You can withdraw your participation at any time. You can request for your data 
to be withdrawn up to one month after your participation without giving a reason 
and without prejudice. 
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If you withdraw from the study, data which is not identifiable will be retained 
because we cannot trace this information back to you. Identifiable data will be 
deleted.  No further data would be collected nor any other research procedures 
carried out on or in relation to you. 
 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to attend 2 sessions on the crowd-
sourcing platform (Amazon MTurk/ Figure-Eight) of no more than 1 hour 
duration each.  At the first task, you will be given this information sheet to keep. 
Also, you will be asked to install and use a mobile app that will be provided to 
you for one week, which you need to access once a day at minimum. 
 
On the second task, you will be invited to come back to uninstall the mobile app 
and provide us with your feedback and opinion on the mobile app used and 
your personal experiences in using similar apps by filling an electronic survey. 
The second visit will take place after one week of the first task. 
 
The mobile app will only collect a list of your installed apps only (and not their 
usage) and send it to a secure server that I manage for data analysis. No 
personal or other information is collected at any time during the experiment. 
You are only required to access the app once a day during one week. 
 
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part? 
 
You will gain monetary compensation which is £10 for attendance at each 
session. That means, if you attend both sessions you will be compensated by 
£20 However, you need to keep the app in your mobile for one week, and 
access it at least once a day. Furthermore, you will hopefully increase your 
privacy awareness on mobile devices. 
 
 
Who is Handling My Data? 
 
The University of Surrey, as the sponsor, will act as the ‘Data Controller’ for this 
study. We will process your personal data on behalf of the controller and are 
responsible for looking after your information and using it properly. This 
information will include your (installed apps’ names, gender, age, nationality 
and mother language), which is regarded as ‘personal data’. We will use this 
information as explained in the ‘What is the purpose of the study’ section above. 
 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
What is said in the interview and/or data collected is regarded strictly 
confidential and will be held securely until the research is finished. All data for 
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analysis will be anonymised. In reporting on the research findings, I will not 
reveal the names of any participants or the organisation where you work. 
 
 
 
All information gathered will be held for long-term storage on University secure 
servers. Hard files will be kept in locked cabinets within the Department of 
Computer Science  
No identifiable data will be accessed by anyone other than me (Saeed 
Alqahtani), members of the research team (Dr Nouf Aljaffan and Dr Shujun Li) 
and authorised personal from the University and regulatory authorities for 
monitoring purposes. Anonymity of the material will be protected by members 
of the research team. 
 
No data will be able to be linked back to you. You will not be identified in any 
reports/publications resulting from this research and those reading them will not 
know who has contributed to it / with your permission we would like to use 
verbatim quotation/audio recordings in reports. 
 
 
What will happen to my data? 
 
As a publicly-funded organisation, we have to ensure when we use identifiable 
personal information from people who have agreed to take part in research, this 
data is processed fairly and lawfully and is done so on the basis of public 
interest This means that when you agree to take part in this research study, we 
will use your data in the ways needed to conduct and analyse the research 
study. 
 
All project data related to the administration of the project, (e.g. consent form) 
will be held for at least 6 years and all research data for at least 10 years in 
accordance with University policy. Your personal data will be held and 
processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with current data 
protection regulations. 
 
Your rights to access, change or move your information are limited, as we 
need to manage your information in specific ways in order for the research to 
be reliable and accurate. If you decide to withdraw your data from the study, 
we may not be able to do so. We will keep the information about you that we 
have already obtained. To safeguard your rights, we will use the minimum 
personally-identifiable information possible. 
 
You can find out more about how we use your information: 
https://www.surrey.ac.uk/information-management/data-protection and/or by 
contacting dataprotection@surrey.ac.uk 
 
 
 
What if I want to complain about the way data is handled? 
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If you wish to raise a complaint on how we have handled your personal data, 
you can contact our Data Protection Officer Mr James Newby who will 
investigate the matter. If you are not satisfied with our response or believe we 
are processing your personal data in a way that is not lawful you can complain 
to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) (https://ico.org.uk/). 
 
For contact details of the University of Surrey’s Data Protection Officer please 
visit: https://www.surrey.ac.uk/information-management/data-protection 
 
 
How is the project being funded? 
 
The project is being funded by King Saud, Saudi Arabia and the research is 
organized by the University of Surrey. 
This study has been given a favourable ethical opinion by the University 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
We expect that the outcomes of the research will be published as a research 
paper. 
 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please 
contact me using the following contact details: 
 
Saeed Alqahtani (Researcher) 
Email: s.alqahtani@surrey.ac.uk 
Phone: 01483 686085 
 
Prof Liqun Chen (Supervisor) 
Email: liqun.chen@surrey.ac.uk 
Phone: 01483 684615 
 
 
Prof Shujun Li (Supervisor) 
Email: shujun.li@surrey.ac.uk 
Phone: 01483 68 6057 
 
Dr Helen Treharne (Head of Department) 
Email: h.treharne@surrey.ac.uk 
Phone: 01483 68 3161 
 
 
 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
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Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt 
with during the course of the study will be addressed; please contact Saeed 
Alqahtani, Principal Investigator via s.alqahtani@surrey.ac.uk in the first 
instance, his supervisor Dr Shujun Li via shujun.Li@surrey.ac.uk, or Head of 
Department Dr Helen Treharne viah.treharne@surrey.ac.uk. 
 
The University has in force the relevant insurance policies which apply to this 
study.  If you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of the 
way you have been treated during the course of this study then you should 
follow the instructions given above. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part 
in this research. 
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Interview Schedule
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Appendix C
Lab-Based Study
Questionnaires
In this appendix, the lab-based study questionnaire of Group 1 followed by the
questionnaire of Group 2 can be found, respectively.
Your Feedback on VAndroidRater
In this survey, we would like to collect your subjective view on different aspects of the tested mobile 
app. Furthermore, to help understand and analyse results of this lab study, we need to obtain your 
experience and background around privacy in mobile devices.
Please be aware that we will not collect any personal information that can be linked back to you, and 
all private details will be kept anonymous.
We would like to express our gratitude for taking part of this study and filling this questionnaire. 
If you have any questions, please contact the research coordinator: 
Saeed Alqahtani 
Lecturer, Taibah University, Saudi Arabia 
PhD Student, Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey, UK 
Email: s.alqahtani@surrey.ac.uk
*Required
Demographic Questions
1. Age: *
Mark only one oval.
 18-24
 25-34
 35-44
 45-54
 55-64
 >=65
2. Gender *
Mark only one oval.
 Female
 Male
 Others
3. Your nationality/nationalities *
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas)
 
 
 
 
 
4. Your mother language(s) *
you can enter more than one (separate them
with commas)
5. Highest degree or level of education *
Mark only one oval.
 PhD degree or equivalent
 Master's degree or equivalent
 Bachelor's degree or equivalent
 Others
Background Questions
6. Are you aware of privacy issues that mobile apps can cause? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Not Sure
7. Please name some mobile app threats on privacy:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas)
 
 
 
 
 
8. Do you use any mobile privacy protection apps? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
9. If previous question is 'Yes', name the protection app/apps you use:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas)
 
 
 
 
 
10. Please write optional free-formatted comments on how to improve privacy on mobile
devices.
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment of The Mobile App Design
11. Do you think the tested app is useful? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Maybe
12. Please write why you think VAndroidRater is/isn't useful. *
 
 
 
 
 
13. How would you assess the design of the tested app: *
Mark only one oval.
 Easy and clear
 Needs some time to be understood
 Confusing
 Can be further improved
14. Do you think you gained knowledge while using the tested app? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Not sure
15. Did you feel that you need to remove/substitute apps with low privacy scores? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Not sure
16. Name apps that you substituted/uninstalled due to their problematic privacy scores:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas) leave empty if none
 
 
 
 
 
Powered by
17. Name apps that you considered substituting/uninstalling them due to their low privacy
rating:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas) leave empty if none
 
 
 
 
 
18. How relevant are the provided alternative apps? *
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5
Irrelevant Relevant
19. What is your general feedback on the provided alternative apps? *
 
 
 
 
 
20. Please tell us how VAndroidRater design interface can be further improved.
 
 
 
 
 
21. Please write a free-formatted comments if you want to share any ideas/opinion about
VAndroidRater app.
 
 
 
 
 
Your Feedback on VAndroidRater
In this survey, we would like to collect your subjective view on different aspects of the tested mobile 
app. Furthermore, to help understand and analyse results of this lab study, we need to obtain your 
experience and background around privacy in mobile devices.
Please be aware that we will not collect any personal information that can be linked back to you, and 
all private details will be kept anonymous.
We would like to express our gratitude for taking part of this study and filling this questionnaire. 
If you have any questions, please contact the research coordinator: 
Saeed Alqahtani 
Lecturer, Taibah University, Saudi Arabia 
PhD Student, Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey, UK 
Email: s.alqahtani@surrey.ac.uk
*Required
Demographic Questions
1. Age: *
Mark only one oval.
 18-24
 25-34
 35-44
 45-54
 55-64
 >=65
2. Gender *
Mark only one oval.
 Female
 Male
 Others
3. Your nationality/nationalities *
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas)
 
 
 
 
 
4. Your mother language(s) *
you can enter more than one (separate them
with commas)
5. Highest degree or level of education *
Mark only one oval.
 PhD degree or equivalent
 Master's degree or equivalent
 Bachelor's degree or equivalent
 Others
Background Questions
6. Are you aware of privacy issues that mobile apps can cause? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Not Sure
7. Please name some mobile app threats on privacy:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas)
 
 
 
 
 
8. Do you use any mobile privacy protection apps? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
9. If previous question is 'Yes', name the protection app/apps you use:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas)
 
 
 
 
 
10. Please write optional free-formatted comments on how to improve privacy on mobile
devices.
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment of The Mobile App Design
11. Do you think the tested app is useful? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Maybe
12. Please write why you think VAndroidRater is/isn't useful. *
 
 
 
 
 
13. How would you assess the design of the tested app: *
Mark only one oval.
 Easy and clear
 Needs some time to be understood
 Confusing
 Can be further improved
14. Do you think you gained knowledge while using the tested app? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Not sure
15. Did you feel that you need to remove/substitute apps with low privacy scores? *
Mark only one oval.
 Yes
 No
 Not sure
16. Name apps that you substituted/uninstalled due to their problematic privacy scores:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas) leave empty if none
 
 
 
 
 
Powered by
17. Name apps that you considered substituting/uninstalling them due to their low privacy
rating:
you can enter more than one (separate them with commas) leave empty if none
 
 
 
 
 
18. Please tell us how VAndroidRater design interface can be further improved.
 
 
 
 
 
19. Please write a free-formatted comments if you want to share any ideas/opinion about
VAndroidRater app.
 
 
 
 
 

143
Appendix D
Advertising Poster

145
Appendix E
Electronic Survey Design
Survey Instructions (Click to collapse) 
 Thank you for taking part of this study. You are here because you have 
successfully completed the first HIT of this experiment. 
 The purpose of this survey is to collect your subjective view on different aspects of the 
tested mobile app, PAltRoid. Furthermore, to help understand and analyse results of 
this lab study, we need to obtain your experience and background around privacy in 
mobile devices. 
 Please be aware that we will not collect any personal information that can be linked 
back to you, and all private details will be kept anonymous. 
 Please take your time to answer the questions below. Your response is highly 
appreciated as it will contribute to the improvement of PAltRoid design.   
Demographic Questions 
 
1. What is your age?  
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
>=65 
2. What is your gender? 
Female 
Male 
Prefer not to say 
3. Your nationality/nationalities: 
 
4. What is your mother language(s)? 
 
5. What is your highest degree of level of education? 
 
PhD degree or equivalent
Master's degree or equivalent
Bachelor's degree or equivalent
Others  
Background Questions 
 
1. Are you aware of privacy issues that mobile apps can cause? 
Yes
No
Not sure  
2. Please name some mobile app threats on privacy: 
 
3. Do you use any mobile privacy protection apps? 
Yes
No
Not sure  
4. If previous question is 'Yes', name the protection app/apps you use: 
 
5. Please write free-formatted comments on how to improve privacy on mobile devices. 
 
Assessment of the Tested Mobile App 
 
1. Do you think the tested app is useful? 
Yes
No
Maybe  
2. Please write why you think the app is/isn't useful. 
 
3. How would you assess the design of the tested app? 
Easy and clear
Needs some time to be understood
Confusing
Can be further improved  
4. Do you think you gained knowledge while using the tested app? 
Yes
No
Not sure  
5. Did you feel that you need to remove/substitute apps with low privacy scores? 
Yes
No
Not sure  
6. Name apps that you substituted/uninstalled due to their problematic privacy scores: 
  
7. Name apps that you considered substituting/uninstalling them due to their low privacy rating: 
 
8. How relevant are the provided alternative apps?  
Very 
Irrelevant 
Irrelevant Not Sure Similar 
Very 
Similar 
     
9. Give a general feedback on the provided alternative apps, please: 
 10. Please tell us how the app interface design can be further improved: 
 
11. You can use this space to write any free-formatted comments if you want to share any 
ideas/opinion about the tested app, this survey or/and the HIT in general:  
 
12. Are you satisfied with the total amount paid for both HITs in this experiment? 
Very 
Unhappy 
Somehow 
Unhappy 
Neither 
or Not 
Sure 
Somehow 
Satisfied 
Very 
Satisfied 
     
 
Submit
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